Counting subjects

Kolak’s arguments for the thesis ‘there is only one person’ in fact show that the subject-in-itself is not a countable entity. The paper argues for this assertion by comparing Kolak’s concept of the subject with Kant’s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception (TUAP), which is a formal feature of experience and not countable. It also argues the point by contrasting both the subject and the TUAP with the notion of the individual human being or empirical self, which is the main concern standard theories of personal identity such as those of Williams, Parfit and Nozick. Unlike the empirical self, but rather like Kant’s TUAP, the subject-in-itself cannot be counted because it is not an object or substance, despite Kolak’s thesis that there is only one. The paper also maintains that Kolak’s contention that the subject is an entity hinges on a strong and less plausible interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism.     

Stereotypes and stereotyping: What's the brain got to do with it?

Influential social-psychological models suggest that perceivers frequently use information-processing strategies that result in the stereotype-based construal and treatment of other people. To elucidate in greater detail when, why, and how social encounters elicit stereotyping, researchers have begun to incorporate neuroscientific tools into their repertoire of investigative methods. The current article reviews these studies and considers their significance in light of existing theories of person perception, knowledge representation, and impression formation. Finally, using the concrete example of stereotyping, benefits and pitfalls of adopting a social neuroscience approach are discussed.     

The face inhibition effect: Social contrast or motor competition?

This research examined the relative importance of encoding and retrieval contexts to the demonstration of concreteness effects in memory. Predictions from relational-distinctive and dual-code positions were evaluated. In the first two experiments, concreteness and recall task (free recall or cued recall) were manipulated following a relational semantic orienting task. The results showed an interaction between concreteness and recall type only when distinctive information could be accessed both within and between pairs. The third experiment showed that concreteness effects appeared under a relational, non-semantic orienting task. In the fourth experiment, we reexamined the magnitude of the concreteness effect following semantic versus non-semantic tasks and relational versus item-specific processing. Overall, the findings were inconsistent with both dual code theory and distinctiverelational view accounts of concreteness effects. An alternative "bidirectionality hypothesis" is suggested.     

Couple Therapy Research and the Practice of Couple Therapy: Can We Talk?

As has been true in every other realm of psychotherapy, couple therapy research generally has had very little impact on the day-to-day practice of couple therapists. To a significant degree, this unfortunate disconnection may be attributable to an overemphasis by researchers in the field on treatment packages and therapeutic methods/techniques. Insufficient attention has been paid to other important sources of influence on treatment outcomes, especially the couple therapist herself/himself. It is argued that effective couple therapy requires a good "fit" between the person of the therapist and her primary theoretical orientation, and that couple therapists may be more influenced by research that addresses process aspects of the therapeutic approaches to which they have their primary theoretical allegiances.