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The decision strategy used to select a choice set from an array of alternative options is known to affect the composition of the final choice set. Specifically, individuals incorporate more answers into their choice set when it is created by eliminating implausible items than when the set is created through the inclusion of plausible options. This difference is accounted for in a decision framework that posits a general reluctance to change the status quo (i.e., actively include or exclude an item). We extended this work to investigate, not only the decisions themselves, but also metacognitive judgments (i.e., confidence in the accuracy of the choice set). In two face recognition experiments, we tested the impact of decision strategy (Experiment 1) and confidence judgment strategy (Experiment 2) on the confidence–accuracy relationship. In Experiment 1, participants completed two blocks of recognition trials, one under inclusion (marking previously seen faces) and one under elimination (marking previously unseen faces) instructions. We observed superior resolution (i.e., discrimination between correct and incorrect) for inclusion trials, but only when they were completed prior to use of the elimination strategy. In Experiment 2, all participants completed face recognition trials under inclusion instructions, but we manipulated the strategy used to assess confidence. Again, we observed a significant impact of strategy on confidence–accuracy resolution. Thus, we observed that both the strategy employed to reach a decision and that employed to assess confidence affected the confidence–accuracy relationship. We discuss theoretical and applied (particularly for eyewitness identification and multiple‐choice testing) implications. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Hal S. Stern 《Multivariate behavioral research》2016,51(1):23-29
Procedures used for statistical inference are receiving increased scrutiny as the scientific community studies the factors associated with insuring reproducible research. This note addresses recent negative attention directed at p values, the relationship of confidence intervals and tests, and the role of Bayesian inference and Bayes factors, with an eye toward better understanding these different strategies for statistical inference. We argue that researchers and data analysts too often resort to binary decisions (e.g., whether to reject or accept the null hypothesis) in settings where this may not be required. 相似文献
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Human choice under uncertainty is influenced by erroneous beliefs about randomness. In simple binary choice tasks, such as red/black predictions in roulette, long outcome runs (e.g. red, red, red) typically increase the tendency to predict the other outcome (i.e. black), an effect labeled the “gambler's fallacy.” In these settings, participants may also attend to streaks in their predictive performance. Winning and losing streaks are thought to affect decision confidence, although prior work indicates conflicting directions. Over three laboratory experiments involving red/black predictions in a sequential roulette task, we sought to identify the effects of outcome runs and winning/losing streaks upon color predictions, decision confidence and betting behavior. Experiments 1 (n = 40) and 3 (n = 40) obtained trial‐by‐trial confidence ratings, with a win/no win payoff and a no loss/loss payoff, respectively. Experiment 2 (n = 39) obtained a trial‐by‐trial bet amount on an equivalent scale. In each experiment, the gambler's fallacy was observed on choice behavior after color runs and, in experiment 2, on betting behavior after color runs. Feedback streaks exerted no reliable influence on confidence ratings, in either payoff condition. Betting behavior, on the other hand, increased as a function of losing streaks. The increase in betting on losing streaks is interpreted as a manifestation of loss chasing; these data help clarify the psychological mechanisms underlying loss chasing and caution against the use of betting measures (“post‐decision wagering”) as a straightforward index of decision confidence. © 2014 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 相似文献
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Kate Vallance 《Counselling and Psychotherapy Research》2005,5(2):107-110
This qualitative study explores counsellors’ experiences and perceptions of how counselling supervision impacts upon their clients. Data collection combined open‐ended questionnaires (n = 13) and semi‐structured interviews (n = 6). The findings indicate that supervision impacts client work both helpfully and unhelpfully. Areas that emerged as having the most direct impact on client work were the counselling relationship dynamics and self‐awareness, professional development, emotional support, clients not discussed in supervision and the quality of the supervisory relationship. Congruence and confidence were the most direct link between supervision and client work. 相似文献
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Previous studies showed that random error can explain overconfidence effects typically observed in the literature. One of these studies concluded that, after accounting for random error effects in the data, there is little support for cognitive‐processing biases in confidence elicitation. In this paper, we investigate more closely the random error explanation for overconfidence. We generated data from four models of confidence and then estimated the magnitude of random error in the data. Our results show that, in addition to the true magnitude of random error specified in the simulations, the error estimates are influenced by important cognitive‐processing biases in the confidence elicitation process. We found that random error in the response process can account for the degree of overconfidence found in calibration studies, even when that overconfidence is actually caused by other factors. Thus, the error models say little about whether cognitive biases are present in the confidence elicitation process. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
47.
The relation between reinforcer magnitude and timing behavior was studied using a peak procedure. Four rats received multiple consecutive sessions with both low and high levels of brain stimulation reward (BSR). Rats paused longer and had later start times during sessions when their responses were reinforced with low-magnitude BSR. When estimated by a symmetric Gaussian function, peak times also were earlier; when estimated by a better-fitting asymmetric Gaussian function or by analyzing individual trials, however, these peak-time changes were determined to reflect a mixture of large effects of BSR on start times and no effect on stop times. These results pose a significant dilemma for three major theories of timing (SET, MTS, and BeT), which all predict no effects for chronic manipulations of reinforcer magnitude. We conclude that increased reinforcer magnitude influences timing in two ways: through larger immediate after-effects that delay responding and through anticipatory effects that elicit earlier responding. 相似文献
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Lioba Werth Fritz Strack Jens Frster 《Organizational behavior and human decision processes》2002,87(2):323
“Hindsight Bias” is a person's tendency, after learning about the actual outcome of a situation or the correct answer to a question, to distort a previous judgment in the direction of this new information. In the literature, hindsight bias has been mostly discussed as an inevitable result of a “judgment under uncertainty.” We think that the hindsight bias is due to memorial as well as inferential processes: Whereas certainty about the recollection is memorial and concerns the recollective experience, certainty at the time of the judgment is inferential and concerns the individual's metaknowledge (“I know that I knew that”). In two experiments participants' feelings of certainty were measured indirectly (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) by giving participants the option of leaving those questions unanswered about which they felt uncertain. This free-report option was offered to half of the participants in the first estimate phase (concerning time of judgment) and to the second half in the memory phase (concerning the recollective experience). At the end of the session, participants were presented again with the questions they had skipped and were now required to answer them. This procedure allowed us to compare the amount of hindsight bias for the skipped, uncertain items to the spontaneously answered, certain ones. Both experiments demonstrated that the hindsight bias is a result of the interaction of both uncertainty and certainty. 相似文献