Phronesis, Poetics, and Moral Creativity

At least since Aristotle, phronesis (practical wisdom) and poetics (making or creating) have been understood as essentially different activities, one moral the other (in itself) non-moral. Today, if anything, this distinction is sharpened by a Romantic association of poetics with inner subjective expression. Recent revivals of Aristotelian ethics sometimes allow for poetic dimensions of ethics, but these are still separated from practical wisdom per se. Through a fresh reading of phronesis in the French hermeneutical phenomenologist Paul Ricoeur, I argue that phronesis should be viewed as at least in part poetic at its very core. That is, phronesis deals with the fundamentally tragic human situation of moral incommensurability, and it responds to this by making or creating new moral meaning. Such a poetics of practical wisdom helps phronesis stand up to significant and important critiques made of it by a range of modernists and post-modernists, pointing a way forward for some important contemporary moral debates.     

Metamorphoses of the Ideal

For Evald Il’enkov, philosophy is a science of the ideal. Il’enkov spent his entire life researching the logical and historical metamorphoses of the ideal. In general, he considered the ideal as a relation between at least two different things, one of which adequately represents the essence of another. At various times Il’enkov explored quite a few ideal phenomena: forms of value and forms of property, personality and talent, language, music and fine arts, not to mention numerous categories of dialectics, ethics, and aesthetics. The article also addresses the problem: which of these phenomena is the most typical and adequate form of being of the ideal?.     

浅谈循证医学与POCT的关系

分别介绍了循证医学和Point Of Care Test(POCT)的概念及各自的特点,并从唯物辩证法的角度对两者的异同以及相互间的影响进行了阐述.     

肝癌微环境研究对肝癌诊治的启示

医学与哲学的关系是紧密联系,相互促进的。其中唯物辨证法是哲学的精髓。肝癌微环境在肝癌的发生发展过程中发挥关键作用,应用唯物辩证法认识肝癌细胞、肝癌微环境及两者相互作用,有助于科学地应用于肿瘤的预防和治疗,并可揭示肿瘤的一般规律。     

唯物辩证法在院前心肺复苏实践中的指导作用

在院前心肺复苏实践中,我们会遇到很多矛盾的问题。本文从唯物辩证法的角度出发,分析了院前心肺复苏中一些比较棘手的问题,并为解决这些问题提出建议,对从事院前急救的医学专业人士以及非医学专业人士均具有一定的启发意义。     

The myths of free association and the potentials of the analytic relationship

The author challenges the traditional and still prevalent view of 'free association', arguing that it entails three forms of denial (also formulated in terms of corresponding myths): 1) denial of the patient's free agency; 2) denial of the patient's and the analyst's interpersonal infl uence; and 3) denial of the patient's share of responsibility for co-constructing the analytic relationship. That responsibility includes some degree of consideration of the analyst's needs. Sometimes, the patient's good judgment to that end may be refl ected in what is automatically and mistakenly reduced to a form of 'resistance'. Attention to the patient's responsibility must be balanced against the effort to provide a uniquely safe environment for the patient's revealing of shame and anxiety-ridden feelings and attitudes. But the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis, ideally, includes the cultivation, through lived experience, of the dialectical interplay of self-expression, on the one hand, and caring relational engagement, on the other. Recognition of the patient's free agency does not preclude exploration of constraining structures laid down in the past. On the contrary, it deepens such exploration. At the same time, it opens the door to the possibility of explicit recognition, via challenge, criticism, or affi rmation, of the patient's contributions to the analytic work.     

论《周易》中的"行"

动与行同义。《周易·系辞》上说:“动静有常,刚柔断矣。”《周易》中有“天行”,有“终则有始”、“消息盈虚”、“反复其道”等特点。“利涉大川”属于“天行”。行动合于天时,故曰“时行”。动而合于天道,故曰“中行”。又有“志行”与“独行”, 守道不回之义。“果行”指勇决。“上行”指遵循天理。另外,还有“说行”与“安行”,皆与“吉行”同义。     

Ambiguity and contradiction: the outlines of Jung’s dialectics

This essay explores Jung’s thinking strategies, argumentation patterns, and concept formation processes, and reveals how they distinguish his work from normal present‐day science. Jung doesn’t much appreciate the law of noncontradiction, which is a cornerstone of classical logic, and he doesn’t refrain from using openly ambiguous theoretical terms. It will be pointed out that not only specific archetypes, but the notion of archetype itself, as well as other of Jung’s theoretical notions (energy, including libidinal energy, polarity, integration, wholeness, instinct, symbol, and so on), are consciously ambiguous and thus potentially contradictory. It is shown that this kind of dialectic research strategy and related contradiction‐tolerant and ambiguity‐tolerant methods connect his work to Post‐Kantian German Idealism, Schelling’s and Schopenhauer’s philosophy in particular. However, it was Hegel who, in his Science of Logic, presented a systematic overview of such dialectic principles of reasoning, which were, in the 19^th century, widely applied by German philosophers, theologians, and other scholars. Unfortunately, Jung decided not to study Hegel, but, instead, wrote derogatorily of his work. It will be argued that a Jungian who wants to be conscious of her own argumentation strategies and methods of concept formation should study Hegel’s complex and sophisticated dialectical logic. In addition, it is suggested that Jungian depth psychology might help us to amend the phenomenological deficits of Hegel’s system by providing it with a primal experiential source. This is needed because Hegel’s Geist, due to its intellectual emphasis, is a self‐conscious conceptual totality which advances progressively from stage to stage by guiding itself with the help of dialectical reason (Vernunft). It will be shown that if enriched with a proper kind of experiential givenness, which includes the Jungian unconsciousness (with libidinal energy, instincts, and archetypes), Hegelian metaphysics would be able to embrace a seriously aconceptual or preconceptual dimension. Aconceptual experience, which is, for Jung, mainly the instinctual layer of archetypes, remains essentially inaccessible, not only for normal scientific concepts, but for the concepts of any form of dialectics as well.     

The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument

In this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the ad hominem-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the ad hominem, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or tu quoque types. I propose to reconstruct the two Aristotelian versions (see sections 1 and 2), which have been recognized again in the ninteenth century (sec. 3). Finally, I examine whether or not it was considered as a fallacious dialogue device by Aristotle and by A. Schopenhauer (sec. 4).     

论阿多诺视域中的一段现象学公案

同一段现象学描述,在胡塞尔那里意味着同一性和直接性,而阿多诺却从中发现了非同一性、中介性、缺席性、他者性和剩余性这些与后现代思想相关的特质。但是,互文性的分析表明,这些特质的首倡者恰恰不是阿多诺而是胡塞尔。阿多诺的分析与批驳,胡塞尔的凸现与“辩护”,恰恰透露了辩证法与现象学的不同旨趣。