Buddhist Narratives of the Great Debates

Western scholars have written on the theory of Buddhist argumentation. They have also analyzed examples of arguments found in philosophical and polemical writing. However, little has been written to date about what might have transpired when Buddhists and their opponents met in face-to-face debates in classical India. Drawing on Chinese and Tibetan historical and biographical writings about famous Indian debates, this essay analyzes the structure and conventions of these accounts as a literary form. While it is difficult to assess the historicity of particular narratives, an analysis of this literature as a whole gives us clues about what might have occured when Indian scholars faced their adversaries in live debates. These sources provide us with a picture of the etiquette, rules of engagement, and strategies that may have been used in such encounters. They also suggest what constituted defeat in ancient Indian verbal contests, and they point to some of the real-political and material benefits of victory. The essay ends by reflecting on the function of these narratives vis-à-vis Tibetan Buddhist scholastic identity.

Metaphor and Maṇḍala in Shingon Buddhist Theology

Buddhist maṇḍala that are made of colored sand or are painted on cloth have been well represented in Asian art circles in the West. Discussions of the role that they can play in stimulating religious contemplation or even as sacred icons charged with power have also appeared in English scholarship. The metaphorical meaning of the term maṇḍala, however, is less commonly referenced. This paper discusses how the founder of the Japanese school of Shingon Buddhism, the Buddhist monk Kūkai of the ninth century, uses this term in a metaphorical sense to convey the transformed nature of awareness that is the ultimate goal of Buddhist practice. Emphasis is also placed on the importance of metaphorical thinking to the religious path of transformation itself.

Paleo-Compatibilism and Buddhist Reductionism

Paleo-compatibilism is the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is not incompatible with determinism about the factors relevant to moral assessment, since the claim that we are free and the claim that the psychophysical elements are causally determined are true in distinct and incommensurable ways. This is to be accounted for by appealing to the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth developed by Buddhist Reductionists. Paleo-compatibilists hold that the illusion of incompatibilism only arises when we illegitimately mix two distinct vocabularies, one concerned with persons, the other concerned with the parts to which persons are reducible. I explore the view, its roots in Buddhist Reductionism, and its prospects.

Toward an Anatomy of Mourning: Discipline,Devotion and Liberation in a Freudian-Buddhist Framework

In this essay I first articulate what I take to be an influential and for the most part persuasive model in the western psychoanalytic tradition that is a response to tragic loss, namely, the one that we find in Freud’s little essay entitled ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917). I then use a well-known Buddhist folk tale about the plight of a young woman named Kisagotami to underscore central elements from Buddhist psychology on the subject of suffering that is a consequence of the loss of a young mother’s only child. Fortified by both traditions, I gather together the ingredients for a cross-cultural mental model that serves to explain and to justify as healthy a specific kind of response to a specific form of suffering, namely, the loss of ones’ loved one. I arrive at this model by asking a number of specific questions of both traditions. For instance, what constitutes a non-pathological response to this kind of suffering? What state of mind represents the cessation of such suffering? Is preoccupation with the dead beloved a way of escaping the fact that the person is dead? Is this a form of ignorance that needs to be removed? Is it a form of moral deficiency? Might certain forms and contexts of ignorance, in effect, put one on a path to enlightenment?     

“乐”——中国人的主观幸福感与传统文化中的幸福观

中国人的幸福感重视人际与集体的和谐, 重视精神的感受。这样的幸福感特点很大程度上受传统文化中幸福观的影响。儒、道、佛三大流派各有自己独特的幸福观：儒家既承认父母俱存、兄弟无故的现实感性之乐, 又强调追求仁义的理性之乐; 道家提倡超越现实的顺应自然之乐和祸福相依的幸福观; 佛家则讲求进入涅槃和普渡众生之乐。各家在追求理想人格、追求审美的过程中, 各自发展又互相融合, 形成对中国人幸福感影响深远的三大幸福观：(1)不以个人情感为重点而代之以人际关系和社会和谐的集体主义幸福观; (2)幸福感与道德感、审美感相连; (3)追求理性之乐。     

The advice of the wise

The demand for happiness advice is vast and many different thinkers have offered their views. This special issue presents a cross section of happiness counseling through the ages and considers the advice by classic Chinese philosophers, Epicurus, Schopenhauer, as well as contemporary New Age thinkers and self-help authors. The papers follow three leading questions: 1) What is recommended for leading a happy life? 2) How does this advice fit in the worldview of the author and into a social, cultural and historical context? 3) Are the recommendations in line with what is known about the conditions of happiness? There are common themes in advice for a happy life but also much contradiction, and some honoured philosophers offer advice that can harm happiness if it is taken to heart by present day readers.     

天然函昰禅师的悟道因缘及其禅教并重的宗趣观

天然函昰禅师是明末清初岭南曹洞宗的高僧,在他的弘化下,曹洞宗风大振,僧俗奔凑如云。本文从函孟禅师的悟道因缘及其阐教并、重的宗趣观入手,说明他之所以能在明末清初之际摄受数千僧俗,乃是因其具有深彻的悟境和圆满的见地,非人们所谓“以忠孝节义垂示及门”所能范围。     

Pluralism and Ambivalence in the Evolution of Morality

Much good work has been done on the evolution of human morality by focusing on how “selfish genes” can give rise to altruistic human beings. A richer research program is needed, however, to take into account the ambivalence of naturally evolved biopsychological motivators and the historical pluralism of human morality in religious systems. Such a program is described here. A first step is to distinguish the ultimate cause of natural selection from proximate causes that are the results of natural selection. Next, some proximate causes are suggested as possible conditions of biological and emotional valuing as well as of customary social morality and individual rational ethical thought. Finally, different moral perspectives of Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity are briefly presented in order to illustrate how one might inquire about the selection of a variety of biopsychological and cultural proximate causes that enable the evolution of a plurality of religious moral systems.     

论中国佛教伦理的理论基础

中国佛教伦理的理论基础可从佛教伦理内涵的旨趣、价值、自觉三个方面得到论证,即佛教伦理旨趣的根据是其人生解脱论,佛教伦理价值的基石是其因果报应论,佛教伦理自觉的本原是其心性论。     

陆九渊佛教观考论

本文尝试研究儒士与佛教关系的另一视角,即由儒士对佛教的认知、理解与评价去考察儒士思想与佛教的关系。由这个角度考察陆九渊佛教观的结论是：佛教并非天生是异端;佛教既有不足,也有其独到的价值;在义利关系、出世入世和生死观等方面,佛教与儒学具有根本性差异;陆九渊思想特征不是阳儒阴释,而是儒体佛用;陆九渊佛教观透显着于当今学术研究具有深刻启示的多重信息。