Children's right to be hostile: Emotions and agency through psychodynamic lens

This paper explores children's hostility towards adult researchers and shows how individual acts of hostility might be linked to wider contexts in children's lives and to their relationships with others. Drawing on ethnographic research with children in Slovakia and psychodynamic theories of Alfred Adler and Anna Freud, the paper argues for hostility to be seen as a legitimate form of children's political agency and one which might require escape from adult logics and interpretations. It suggests that children's hostility towards the researcher should be seen as a right before it is considered a problem, and it should not on its own exclude children from participation in research. Tracing the emotional dynamics of research-participant encounters and their links to other social relationships, personal histories and emotional materials, the paper suggests that recognising children's agency as too elusive for adult interpretations might facilitate new forms of research participation, one which would not rest as heavily on the adult conceptions of childhood.     

The Liberating Awareness

The purpose of this article is to reflect on the search for racial justice as a call from God, using biblical readings and documents produced by the World Council of Churches (WCC). It is anchored in the increasingly intense challenges that emerge in this respect in Brazil, a country whose Indigenous peoples were annihilated in its colonization process, and which up until the 19th century received the largest flow of enslaved Africans in the world. The article combines the Latin American methodology “See, Judge, Act” with the theological methodology of the WCC's Pilgrimage of Justice and Peace and its three steps: “Celebrating Gifts,” “Visiting the Wounds,” and “Transforming Injustice.” The first part of the paper reflects the “See” and exposes the expressions of everyday racism in Brazil. The second part presents the “Judge,” seeking references to the challenge of racial justice in the Bible and in ecumenical reflection. The third and final section, “Act,” reflects on the possibility for transforming racial injustices, sharing experiences from Brazil as well as one of the Pilgrim Team Visits organized by the WCC in 2019.     

Framing a Theological Response to COVID-19 in the Presence of the Religious Other

The Christian faith has a long history of responding to pandemics. Its past practice bore witness to the desire to care for others: it furnished an exemplary model with some notable exceptions. The dilemma that COVID-19 presents is that the understanding of viral spread now lies within the preserve of a professionalized health system. The evident risk as a consequence is one of theological quietism and being “unavailing.” Now is not the time for simple hyper compliance at the expense of an enquiring confessional claim. The ecumenical witness in solidarity with other faiths/religions lends itself to a desire to consider how the present pandemic crisis might serve as an invitation for a theological enquiry into wider planetary issues.     

Robots as Malevolent Moral Agents: Harmful Behavior Results in Dehumanization,Not Anthropomorphism

A robot's decision to harm a person is sometimes considered to be the ultimate proof of it gaining a human-like mind. Here, we contrasted predictions about attribution of mental capacities from moral typecasting theory, with the denial of agency from dehumanization literature. Experiments 1 and 2 investigated mind perception for intentionally and accidentally harmful robotic agents based on text and image vignettes. Experiment 3 disambiguated agent intention (malevolent and benevolent), and additionally varied the type of agent (robotic and human) using short computer-generated animations. Harmful robotic agents were consistently imbued with mental states to a lower degree than benevolent agents, supporting the dehumanization account. Further results revealed that a human moral patient appeared to suffer less when depicted with a robotic agent than with another human. The findings suggest that future robots may become subject to human-like dehumanization mechanisms, which challenges the established beliefs about anthropomorphism in the domain of moral interactions.     

Libet’s intention reports are invalid: A replication of Dominik et al. (2017)

In the “Libet experiment” the onset of movement-related brain activity preceded the reported time of the conscious intention to move, suggesting that conscious intention may not play a role in initiating voluntary movements (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Dominik et al. (2017) provided evidence that the intention reports employed in the Libet experiment, which Libet et al. (1983) found to precede movement reports, are invalid. In the study by Dominik et al., intention reports preceded movement reports only when participants had prior experience making movement reports. Individuals without such experience reported intention around the same time as movement. These findings suggest that Libet’s intention reports do not reflect experiences of intention, but, rather, inferences based on prior experience with movement reports. Our study replicated the core findings of Dominik et al. We argue that Libet’s intention reports are invalid and explore the phenomenology of intention in the Libet experiment.     

Affordances can invite behavior: Reconsidering the relationship between affordances and agency

The concept of agency has been central to ecological approaches to psychology. Gibson, one of the founders of this movement, made room for this concept by arguing against the mechanistic conceptions in psychology. In his view, the environment is not a collection of causes that pushes the animal around, but consist of action possibilities, which he coined affordances. In making their way in the world, animals regulate their behavior with respect to these possibilities. Reed later developed this ecological conception of agency, following Gibson in conceiving of affordances as action possibilities. However, drawing upon industrial design, architecture, and phenomenology, we argue that affordances are not mere action possibilities but that they can also invite behavior. We suggest a mutualist perspective on invitations, suggesting that they depend on the animal-environment relationship in multiple dimensions. The implications of this new conception of affordances for the ecological account of agency are explored.     

Are historic years understood as numbers or events? An fMRI study of numbers with semantic associations

While numbers generally cue processing of quantity or order, they can also contain semantic information, as in the case of historic years (e.g., “1492” calls forth associations of Columbus sailing the ocean blue). Whether these dates are processed as quantities or events may depend on the context in which they occur. We examined such “ambiguous number” processing in two different contexts using a paired-comparison task, recording both behavioral responses and brain activity. Participants were either asked to think of all items as numbers and to choose the larger number, or were told to treat the comparators as events and to choose the later event. Behaviorally, all events showed a normal distance effect, establishing that they may be understood and compared in an ordinal sequence. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) demonstrated significant differences between years when treated as numbers versus as events. Dates in both contexts shared activity in parietal lobe regions previously implicated in number processing. Dates as numbers showed no extra-numeric activity, while dates thought of as events evoked activity in temporal semantic processing and frontal semantic retrieval areas. These differences suggest that extra-numeric information may be easily accessed and incorporated during processing when supported by even a weak context. This work supports previous studies showing a dissociation between quantity and meaning, and illustrates the brain areas involved in these different aspects.     

SOME REFLECTIONS ON IAN MCEWAN'S ATONEMENT: ENACTMENT,GUILT, AND REPARATION

Recognizing that enactments have been discussed in psychoanalysis primarily as occurrences in the treatment setting, the author proposes a new application of the term enactments: that it may pertain to the actions of some individuals in their efforts to cope with bad things that they have done to others. That is, enactment can be a substitute‐for‐atonement mechanism. The author illustrates this view of enactment through a discussion of Ian McEwan's novel Atonement (2001), and in particular by examining the behavior and motivations of one of its central characters, Briony Tallis. Included are explorations of the relationships between enactment and guilt and between enactment and reparation.