Reactions to threat by defensive and congruent internals and externals: A self-esteem analysis

The hypothesis that vulnerable self-esteem internals and externals would react more defensively to negative intellectual and personality feedback than congruent (more secure self-esteem) internals and externals was investigated in two experiments. The defensive (DE)-congruent (CE) external distinction was strongly confirmed in both cases. In Experiment 1, DEs assumed less personal responsibility for failure than for success, while CEs assumed little personal responsibility for either outcome. Defensive externals performed more poorly than CEs on a task described as an IQ test, suggesting greater anxiety in the face of possible failure. In Experiment 2, DEs rated themselves more favorably and derogated evaluator's competence more than CEs following receipt of negative information regarding their interpersonal skills. Congruent internals (CI) performed more poorly than defensive internals (DI) on the “IQ” task, while male DIs attributed responsibility for outcomes more defensively. It was suggested that a consistently internal view of causation may increase stress in evaluative situations. Implications of these findings for better understanding the relationship between locus of control and maladjustment were discussed, and suggestions for future research were presented.     

Metamemory and the transfer of an interrogative strategy by EMR children

EMR children were taught to produce an interrogative strategy as an aid to paired-associate learning. Interrogative training was spread over four sessions with experimenter guidance gradually faded; training was followed by tests of long-term retention for the trained items, strategy maintenance, and generalization. Metamemory was assessed prior to training and following generalization. Analysis of recall demonstrated successful maintenance and generalization of the interrogative strategy; the quality of elaborations produced by the trained children predicted recall accuracy. Importantly, metamemory pretest measures for the interrogative trained children were related to strategy use at generalization. Metamemory posttest reliably predicted recall during training, maintenance, and generalization sessions and strategy use at maintenance. Interrogative training did not noticeably improve general aspects of metamemorial knowledge.     

The validity of form F of the Matching Familiar Figures Test with kindergarten children

Egeland and Weinberg's contention that form F of the Matching Familiar Figures Test is inappropriate for kindergarten children was examined. White, middle-class, suburban kindergarten children were given form F of the Matching Familiar Figures Test, as well as a series of tests varying in degree of response uncertainty. It was hypothesized that tasks identified as high in response uncertainty would be the best predictors of norm-referenced composite reflection-impulsivity scores. Stepwise multiple regression analysis supported this hypothesis. The results were interpreted as supporting the construct validity of the Matching Familiar Figures Test as an index of reflection-impulsivity among kindergarten children.     

Quota vs positional power in four-person apex games

In coalition formation experiments, which coalitions will form and how players in coalitions will allocate their jointly gained rewards are typically predicted as a function of the players' relative power. In this paper, we isolated two logically independent sources of a player's power: the player's contribution to the rewards obtainable by coalitions of which he may be a member (“quota power”), and the number of distinct coalitions which a player may join (“positional power”). The separation of the two types of power is clearly shown in apex games, where a single player (Apex) attempts to lure any of the other players (Base) from the coalition of all Bases. A series of four-person computer-controlled apex and nonapex characteristic function games, varying with respect to the relationship of quota power to positional power, were played by 15 quartets of male players. Quota power was strongly manifested in all outcome measures, while positional power appeared only as a bias toward equal allocations of reward when coalitions among players of equal positional power formed. Neither of two social psychological theories that are applicable, pivotal power and weighted probability theory, predicted coalition frequencies. In a test of five solution concepts, the competitive bargaining set predicted payoff allocations better than either of the two aforementioned theories, the kernel, or an equal-split model.     

Impulsivity and speed and errors in a reaction time task: a contribution to the construct validity of the concept of impulsivity

Acting on the spur of the moment without considering the effects is one of the core attributes of the extraversion-impulsivity concept. Performance in a choice-reaction time task may reflect this tendency. Reaction time and number of errors were studied in a group of 55 boys (15–17 years). Extraversion-impulsivity, anxiety proneness and some other personality characteristics were measured by inventory scales. As hypothesized more impulsive subjects had shorter reaction times and made more errors than less impulsive. This relationship was rather stable over a period of one month. Subjects with higher scores in the Psychoticism scale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire tended to make more errors. A considerable amount (36%) of the variance in the number of errors variable could be predicted from the three personality variables Impulsiveness, Muscular Tension and Psychoticism.     

Exploring and reexploring issues of integrality,perceptual sensitivity,and dimensional salience

Some observations that can be described conveniently by investigators in terms of dimensional sensitivity and dimensional salience actually need not implicate the psychological reality of the dimensions for the subjects. The developmental hypothesis that stimuli are perceived often as integral in early childhood can account for such phenomena only with the assumption that young children often apprehend objects as global wholes, related to one another by overall similarity. Classification data, recently presented by J. R. Aschkenasy and R. D. Odom (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1982, 34, 435–448) can be reinterpreted in this way. On this reinterpretation, Aschkenasy and Odom's findings are exactly what the developmental form of the integrality-separability hypothesis predicts. Moreover, a variety of other findings and lines of inference converge on the conclusion that, in young children, the use of overall similarity relations to organize perception and cognition predominates over the use of dimensional relations (and that the relative balance between these stimulus relations changes in development). Examples are selected from the literature on the natural development of word meanings, as well as from the literatures on children's and adults' classification.     

