Convergent cortical representation of semantic processing in bilinguals

This study examined whether semantic processes in two languages (English and Spanish) are mediated by a common neural system in fluent bilinguals who acquired their second language years after acquiring their first language. Functional magnetic resonance imaging was performed while bilingual participants made semantic and nonsemantic decisions about words in Spanish and English. There was greater activation for semantic relative to nonsemantic decisions in left and right frontal regions, with greater left frontal activation. The locations of activations were similar for both languages, and no differences were found when semantic decisions for English and Spanish words were compared directly. These results demonstrate a shared frontal lobe system for semantic analysis of the languages and are consistent with cognitive research on bilingualism indicating that the two languages of a bilingual person access a common semantic system.     

Facilitation of Sodium Aversion Learning in Sodium-Deprived Rats

Two experiments with rats explored the effects of sodium deprivation induced by furosemide injections upon acquisition of taste aversion to sodium chloride (NaCl). In Experiment 1, rats under either sodium deprivation or a balanced nutrition condition were given access to a limited amount of NaCl solution prior to poisoning. When all rats were tested under sodium repletion, the previously sodium-deprived rats consumed less NaCl than did the nondeprived rats. This finding was replicated in Experiment 2A in which ingestion of a compound solution of NaCl and hydrochloric acid (HCl) was followed by poisoning. Consumption of HCl, however, showed the opposite pattern: the sodium-deprived rats drank more HCl than did the nondeprived rats, a result that was replicated in Experiment 2B. These results suggest that sodium deprivation strengthens the salience of NaCl, thereby facilitating acquisition of aversion to this taste and strongly overshadowing that to a simultaneously presented taste.     

The Timing of Conscious Experience: A Critical Review and Reinterpretation of Libet''s Research

An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. According to this reinterpretation, the Minimum Train Duration of electrical brain stimulation should be considered as the time needed to create a brain stimulus efficient for producing conscious sensation and not as a basis for inferring the latency for conscious sensation of peripheral origin. Latency for conscious sensation with brain stimulation may occurafterthe Minimum Train Duration. Backward masking with cortical stimuli suggests a 125–300 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of threshold skin stimuli. Backward enhancement is not suitable for inferring this latency. For determining temporal relations between stimuli that correspond to subjects' reports, theendof cerebral Minimum Train Duration should be used as reference, rather than its onset. Results of coupling peripheral and cortical stimuli are explained by a latency after the cortical Minimum Train Duration, having roughly the same duration as the latency for supraliminal skin stimuli. Results of coupling peripheral stimuli and stimuli to medial lemniscus (LM) are explained by a shorter LM latency and/or a longer peripheral latency. This interpretation suggests a 230 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of somatosensory near-threshold stimuli. The backward referral hypothesis, as formulated by Libet, should not be retained. Long readiness potentials preceding spontaneous conscious or nonconscious movements suggest that both kinds of movement are nonconsciously initiated. The validity of Libet's measures of W and M moments (Libet et al., 1983a) is questionable due to problems involving latencies, training, and introspective distinction of W and M. Veto of intended actions may be initially nonconscious but dependent on conscious awareness.     

Effects of domain knowledge,working memory capacity,and age on cognitive performance: an investigation of the knowledge-is-power hypothesis

Domain knowledge facilitates performance in many cognitive tasks. However, very little is known about the interplay between domain knowledge and factors that are believed to reflect general, and relatively stable, characteristics of the individual. The primary goal of this study was to investigate the interplay between domain knowledge and one such factor: working memory capacity. Adults from wide ranges of working memory capacity, age, and knowledge about the game of baseball listened to, and then answered questions about, simulated radio broadcasts of baseball games. There was a strong facilitative effect of preexisting knowledge of baseball on memory performance, particularly for information judged to be directly relevant to the baseball games. However, there was a positive effect of working memory capacity on memory performance as well, and there was no indication that domain knowledge attenuated this effect. That is, working memory capacity contributed to memory performance even at high levels of domain knowledge. Similarly, there was no evidence that domain knowledge attenuated age-related differences (favoring young adults) in memory performance. We discuss implications of the results for understanding proficiency in cognitive domains from an individual-differences perspective.     

The human first hypothesis: identification of conspecifics and individuation of objects in the young infant

How do infants individuate and track objects, and among them objects belonging to their species, when they can only rely on information about the properties of those objects? We propose the Human First Hypothesis (HFH), which posits that infants possess information about their conspecifics and use it to identify and count objects. F. Xu and S. Carey [Cognitive Psychology, 30(2), 111-153, 1996] argued that before the age of 1 year, infants fail to use property information. To explain their results, Xu and Carey proposed the Object First Hypothesis (OFH), according to which infants under 1 year of age have only the general concept of physical object to identify and count objects. We show that infants have a more extensive knowledge of sortals than that claimed by the OFH. When 10-month-olds see one humanlike and one non-humanlike object, they successfully identify and count them by using the contrast in their properties, as predicted by the HFH. We also show that infants succeed even when they make a decision based on differences between two close basic-level categories such as humanlike objects and doglike objects, but fail when they have to use differences within the human category. Thus, infants treat "human" as a basic sortal, as predicted by the HFH. We argue that our results cannot be accounted for by general purpose mechanisms. Neither the strong version of the OFH and its explanation in terms of object indexing mechanisms [A. M. Leslie, F. Xu, P. Tremoulet, & B. J. Scholl, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2(1), 10-18, 1998] nor explanations in terms of task demands [T. Wilcox & R. Baillargeon, Cognitive Psychology, 37(2), 97-155, 1998] are sufficient to explain our results.     

