论荀子的性情观

在近年出土的战国楚简中,“性”和“情”及其表达的思想特别引人注目,这不能不使我们重新思考传统文献特别是《荀子》中“性”“情”思想的含义。荀子论性,一面认同性乃自然成就,一如白纸;一面又认为它既有恶的倾向,又有善的倾向。荀子论情,是把它放在后天的位置上,并赋予广泛的内容,使之具有善恶一体、两端相对的特征。荀子论性情关系,一个在先,一个在后,经由心的统摄而联为一体,没有性,情无所出,没有情,性无由见。荀子的所谓性恶论,更准确地说应该是情恶论,这一层应该引起特别的注意。     

Xunzi and the primitivists on natural spontaneity (xìng 性) and coercion

This article explores two opposing views from Warring States China concerning the value of human natural spontaneity (hereafter xìng 性) and large-scale government coercion. On the one hand, the Ruist (Confucian) philosopher Xunzi championed a comprehensive and coercive ethical, political, and social system or Way (dào 道) that he believed would lead to social order and moral cultivation while opposing people’s xìng. On the other hand, the authors of roughly books 8–10 of Zhuangzi, the primitivists, criticized a Way bearing a striking resemblance to Xunzi’s on the grounds that it seriously harms people by opposing their xìng. I argue that the primitivists offer compelling reasons for Xunzi to modify his own Way regarding its relationship with xìng, though their own proposed alternative Way is not very attractive. I conclude with a brief discussion of one primitivist-inspired alternative view found in the Lü Shi Chun Qiu, which plausibly suggests that one way of respecting people’s xìng is by offering them opportunities to explore their natural abilities.     

荀子的"法后王"与儒学的走向政治

孔子与孟子以道德自律、道德教化为改造社会的手段,而对外在制度的匡正作用重视不够,在实际政治中的可操作性不强,从而被讥为“迂远而阔于事情”,不为现实政治所接纳。但救世济民这种根源于儒家思想深层的理念,必然要求后来的儒者强化儒学的现实性与在政治实践中的可操作性。荀子“法后王”就是对儒学发展要求的一个切实的回应。从这个意义上讲,“后王”毫无疑义地指“当今之王”或“近世之王”,亦即那些在春秋战国这一急剧变化的时代中变法自强的帝王,荀子探索出了儒学与政治的契合点,并由此开辟了通向政治实践的巷道。     

逆性与顺性——荀子人性论的内在紧张

本文从一个新的角度(逆性与顺性的内在紧张 )来讨论荀子的人性论。逆性的思想主要表现于《性恶》一篇。但是 ,荀子的人性论思想不仅表现于此篇中 ,而且还表现于其他篇 (如《礼论》、《王霸》等 )。本文认为 ,在《性恶》以外的诸篇中 ,荀子有明显的顺性思想 ,从而意味着性不恶。针对一般论者只局限于《性恶》一篇来考察荀子的人性论 ,本文强调他篇的意义。本文还试图从几种路子来解释荀子人性论逆性与顺性的紧张 ,并把他的性恶论与韩非以及西方的性恶论略作比较。     

Which Teacher Should I Choose?: A Xunzian Approach to Distinguishing Moral Experts from Fanatics

This essay examines whether an invocation of an epistemological privilege on the part of supposed moral experts prevents potential students from being able to evaluate among potential candidates for the role of plausible moral teacher. Throughout, it works to demonstrate that it is possible for even the untutored student to distinguish between a fanatic and a moral expert. In particular, this essay focuses on the version of virtue ethics espoused by the early Chinese philosopher Xunzi. It argues that by reflecting on the attributes of fanatics, as well as on Xunzi's ideas and arguments about students and teachers, it is possible to arrive at a general set of principles that provide beginners with the tools necessary to distinguish dangerous fanatics from plausible moral teachers, even given the fact that both claim for themselves an epistemological privilege.     

THE CLASSICAL CONFUCIAN POSITION ON THE LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Focusing on the thought of Mencius and Xunzi, this essay reconstructs and examines the classical Confucian position on the legitimate use of military force. It begins by sketching historically important political concepts, such as types of political leaders, politics of the kingly way versus politics of the hegemonic way, and the controversial role of lords‐protector. It then moves on to explore Confucian criteria for justifying resort to the use of force, giving special attention to undertaking punitive expeditions to interdict and punish aggression and tyranny. Following this discussion, the essay then attends to important Confucian moral constraints on how military force is properly employed, including prohibitions on attacking the defenseless, indiscriminate slaughter of enemy forces, destruction of civilian infrastructure, prisoner abuse, and non‐consensual annexation of territory. The essay concludes by first discussing an illustrative case from Mencius and then comparing its reconstruction of the Confucian position to those offered by other scholars.     

Two Rival Interpretations of Xunzi's Views on the Basis of Morality

This essay examines the textual evidence and arguments for two rival ways of interpreting Xunzi's accounts of the origins and normative bases of ritual and the Way: a human‐centered line of interpretation which maintains that the moral order constituted by the Confucian Way and its ritual tradition was the artificial creation of a group of ancient sages, and a Heaven‐centered line of interpretation which maintains, in contrast, that those same sages based the Confucian Way and its ritual tradition on a cosmic moral order that they discovered already existing in the world. It argues that the weight of textual evidence best supports a version of the former view, and shows that three representative versions of the latter view do not withstand critical scrutiny.