Configural and local processing of faces in children with Williams syndrome

Three experiments investigated face processing in children with Williams syndrome (WS). In Experiment 1, the ability to discriminate different aspects of faces was compared between WS subjects and a group of children individually matched for chronological age (CA-matches) and another group matched for mental age (MA-matches). In Experiments 2 and 3, the ability to process the local and configural aspects of geometrical patterns and faces was assessed within the same groups of subjects. The results indicated that the WSs' overall performance on face recognition was below that of the CA-matches, but similar to that of the MA-matches. This study revealed in addition that the CA- and MA-matches showed a bias toward a configural mode of face and geometrical shape processing, whereas children with WS did not show any bias. These findings suggest that face processing undergoes an abnormal developmental course in WS.     

Do Consequentialists Have One Thought Too Many?

In this paper I defend consequentialism against the objection that consequentialists are alienated from their personal relationships through having inappropriate motivational states. This objection is one interpretation of Williams' claim that consequentialists will have "one thought too many". Consequentialists should cultivate dispositions to act from their concern for others. I argue that having such a disposition is consistent with a belief in consequentialism and constitutes an appropriate attitude to personal relationships. If the consequentialist has stable beliefs that friendship is justifiable in consequentialist terms, that friendship requires acting from concern for others, and furthermore if the consequentialist finds that she is concerned for others, then she will be able to form a disposition which involves acting from her concern for others without having one thought too many.     

Three Conceptions of Rational Agency

Rational agency may be thought of as intentional activity that is guided by the agent's conception of what they have reason to do. The paper identifies and assesses three approaches to this phenomenon, which I call internalism, meta-internalism, and volitionalism. Internalism accounts for rational motivation by appeal to substantive desires of the agent's that are conceived as merely given; I argue that it fails to do full justice to the phenomenon of guidance by one's conception of one's reasons. Meta-internalism explains this phenomenon by postulating higher-order dispositions, consitutive of (rational) agency itself, which causally interact with the agent's normative beliefs to produce corresponding motivations to action. I show that meta-internalism comes to grief over cases of akrasia, insofar as it leaves no room for the capacity for rational guidance when agents voluntarily act at variance with their judgments about what they have reason to do. Volitionalism, I contend, improves on both internalism and meta-internalism. Its distinctive feature is the postulation of a kind of motivation that is directly subject to the agent's control, and independent of the dispositions and desires to which the agent is passively subject.     

Developmental reversal in classification accuracy due to an increase with age in orientation-free judgments.

A complete developmental reversal in accuracy was obtained in Experiment I in which third graders, sixth graders, and adults judged the class membership of patterns presented in a same-different task. An examination of the task requirements and pattern classes employed led to the hypothesis that the reversal in accuracy resulted from an increase with age in orientation-free judgments. The results of Experiment II, in which adults were told to not rotate the patterns, and Experiment III, which was a replication of Experiment I using symmetric rather than areally skewed pattern classes, provided confirmation for that hypothesis.     

Homonym understanding and conservation

It is proposed that a common cognitive capacity underlies both homonym understanding and conservation ability—namely, the capacity to shift attention from one dimension (domain) to another. This hypothesis is tested in a longitudinal study of kindergarten (mean age 6-0) and first-grade (mean age 6-6) children. The results indicate that conservation status is significantly related to homonym understanding, over and above the age or general vocabulary level of the child.     

The modification of racial bias in preschool children

In previous studies using the Preschool Racial Attitude Measure (PRAM) and other measurement procedures, preschool children have displayed a tendency to evaluate light-skinned (Euro-American) persons more positively than dark-skinned (Afro-American) persons. Both Euro- and Afro-American children demonstrate this pro-Euro/anti-Afro ($\text{E+}\text{A?}$) bias, though it is less pronounced among Afro children.Two experiments designed to modify this racial bias are reported. The first study involved 39 Euro- and Afro-American preschool children and employed operant learning principles to modify $\text{E+}\text{A?}$ bias via a teaching machine procedure which provided reinforcement for pro-Afro/anti-Euro responses. Following training, the children showed a reduction in $\text{E+}\text{A?}$ bias on a test procedure not associated with the training. Follow-up testing of 30 of the children approximately 1 yr after the posttest revealed a tendency for the pro-Euro bias to be partially reestablished. The second study involved 70 Euro-American kindergarten children and was concerned with the modification of $\text{E+}\text{A?}$ bias via a classroom curriculum procedure and the possible influence of the race of the teacher associated with the curriculum. The experimental curriculum, designed to develop positive associations to dark-skinned persons and to the colors black and brown, was shown to have no effect on $\text{E+}\text{A?}$ bias, nor was race of teacher a variable of significance. Possible explantations for the findings of both experiments were discussed.     

Memory abilities in Williams syndrome: Dissociation or developmental delay hypothesis?

Williams syndrome (WS) is a neurodevelopmental genetic disorder often described as being characterized by a dissociative cognitive architecture, in which profound impairments of visuo-spatial cognition contrast with relative preservation of linguistic, face recognition and auditory short-memory abilities. This asymmetric and dissociative cognition has been also proposed to characterize WS memory ability, with sparing of auditory short-term memory and impairment of spatial and long-term memory abilities. In this study, we explored the possibility of a double memory dissociation in WS (short- versus long-term memory; verbal versus visual memory). Thus, verbal memory abilities were assessed using California Verbal Learning Test and Digit Span and Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure and Corsi Blocks was used to assess visual-spatial memory abilities. Overall, WS subjects were found to present a generalized significant impairment in verbal and visuo-spatial components either in short- or long-term memory. In sum, data from this study brings support for a developmental delay hypothesis, rather than a double dissociation within memory systems in WS.     

NATURAL DOUBTS

Abstract: Many philosophers now argue that the doubts of the philosophical sceptic are unnatural ones, in that they are not forced on us by considerations that any reasonable person would have to accept as compelling but only arise if one has already accepted certain controversial theoretical commitments. In this article I defend the naturalness of philosophical scepticism against such criticisms. After defining “global ontological scepticism,” I examine the work of a number of anti‐sceptical philosophers—Michael Huemer, Michael Williams, and John McDowell. Although McDowell does move the debate to a deeper level by interpreting scepticism as a challenge to the very possibility of the mind's apprehending reality by being in a rational rather than a merely causal relation to it, none of them succeeds in showing that global ontological scepticism is, in the relevant sense, unnatural. This is not to say that the sceptic is correct; simply that it has not been shown that we can reasonably dismiss the sceptical questions and thereby evade the need to engage seriously with the sceptical arguments.