3~6岁儿童二级错误信念认知的发展

采用“新故事”对来自两所幼儿园的133名3~6岁儿童的二级错误信念进行了测查,探查了这一阶段儿童二级错误信念认知的发展。研究主要得出以下结论：4岁左右的儿童能够掌握二级未知知识,但是儿童对于二级错误信念的理解要晚1~2年,6岁左右是儿童二级错误信念发展的关键期。儿童对于信念问题的错误回答主要是基于一级推理,相当一部分的6岁儿童能够基于二级推理对信念问题做出合理解释。儿童对于二级错误信念认知的发展不是一个全或无的过程,而是一个逐步发展的过程。     

行为决策中模糊规避研究的回顾与展望

模糊规避是指在相同奖赏的情况下,决策者会偏好有精确概率的事件而不是从主观上判断具有相同模糊概率的事件。自从Ellsberg提出模糊规避的概念以来,模糊规避已在行为决策研究的多个领域得到广泛验证。本文梳理了近五十年来关于模糊规避的研究文献,系统分析了模糊规避的研究范式、心理机制和影响因素,同时提出了未来的研究展望。     

Circumstantial ignorance and mitigated blameworthiness

It is intuitive that circumstantial ignorance, even when culpable, can mitigate blameworthiness for morally wrong behavior. In this paper I suggest an explanation of why this is so. The explanation offered is that an agent’s degree of blameworthiness for some action (or omission) depends at least in part upon the quality of will expressed in that action, and that an agent’s level of awareness when performing a morally wrong action can make a difference to the quality of will that is expressed in it. This explanation makes use of Holly Smith’s (1983. “Culpable Ignorance.” Philosophical Review 92 (4): 543–571) distinction between benighting and benighted actions as well as a notion developed here called “capture.”     

Moral responsibility and the ‘ignorant scientist’

The question whether a scientist can be responsible for an outcome of her work which she does not foresee, and so is ignorant of, is addressed. It is argued that ignorance can be a ground for the attribution of responsibility, on condition that there are general principles, rules or norms, that the subject should be aware of. It is maintained that there are such rules which inform the practice of science as a social institution.     

Biases in the perceived prevalence and motives of severe acute respiratory syndrome prevention behaviors among Chinese high school students in Hong Kong

In two studies conducted in Hong Kong during and immediately after the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), participants displayed several social cognitive biases when they estimated the prevalence of and inferred the motives underlying SARS preventive behaviors. First, participants who practiced preventive behaviors (practicers) consistently estimated that more people practiced such behaviors than did non-practicers (false consensus bias). Second, for some preventive behaviors, participants believed that their own behaviors were more motivated by prosocial concerns (relative to self-interest) than were other practicers (pluralistic ignorance). Finally, non-practicers underestimated the importance of prosocial concerns underlying some preventive behaviors (actor-observer bias). We discussed the relevance of these social cognitive biases to health education and to Hong Kong people's psychological reactions to SARS.     

Twelve-month-olds communicate helpfully and appropriately for knowledgeable and ignorant partners

In the current study we investigated whether 12-month-old infants gesture appropriately for knowledgeable versus ignorant partners, in order to provide them with needed information. In two experiments we found that in response to a searching adult, 12-month-olds pointed more often to an object whose location the adult did not know and thus needed information to find (she had not seen it fall down just previously) than to an object whose location she knew and thus did not need information to find (she had watched it fall down just previously). These results demonstrate that, in contrast to classic views of infant communication, infants' early pointing at 12 months is already premised on an understanding of others' knowledge and ignorance, along with a prosocial motive to help others by providing needed information.     

The Burden of Proof and Its Role in Argumentation

The notion of “the burden of proof” plays an important role in real-world argumentation contexts, in particular in law. It has also been given a central role in normative accounts of argumentation, and has been used to explain a range of classic argumentation fallacies. We argue that in law the goal is to make practical decisions whereas in critical discussion the goal is frequently simply to increase or decrease degree of belief in a proposition. In the latter case, it is not necessarily important whether that degree of belief exceeds a particular threshold (e.g., ‘reasonable doubt’). We explore the consequences of this distinction for the role that the “burden of proof” has played in argumentation and in theories of fallacy.     

Rejecting the Urge to Theorise in Fallacy Inquiry

In this paper, I examine the incessant call to theory that is evident in fallacy inquiry. I relate the motivations for this call to a desire to attain for fallacy inquiry certain attributes of the theoretical process in scientific inquiry. I argue that these same attributes, when pursued in the context of philosophical inquiry in general and fallacy inquiry in particular, lead to the assumption of a metaphysical standpoint. This standpoint, I contend, is generative of unintelligibility in philosophical discussions of rationality. I claim that this same unintelligibility can be shown to characterise fallacy inquiry, an example of the study of argumentative rationality. The context for my claim is an examination of the theoretical pronouncements of two prominent fallacy theorists, John Woods and Douglas Walton, in relation to the argument from ignorance fallacy. My conclusion takes the form of guidelines for the post-theoretical pursuit of fallacy inquiry.     

Rules for Reasoning from Knowledge and Lack of Knowledge

In this paper, the traditional view that argumentum ad ignorantiam is a logical fallacy is challenged, and lessons are drawn on how to model inferences drawn from knowledge in combination with ones drawn from lack of knowledge. Five defeasible rules for evaluating knowledge-based arguments that apply to inferences drawn under conditions of lack of knowledge are formulated. They are the veridicality rule, the consistency of knowledge rule, the closure of knowledge rule, the rule of refutation and the rule for argument from ignorance. The basic thesis of the paper is that knowledge-based arguments, including the argument from ignorance, need to be evaluated by criteria for epistemic closure and other evidential rules that are pragmatic in nature, that need to be formulated and applied differently at different stages of an investigation or discussion. The paper helps us to understand practical criteria that should be used to evaluate all arguments based on knowledge and/or ignorance.