What Is Legal Philosophy?

This article delineates some of the main issues that are debated by philosophers of law. It explores the connections between legal philosophy and other areas of philosophy, while also seeking to specify the distinctiveness of many of the concerns that have preoccupied philosophers of law. It illustrates its abstract points with examples focused on the separability of law and morality, the nature of the rule of law, the nature of rights, justifications for the imposition of punishment, and the identification of basic legal entitlements.     

Modeling,Truth, and Philosophy

Knowledge requires truth, and truth, we suppose, involves unflawed representation. Science does not provide knowledge in this sense but rather provides models, representations that are limited in their accuracy, precision, or, most often, both. Truth as we usually think of it is an idealization, one that serves wonderfully in most ordinary applications, but one that can terribly mislead for certain issues in philosophy. This article sketches how this happens for five important issues, thereby showing how philosophical method must take into account the idealized nature of our familiar conception of truth.     

Hume and the nominalist tradition

Many of the central theses of Hume's philosophy – his rejection of real relations, universals, abstract objects and necessary causal relations – had precedents in the later medieval nominalist tradition. Hume and his medieval predecessors developed complex semantic theories to show both how ontologies are apt to become inflated and how, if we understand carefully the processes by which meaning is generated, we can achieve greater ontological parsimony. Tracing a trajectory from those medieval traditions to Hume reveals Hume to be more radical, particularly in his rejection of abstraction and abstract ideas. Hume's denial of general, abstract ideas is consistent with his philosophical principles but fails to appreciate the more sophisticated nominalist approaches to abstraction, the result of which is a theoretically impoverished account of our capacity for generalization.     

Are immigrants in the nursing industry at increased risk of bullying at work? A one‐year follow‐up study

The purpose of this study was to explore whether (a) immigrant health care workers (HCW) are more at risk of bullying at work than Danish staff members, (b) this association is increased by previous exposure to bullying and (c) immigrants experience more bullying from supervisors, colleagues and clients/residents. We analyzed cross-sectional baseline data from 5,635 health care students of whom 10.4% were immigrants, and conducted a prospective analysis by following 3,109 of these respondents during their first year of employment. More than a third of the respondents had previous experiences with bullying. The baseline analyses showed that immigrants are more at risk of being bullied during both their theoretical education and trainee periods than their Danish co-students. At follow-up we found that 9.1% of the total cohort had been exposed to bullying at work during their first year of employment, hereof 1.8% frequently. "Non-Western" immigrants had a significantly higher risk of exposure to bullying at work during follow-up than the Danish respondents independent of previous experience with bullying. Danish and immigrant health care workers were more exposed to bullying from co-workers than from supervisors with no statistically significant difference between the Danes and the immigrant groups. Both "Western" and "non-Western" respondents were more at risk of bullying from clients/residents than the Danish respondents.     

Skepticism,naturalism, pyrrhonism

Skepticism and naturalism bear important connections with one another. Do they conflict or are they different sides of the same coin? In this paper, by considering the ways in which Sextus and Hume have examined these issues, I offer a Pyrrhonian response to Penelope Maddy's attempt to reject skepticism within the form of naturalism that she calls “second philosophy” (Maddy, 2007, 2017) and to Timothy Williamson's attempt to avoid skepticism from emerging within his knowledge-first approach (Williamson, 2000). Some lessons about Pyrrhonism result.     

Reflective,Critical, and Reconstructing Contemporary Chinese Ethics

Contemporary Chinese ethics faces two theoretical tasks: expansion in breadth and exploration in depth. The former refers to the opening of the problem area, and the latter refers to the deepening of ethics itself. To get out of the dilemma that academic results in the area are abundant in quantity but low in quality, contemporary Chinese ethics should expand and deepen in the three dimensions, namely, “no longer,” “being” and “not yet.” Within the framework of “no longer,” efforts should be made to deepen the studies of the history of moral concept and practice, and the ethics of culture from the perspective of genetics; with regard to the perspective of “being,” the ethical reflection on public crisis, system and Lnstitutional ethics, the dilemma of virtue theory and normative theory, and the conflicts and generalization between different moral paradigms will become the difficulties that require in-depth analysis and demonstration. As for the contemporary Chinese ethics towards “not yet,” attention must be paid to the duality of modern technology, the origin of human ethics based on building a community with a shared future for mankind and the moral philosophy that goes deep into people’s minds. To complete the above theoretical tasks, one must have judgment, thinking, and willingness, which can only be cultivated in the experience and thinking of “practical” life.     

From Copenhagen to the consulting room: Pauli and Jung in Copenhagen

In this paper the city of Copenhagen is used as a starting point to highlight some critical historical events, both concerning the exchange of ideas between the physicist Wolfgang Pauli and C.G. Jung and the history of psychotherapy in Scandinavia. Pauli's years in Copenhagen under the influence of Niels Bohr and his philosophy prepared him mentally to receiveC.G. Jung's ideas. The paper also recounts the one occasion that Jung was in Scandinavia, attending the 9th conference of the General Medical Society for Psychotherapy in Copenhagen, just before going to New York in 1937 to give his final seminars on Pauli's dreams. The reason for focusing on these particular events is that they also constitute part of the history of the reception of psychodynamic psychology in Sweden and Scandinavia.     

Learning from the patient: The East,synchronicity and transference in the history of an unknown case of C.G. Jung

This article presents the history of one until now unknown case of C.G. Jung: Maggy Reichstein. Born in Indonesia in 1894 in a very aristocratic family, she brought her sister to Zurich to be treated by Jung in 1919, and later she herself was in analysis with him. Jung used her case as example in his lecture in 1937 on the realities of practical psychotherapy, relating it to the process of transference and countertransference. Jung deepened his studies in Eastern psychology after a series of dreams she had, which culminated in the Yoga Kundalini Seminars. She was also the case presented in his article of 1951 on the concept of synchronicity. Jung wrote that her case, concerning synchronicity, remained unique in his experience. Jung also published some of her mandalas. He considered her able to understand his ideas in depth. Reichstein was for Jung an important case, which challenged and triggered his interests in different subjects.     

Rereading the Kripkean Intuition on Reference

Saul Kripke's thought experiments on the reference of proper names target the theory that the properties which identify a term's referent are the subject of an implicit agreement. Recently, survey versions of the experiments have been thought to show that intuitions about reference are culturally contingent. Proposing a revisionary interpretation, this article argues, first, that Kripke's Cicero/Feynman experiment reveals that every name user knows enough to be capable of identifying the same individual as the name's most informed users. Second, the article shows that Kripke's presentation of the Gödel/Jonah experiment is ambiguous with respect to the properties attributed to the referent. Disambiguated, the experiment fails to reveal that name users may be mistaken in every unique property they attribute. Since the experiment's ambiguity is replicated in survey presentations, cross‐cultural variation in survey response fails to show that intuitions about reference are culturally contingent.     

Normative Ethics after Pragmatic Naturalism

Philip Kitcher presents an ambitious account of pragmatic naturalism that incorporates an explanatory story of the emergence and development of ethics, a metaethical perspective on progress, and a normative stance for moral theorizing. This article contends that Kitcher's normative stance is incompatible with the explanatory and metaethical components of his project. Instead, pragmatic naturalists should endorse a normative ethics that is experimental, grounded in practice, and acutely aware of cognitive and informational limitations. In particular, the ethical project would benefit from endorsing empirical work on participatory democracy for the identification of mechanisms to guide us on deep moral conflicts.