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Jerome A. Stone 《Zygon》2004,39(4):755-772
Abstract Philip Hefner is part of neither the dominant Western paradigm nor the usual postmodernist reaction against it. He belongs within an Anglo‐American viewpoint that also is within neither the dominant Western nor the postmodernist paradigm. Herein I sketch the differences between these paradigms. I elaborate Hefner's theology of the created co‐creator to show where Hefner constrasts with them and then contrast his ideas with those of two contemporary theologians who fit into the second paradigm, George Lindbeck and Mark C. Taylor. 相似文献
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Paul McNamara 《Journal of Applied Logic》2004,2(1):117
I explore various ways of integrating the framework for predeterminism, agency, and ability in [P. McNamara, Nordic J. Philos. Logic 5 (2) (2000) 135] with a framework for obligations. However, the agential obligation operator explored here is defined in terms of a non-agential yet personal obligation operator and a non-deontic (and non-normal) agency operator. This is contrary to the main current trend, which assumes statements of personal obligation always take agential complements. Instead, I take the basic form to be an agent's being obligated to be such that p. I sketch some logics for agential obligation based on personal obligation and agency, first in a fairly familiar context that rules out conflicting personal obligations (and derivatively, conflicting agential obligations), and then in contexts that do allow for conflicts (of both sorts). Finally, a solution to van Fraassen's puzzle is sketched, and an important theorem is proved. 相似文献
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Pat Bennett 《Zygon》2019,54(1):86-106
This article—the first of a linked set of three outlining the development and practice of a different approach to science/religion dialogue—begins with an overview of some persistent tensions in the field. Then, using a threefold heuristic of encounter, engagement, and expression, it explores the routes taken by James Ashbrook and Andrew Newberg to develop a dialogue between theology and neuroscience, discussing some of the problems associated with these and their implications for attempts to further develop neurotheology. Finally, it proposes a different way of thinking about this enterprise and points toward a new methodology for supporting this endeavor. 相似文献
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Jerome A. Stone 《Zygon》2002,37(2):381-394
Although its roots go back at least to Spinoza, religious naturalism is once again becoming a self–conscious option in religious thinking. This article seeks to (1) provide a generic notion of religious naturalism, (2) sketch my own "minimalist" variety of religious naturalism, and (3) view the science–religion dialogue from both of these perspectives. This last will include reflection on the nature of scientific practices, the contributions of religious traditions to moral reflection, and Ursula Goodenough's "religiopoiesis." 相似文献
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John J. Davenport 《The Journal of Ethics》2002,6(3):235-259
This essay evaluates John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza'smature semi-compatibilist account of moral responsibility, focusingon their new theory of moderate reasons-responsiveness as a model of``moral sanity.' This theory, presented in Responsibility andControl, solves many of the problems with Fischer's earlier weakreasons-responsiveness model, such as its unwanted implication thatagents who are only erratically responsive to bizarre reasons can beresponsible for their acts. But I argue that the new model still facesseveral problems. It does not allow sufficiently for non-psychoticagents (who are largely reasons-responsive) with localized beliefsand desires incompatible with full responsibility. Nor does it take intoaccount that practical ``fragmentation of the self' over time may alsoreduce competence, since moral sanity requires some minimum level ofnarrative unity in our plans and projects. Finally, I argue that actual-sequenceaccounts cannot adequately explain sane but weak-willed agency. This isbecause without libertarian freedom, such accounts have no way to modelthe perverse agent's determination to be irrational or weak. 相似文献
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Alexander Paul Bozzo 《Metaphilosophy》2016,47(2):181-198
Bas C. van Fraassen, in his Terry Lectures at Yale University (subsequently published as The Empirical Stance), is concerned to elucidate what empiricism is, and could be, given past and current failures of characterization. He contends that naïve empiricism—the metaphilosophical position that characterizes empiricism in terms of a thesis—is self‐refuting, and he offers a reductio ad absurdum to substantiate this claim. Moreover, in place of naïve empiricism, van Fraassen endorses stance empiricism: the metaphilosophical position that characterizes empiricism in terms of certain attitudes and commitments. The present article, however, argues that van Fraassen begs the question in his reductio of naïve empiricism, and thus that his primary defense of stance empiricism is inadequate. 相似文献
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Bob Fischer 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2016,46(2):228-247
We have some justified beliefs about modal matters. A modal epistemology should explain what’s involved in our having that justification. Given that we’re realists about modality, how should we expect that explanation to go? In the first part of this essay, I suggest an answer to this question based on an analogy with games. Then, I outline a modal epistemology that fits with that answer. According to a theory-based epistemology of modality, you justifiably believe that p if (a) you justifiably believe a theory that says that p and (b) you believe p on the basis of that theory. 相似文献
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K. Brad Wray 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(1):81-89
I argue that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation for the success of science is superior to the realists’ explanation.
Whereas realists argue that our current theories are successful because they accurately reflect the structure of the world,
the selectionist claims that our current theories are successful because unsuccessful theories have been eliminated. I argue
that, unlike the explanation proposed by the realist, the selectionist explanation can also account for the failures of once successful theories and the fact that sometimes two competing theories are both equally successful.
相似文献
K. Brad WrayEmail: |
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Helen Longino 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(1):25-32
Bas van Fraassen’s empiricist reading of Perrin’s achievement invites the question: whose doubts about atoms did Perrin put to rest? This comment recontextualizes the argument and applies the notion of empirical grounding to some contemporary work in behavioral biology. 相似文献