CAN NATURE TRULY BE OUR FRIEND?

Abstract. The question of whether nature can embody love or be considered in this sense as "friend" is a thorny problem for Christian theology. The doctrines of finitude and sin argue against nature as a realm of love, whereas the doctrine of creation out of nothing, which links God and the creation so forcefully, would seem to argue for such a view of nature. This paper explores the thesis that Western culture has not offered a concept of nature rich enough to allow for an understanding of it as a domain of gracious-ness. From pre-Socratic times through the Enlightenment and the rise of modern science, nature was conceived of as a realm of defect or lacking in creative possibilities. Christian theology has consistently spoken of nature in terms that defy the limitations of the authorized views proposed by the ambient Western cultures. The present times, under the influence of the sciences, have furnished for the first time an authorized concept of nature that is large enough and dynamic enough to entertain the dimension of grace. Consequently, ours is a time of great promise for developing a more adequate theology of nature.     

APOLOGIA PRO SCRIPTURA SUA, OR MAYBE WE GOT IT RIGHT AFTER ALL

Abstract. A summary of the progress of biogenetic structuralism as an approach to the social and behavioral sciences is presented, from the publication of Biogenetic Structuralism in 1974 to the present. The difficulty that many scholars have found integrating neuroan-thropology and comparative ethology into an understanding of cultural, and particularly of religious, phenomena over the past almost two decades is considered. More specifically, the articles of James Ashbrook and Mary Lynn Dell published in the same June 1993 issue of Zygon as this article are analyzed and responded to. These authors critique Eugene d'Aquili's work of integrating neuropsychology and religious experience primarily by analyzing Brain, Symbol & Experience , which d'Aquili co-authored with Charles Laughlin, Jr., and John McManus, H. Rodney Holmes's article in the same issue of Zygon analyzes the whole corpus of d'Aquili's religion and science work as it appeared over the years in the pages of Zygon and in other articles and books as well as in Brain, Symbol & Experience. This critique is likewise carefully considered and responded to. Finally a proposed trajectory of d'Aquili's (and Andrew Newberg's) future work in their ongoing project integrating neuropsychology and religious experience is elaborated. This involves, not only expansion of their general theoretical approach, but also empirical testing of hypotheses relating brain function to religious experience using PET scanning and some newer MRI visualization techniques.     

Zu Einem Methodologischen Interpretationskonstruktionismus

Interpretari necesse est (Interpretation is necessary). This slogan is summarizing the methodological and epistemological essay concentrating on what can be called a transcendental interpretationism and a methodological interpretationism. This approach is combining a pragmatic interpretive approach with a constitutional quasi Kantian but more pluralistic and flexible epistemology. It takes up the assets of Nietzsches radical interpretationism without ending up in an interpretationist idealism. Though a basic fundamental insight is a statement of the interpretation-impragnatedness of any knowledge and experience whatsoever, there is nevertheless a possibility to combine a kind of critical realism with this interpretationist approach. Though we are always obliged to use interpretation-dependent epistemological schemata and concepts as well as theories (we have no non-interpretive concepts, theories and ways of gaining and constructing knowledge), we have still, for practical reasons, to presuppose an external independent world which can however only be described in interpretation-dependent terms. Even this epistemological model is certainly an interpretive one. If we distinguish between different levels of more or less variable interpretations (we cannot, by our very biological constitution, change primary interpretations built in to our biological constitution and make-up of sense-organs etc.), we can analyse and define truth as a relation between different levels and types of interpretations. The ideal of truth makes some sense of a concept of correspondence, though in the last analysis it is a combination of coherence-theoretical and pragmatic-constructivist ideas. — The model of an epistemological interpretationism has the advantage (by contradistinction, e.g., with critical rationalism) to be consistently applied to itself: The interpretive epistemology is certainly but an interpretational model itself. — The sketched interpretationism has certain similarities with Nelson Goodman's constructive interpretive pluralism and Hilary Putnam's internal realism, although there are slight, but decisive differences to be carefully observed. The differences have to do with the mentioned practical realism and the presupposition of one world in which we live. The similarities are greater with respect to internal realism. A decisive difference is only that you cannot, according to methodological and transcendental interpretationism, compel somebody towards the uniqueness of language use. There are always degrees of freedom and variation to change the usage of signs. There is no socially intended uniqueness and compulsory usage of signs and their meanings. Even within the language community the rules are always only conventionally realized and actualized. There is no real correspondence between signs and signs (or interpretive constructs, for that matter). Any correspondence whatsoever can only refer to interpretational constructs itself. Any classification, verification, selection and identification of facts, even any thinking of data and facts as such is in the last analysis dependent on interpretations. Even the conception of an epistemological subject is but an interpretational construct on a higher level.