朱熹对邵雍先天象数学的继承和发展

朱熹从探究《易》之本义的角度,继承和发展了邵雍的先天象数学,提出了《周易》本来是卜筮之书的思想,主张“三圣易”和经传相分,探析了河图、洛书及其关系,进而对伏羲画卦的内在机制以及大衍之数五十的来源做了阐释,从而不仅为象数易学增添了新内容,而且为学人提供了一种合理的解《易》方法。     

朱震卦变思想解析

卦变说是朱震易学思想中体系最为庞杂、但却最能体现其作为象数派易学家的部分。他对“卦变”做出了多种解读,提出凡是由一卦演变出另一卦及有关意义的思想,皆可视为卦变。虽然其中难免有牵强附会之处,但其内在的思维理路,就是试图以“变”为主体内容,以卦变为基础,统率易学中的相关体例。     

朱熹论《太玄》

本文梳理了《朱子语类》中对《太玄》的评价。朱子基于儒学正统立场,对扬雄的拟《易》之作《太玄》的主要方面都进行了评说。朱子认为扬雄的模仿不足道,《太玄》高处乃是道家之学;其以三起数,失《易》之本义;《太玄》只是在作历,其数零星凑补得可笑,而其卦气有气无朔,是没有道理的;且《太玄》的“爻位”吉凶太笃定,把《易》变动不居之理说死了。总之,朱子认为,扬雄虽费力安排,但《太玄》的内容和形式都不足道。     

道器之辨中的三种范式及其转换

道器之辨在中国哲学发展史上形成了三种理论范式并实现了范式转换,即从汉唐宇宙生成论范式下的"道先器后"说转换为宋明本体论范式下的"道体器用"说,进而在明清之际转换为生存论范式下的"治器显道"说,而生存论范式开启了人文主义视野和趋时更新的开放价值取向。     

真可论《易》--《易经》"佛经化"的一个实例

佛教自汉代传入中国后便不断地中国化,至宋明以后,中国化的佛教便完全成熟。作为成熟的中国化佛教的一个重要标志,便是佛教僧人将中国本土经典“佛经化”,以佛教的道理来诠释中国本土经典,形成了中国佛教思想史上的一个新运动,作为这一新运动的一个典型实例,晚明时期的高僧真可将《易经》“佛经化”,用佛理来诠释《易经》。通过这种诠释,真可不但从总的方面论述了《易经》中所蕴含的佛理,更是深入到《易经》六十四卦的具体卦例中去探索佛理,向人们昭示了《易经》的卦爻逻辑在表达佛理方面所具的特有功能,并使人们得以借助易理来通晓佛理。     

再论退溪易学

文章辨析了退溪与朱熹在对待《周易》“经传关系”问题上的差异,特别强调:退溪并不尊崇朱子 易为卜筮而作的观点,他坚定的实行经传合观,也与朱子在经传分合上犹疑不定的态度大相径庭。朱子 易为卜筮而作的观点,在当时或以后并未得到很多人的认同。     

《易序》作者略考

<易序>为朱熹著作<周易本义>中的一篇序文,但此文也被收入程颐的<程子遗文>及程颐的弟子周行己的<浮沚集>中.谁是<易序>的真正作者,众说纷纭.本文从文献的角度和思想的关联上断定朱熹是这篇序文的真正作者.     

Desire: The unfolding of the other

The Confucian classic the Liji 禮記 defines ‘desire’ as ‘the arousal of nature’. In line with this classical definition, Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724–1777) sees desire as human nature in activation. However, while the Liji ascribes human deceits and debauchery to the susceptibility of human nature, Dai Zhen speaks highly of its responsiveness and receptivity. This article discusses Dai Zhen’s conception of desire and argues that Dai Zhen distinguishes himself from other Confucian moral thinkers by bringing to light the dimension of the Other in addressing the issue of desire. As the Confucian tradition has long been disturbed by an anxiety to keep desire in check, Dai Zhen draws our attention to how to cultivate the affective faculty inherent in human nature to develop our sensitivity to the needs and desires of others, especially those of the widow, the orphan, the solitary, the sick, and the weak.     

Shu and zhong as the virtue of the Golden Rule: a Confucian contribution to contemporary virtue ethics

I aim to show how Confucian philosophy can contribute to the contemporary resurgence of virtue ethics education by arguing that it has the resource to address a lacuna in Aristotelian ethics. Aristotelian ethics, which is arguably the main resource of contemporary virtue ethics, lacks a virtue that corresponds to the notion of loving each person as one’s self or the Golden Rule. To be more precise, Aristotelian ethics has no virtue about loving all people as one’s self, although philia comes close but is precisely limited because it lacks universality. However, I believe that Dai Zhen’s interpretation of the Confucian virtues of shu and zhong does have this universal scope which philia lacks. For Dai, the ground for loving another is not any characteristic that a particular group of people have in common, such as, in the case of philia, being virtuous. Rather, the ground is universal human nature itself.     

朱子易学之哲学的分析——通过《易学启蒙》理解"理"的"穷极"义

本文通过对朱熹<易学启蒙>的分析,考察作为象数易学和义理易学的基础的先天易学和后天易学的基本原理和相互关系,由此进一步研究作为象数易学和义理易学的共同基础的"理"的意味.朱熹的易学不是在象数和义理哪一个的立场上对两种易学的综合,而是试图确立易学的基础,进而把对理的意味的系统的解释和说明作为最终目标.