Tense and syntactic processes in agrammatic speech

This study focuses on inflectional errors in a group of eight, English-speaking people with agrammatism. Subjects were required to provide inflected verbs in declarative sentences and construct negative sentences. The errors made by these speakers are considered in terms of whether they resemble the errors made by children at the Optional Infinitive Stage. Results confirm that the errors differ from those made by children and that a different explanation is required. Explanations offered by Borer and Rohrbacher (1997) and by Friedmann and Grodzinsky (2000) are discussed but are considered inadequate to deal with our data. It is proposed that agrammatic speakers have problems with the implementation of grammar and particularly with syntactic processes such as feature-checking.     

Reproducibility of fMRI-determined language lateralization in individual subjects

This study investigated within-subject test-retest reproducibility (i.e., reliability) of language lateralization obtained with fMRI. Nine healthy subjects performed the same set of three different language tasks during two fMRI sessions on separate days (verb generation, antonym generation, and picture naming). A fourth task analysis was added in which the three tasks were analyzed conjointly (combined task analysis, CTA). The CTA targets brain areas that are commonly used in different language tasks, aiming more selectively at language-critical structures. The number of active voxels (i.e., robustness) and calculated lateralization index (LI) were compared across sessions, tasks, subjects, and two a priori defined volumes of interest (classical language regions versus whole hemisphere) for a wide range of statistical thresholds. Robustness and reliability strongly varied between task analyses. The CTA was a robust detector of language-related brain activity, in contrast to the single task approaches. The CTA and verb generation task allowed for reliable calculation of the LI. Higher thresholds yielded a clear increase in left lateralization, which was largest when calculated from active voxels in classical language regions.     

Novel metaphors appear anomalous at least momentarily: evidence from N400

This study addresses a central question in perception of novel figurative language: whether it is interpreted intelligently and figuratively immediately, or only after a literal interpretation fails. Eighty sentence frames that could plausibly end with a literal, truly anomalous, or figurative word were created. After validation for meaningfulness and figurativeness, the 240 sentences were presented to 11 subjects for event related potential (ERP) recording. ERP's first 200 ms is believed to reflect the structuring of the input; the prominence of a dip at around 400 ms (N400) is said to relate inversely to how expected a word is. Results showed no difference between anomalous and metaphoric ERPs in the early window, metaphoric and literal ERPs converging 300-500 ms after the ending, and significant N400s only for anomalous endings. A follow-up study showed that the metaphoric endings were less frequent (in standardized word norms) than were the anomalous and literal endings and that there were significant differences in cloze probabilities (determined from 24 new subjects) among the three ending types: literal > metaphoric > anomalous. It is possible that the low frequency of the metaphoric element and lower cloze probability of the anomalous one contributed to the processes reflected in the early window, while the incongruity and near-zero cloze probability of the anomalous endings produced an N400 effect in them alone. The structure or parse derived for metaphor during the early window appears to yield a preliminary interpretation suggesting anomaly, while semantic analysis reflected in the later window renders a plausible figurative interpretation.     

Explaining neurocognitive aging: is one factor enough?

As an introduction to the special issue on neurocognitive factors underlying age effects, we discuss a number of recent developments in the literature on aging. The classic distinction between generalized and process-specific cognitive changes with old age has reappeared in the distinctions between the frontal lobe hypothesis and more differentiated views of neurocognitive aging. We argue that neurological decay in the frontal cortex has important implications for cognitive control, but that the frontal lobe hypothesis does not capture the plethora of changes that characterize aging and incorrectly suggests a unitary effect.     

Test of a potential link between analytic and nonanalytic category learning and automatic, effortful processing

The link between automatic and effortful processing and nonanalytic and analytic category learning was evaluated in a sample of 29 college undergraduates using declarative memory, semantic category search, and pseudoword categorization tasks. Automatic and effortful processing measures were hypothesized to be associated with nonanalytic and analytic categorization, respectively. Results suggested that contrary to prediction strong criterion-attribute (analytic) responding on the pseudoword categorization task was associated with strong automatic, implicit memory encoding of frequency-of-occurrence information. Data are discussed in terms of the possibility that criterion-attribute category knowledge, once established, may be expressed with few attentional resources. The data indicate that attention resource requirements, even for the same stimuli and task, vary depending on the category rule system utilized. Also, the automaticity emerging from familiarity with analytic category exemplars is very different from the automaticity arising from extensive practice on a semantic category search task. The data do not support any simple mapping of analytic and nonanalytic forms of category learning onto the automatic and effortful processing dichotomy and challenge simple models of brain asymmetries for such procedures.