The interaction of memories in the rat: Effects on short-term retention performance

In four experiments, rats were tested for short-term retention of a target spatial location either with or without prior exposures to alternate spatial locations in a T-maze. In all cases, exposure to alternate locations prior to exposure to the target location impaired retention of the target. This impairment increased as the number of exposures to the alternate location was increased, and the impairment decreased as the interval between alternate and target exposures was increased. In no case was the magnitude of the impairment found to increase as the retention interval was lengthened.     

Acquisition of spatial antonym pairs

Twenty-eight children (mean age 4.3 yr) were tested for comprehension of spatial antonym pairs with arrays which contained four objects representing both members of two antonym pairs. The results showed that: (a) the most common error was to point to an object representing the same polarity (marked-unmarked) as the word requested; (b) there was not a high degree of confusion within antonym paris; (c) unmarked antonyms tend to be acquired before marked antonyms; and (d) the order of acquisition of the pairs was: tall-short, long-short, high-low, thick-thin, deep-shallow, wide-narrow. The results were interpreted as supporting a modified semantic-feature hypothesis, in which polarity is acquired before dimension.     

Constraints on the processing of indirect speech acts: evidence from aphasiology

The ability of anterior aphasics and patients with right-hemisphere damage to comprehend both the literal and nonliteral readings of indirect speech acts was examined. Subjects viewed videotaped episodes in which one actor asked another “Can you X?” and the second actor responded with either an action or a simple “Yes.” Subjects judged whether the response was appropriate given its context. Anterior aphasics could comprehend the nonliteral but not the literal reading, supporting models that posit that people have direct access to nonliteral but conventional readings. Patients with right-hemisphere damage could appreciate the direct reading, but failed to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate action-responses. This finding suggests that it may be possible to dissociate the pragmatic and syntactic aspects of comprehension of indirect speech acts.     

The influence of incentive-aroused ambivalence on overjustification effects in attitude change

Rewarding people to advocate a position with which they already agree can undermine their attitudinal positivity. This research tests a novel explanation of this example of the overjustification phenomenon. The hypothesis holds that the provision of an unnecessary incentive gives rise to an ambivalent response: the positive reaction to the reinforcement is accompanied by a sense of uneasiness, or apprehension, regarding the legitimacy of the induced behaviors. Attitude change is expected only in circumstances that confirm the apprehension. Results consistent with this expectation were discovered. In Study 1, respondents asked to play the role of a subject in an overjustification experiment reported greater levels of ambivalence regarding their (role-played) proattitudinal action as a function of payment. Contrary to alternative interpretations of the phenomenon, no incentive-related differences were found in subjects' ratings of the reprehensibility of the requested action, or in their beliefs that future activities of the type requested be undertaken only for payment. In Study 2, subjects paid to read a proattitudinal speech were found subsequently to be less in favor of their original positions only if they also had been given a counterattitudinal communication. The presence or absence of the countercommunication had no influence on the attitudes of unpaid respondents. Subjects for whom the payment was made to appear incidental to the experiment did not demonstrate the usual overjustification effect. These results supported the incentive-aroused ambivalence hypothesis. Psychological mechanisms that might underlie the effect were discussed.     

The psychological causality implicit in language

We are concerned with the causality implicit in English verbs that name interactions, either mental or behavioral, between two persons, verbs such as like, notice (mental), and help, cheat (behavioral) in such a context as Ted—Paul. Using four different methods, we show that adult native speakers think of causality in such verbs as unequally apportioned between interactants. For behavioral (or action) verbs greater causal weight is given to the Agent argument of the verb (e.g., Ted in Ted helps Paul) than to the Patient argument (Paul). For mental (or state) verbs greater causal weight is given to the Stimulus argument of the verb (e.g., Paul in Ted likes Paul) than to the Experiencer argument (Ted). For English verbs of the type studied, derivational adjectives often exist (e.g., helpful, cheating, likable, noticeable). Such adjectives are attributive to one or the other argument of the verb base (Agent or Patient; Stimulus or Experiencer). We show that the direction of causal attribution in the adjective (e.g., helpful is attributive to Ted the Agent; likable is attributive to Paul the Stimulus) predicts the primary causal weightings assigned in our experimental tasks. We also show that in the English language adjectives derived from action verbs are almost attributive to the Agent and adjectives derived from state verbs to the Stimulus. Because certain facts about English morphology predict certain ways of thinking about causality, our main finding may seem to be a Whorfian one, a demonstration that language affects thought. However, we argue that it is not that but rather a demonstration that two modes of thought (the Agent-Patient Schema and the Stimulus-Experiencer Schema) affect language use. We suggest that the schemas are universals of human thought.     

Inferences,affects, and intentions in a model of paranoia

Models of psychopathologies can be construed as modifications to the normal purposive behavior of an organism. The particular elements of purposive behavior to be emphasized here are (1) deriving facts about the environment (inferences), (2) attending to the self's needs, desires, and interests (affects), and (3) choosing directions and goals to fulfill these interests (intentions). A series of processes in a model of paranoia which performs these tasks will be described. We also describe the modifications made by the paranoid processes to the normal processes. A computer simulation has been constructed to test the model.     

Short-term memory and information processing in pigeons

Six pigeons were trained to asymptotic performance on a variable-delay matching-to-sample task in which the samples were sometimes line or color elements and sometimes line-color compounds. On compound-sample trials, the comparison stimuli were sometimes color elements and sometimes line-tilts. Sample type and delay (0, 1.5, and 4.5 sec) were varied within sessions, and sample duration (.4, 1.0, and 3.0 sec) was varied between sessions. Forgetting curves were steeper for line-tilt than for color. As sample duration increased, matching performance improved more for colors than for line-tilts, especially at delays greater than zero. Performance was better with element samples than with compound samples only on the line-tilt dimension at zero delay. Some predictions of a unitary trace growth and decay theory of pigeon short-term memory were not confirmed. A dual-code hypothesis was proposed to account for the data.     

Paired-associate learning by normal children and retardates with relevant redundant compound stimuli

During daily sessions four first-grade boys each played a two-choice marble dropping game. When one colored light was presented a plain token was dispensed as soon as S dropped a marble, and when another light was on a token with a hole in its center was delivered. During choice trials that were interspersed among single-color trials S had to choose one of the two different colored holes. At the end of each session S traded tokens with holes for pennies and then turned in the remaining plain tokens which were not exchanged for money. After S had developed a preference for the response that earned the tokens with holes (tokens that were backed up with pennies) E instructed S to try to get as many plain tokens (unexchangeable tokens) as he could. All Ss immediately switched to the response that earned unexchangeable tokens but as soon as E left they returned to choosing the backed up response. When the adult reentered, Ss again chose to work for unexchangeable tokens. Two different Es (male and female) served and the instructions of each were effective in controlling responding as long as the adult was present, except for one S who did not respond to one E, but did respond as described for the other.