Ideological Orientation and Political Transition in Hong Kong: Confidence in the Future

In the two-component model of ideological orientation, a person's ideological position is jointly influenced by attitudinal and affective components. The present study adopted this conceptual model to predict confidence in the future of Hong Kong. Questionnaire responses were collected from 395 adults (56.8% men and 43.2% women) in Hong Kong in April 1995, some 2 years before its transfer from British to Chinese control. The results show that the level of confidence in Hong Kong was related to both attitudinal and affective identification with Hong Kong and China. These findings suggest that the transfer of government may have brought to the surface a collision of the divergent political cultures of Hong Kong and mainland China, resulting in two antagonistic political orientations that predicted confidence in the future of Hong Kong.     

大学生成就动机、性格特征、控制点与自信关系的研究

本研究将成就动机、性格特征及内外控倾向三因素综合起来加以考察 ,探讨它们对大学生自信人格的影响作用及影响路径 ,从而揭示出四种人格特征之间的内在关系 ,2 3 5名大学生参加了测试。结果表明 :大学生成就动机、性格特征、内外控和自信等四种人格特征之间存在不同程度的相关 ;成就动机、内外控倾向和性别等主要变量对大学生自信有显著预测作用 ;成就动机和控制点对大学生自信具有直接效应 ,控制点和性格特征对自信具有间接效应     

反馈对目击证人辨认信心的影响

探讨辨认主持人对目击证人的辨认给予不同反馈对其辨认信心的影响。213名被试参加实验。先看一段模拟罪犯逃逸时的录像,然后对11张相继呈现的人像照片做辨认和确定程度的判断。随机给予肯定、否定或没有反馈之后,被试做辨认确定程度和其他一些相关问题的判断。结果表明,辨认错误的证人在得到肯定反馈后,受到的影响较小;而得到否定反馈后,受到的影响较大。不同专业背景、不同性别的被试受到反馈的影响也有所不同。     

Two modes of confidence rating: An effect of episodic information of participant's own past responses in a repeated-question paradigm

Abstract: General knowledge questions with two answer alternatives were employed in experimental session 1; in session 2, the same questions were presented together with participants' own session-1 responses. In order to examine whether or not the episodic information of participant's own responses would suppress standard confidence-rating mode in session 2, rates of answer- and confidence-changes between sessions were analyzed. In session 2, participants were able to change the confidence value to another, if they thought the initial value inadequate. They then had a chance to change the answer to the other and rated their confidence in the new answer. The major results were as follows: (a) Between-session answer change rate was very low; (b) Between-session answer change rate was not a monotonic decreasing function of confidence; (c) However, the rate depended on confidence change from session 1 to before-answer-change rating. These results clearly contrasted with a previous study ( Saito, 1998 ) in which episodic information of participant's own session 1 answers and confidence values was not presented. It was argued that the episodic information triggered another mode of confidence rating or a decision inertia effect.     

Beliefs do not come in degrees

Philosophers commonly say that beliefs come in degrees (or that beliefs are graded or that there are partial beliefs). Drawing from the literature, I make precise three arguments for this claim: an argument from degrees of confidence, an argument from degrees of firmness, and an argument from natural language. I show that they all fail. I also advance three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees: an argument from natural language, an argument from intuition, and an argument from the metaphysics of degrees. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that beliefs do not come in degrees.     

Individual Differences in Decision Making Depend on Cognitive Abilities,Monitoring and Control

Decision making is the process by which actions are constructed and initiated. Across many research streams, this can be explained in terms of three broad cognitive processes: cognitive abilities that construct judgements and potential courses of action, and interacting monitoring and control processes that determine when to initiate them as behaviour. The aim of this research was to investigate the generality of individual differences in these processes, and their power to predict patterns of decision behaviour identified in our previous research. Undergraduate participants (N = 364) completed nine tests assessing cognitive abilities, monitoring confidence, control thresholds and various patterns of decision behaviour. The tests differed in their cognitive ability requirements and the nature of the payoffs associated with decisions. Cognitive abilities were a strong predictor of individuals' decision competence and optimality, while monitoring confidence and control thresholds were strong and unique predictors of their overall decisiveness, and reckless and hesitant errors. These results were strongest when the measures of cognitive abilities and monitoring confidence were derived from tests with the same cognitive requirements as the tests used to derive the decision behaviours and when the control threshold measure was derived from tests with the same decision payoffs as the test used to derive the decision behaviours. This effect was particularly pronounced for control thresholds, highlighting the domain‐specific nature of cognitive control processes. These findings demonstrate how cognitive abilities, monitoring output and control thresholds interact with cognitive requirements and context‐specific payoffs to drive individual differences in decision‐making behaviour. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can People Identify “Deceptive” or “Misleading” Items that Tend to Produce Mostly Wrong Answers?

In many domains, two‐alternative forced‐choice questions produce more correct responses than wrong responses across participants. However, some items, dubbed “deceptive” or “misleading”, produce mostly wrong answers. These items yield poor calibration and poor resolution because the dominant, erroneous response tends to be endorsed with great confidence, even greater than that of the correct response. In addition, for deceptive items, group discussion amplifies rather than mitigates error while enhancing confidence in the erroneous response. Can participants identify deceptive items when they are warned about their existence? It is argued that people's ability to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive items is poor when the erroneous responses are based on the same process assumed to underlie correct responses. Indeed, participants failed to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive perceptual items when they were warned that some of the items (Experiment 1) or exactly half of the items (Experiment 2) were deceptive. A similar failure was observed for general‐knowledge questions (Experiment 3) except when participants were informed about the correct answer (Experiment 4). Possibly, for these tasks, people cannot escape the dangers lurking in deceptive items. In contrast, the results suggest that participants can identify deceptive problems for which the wrong answer stems from reliance on a fast, intuitive process that differs from the analytic mode that is likely to yield correct answers (Experiment 5). The practical and theoretical implications of the results were discussed. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Incidental Confidence Influences Self‐Interested Behaviors: A Double‐Edged Sword

The present research investigates how incidental confidence influences self‐interested behaviors. It is well established that being in a psychological state of lower confidence causes people to experience psychological aversion that they are motivated to reduce. We study the transfer effect of confidence; people strive to compensate for lower confidence in one domain by obtaining higher status in other unrelated domains. Prior research has linked money with status and suggested that money can increase confidence. Building on this research, we proposed and showed in four experiments that lower incidental confidence increased self‐interested behaviors that brought financial gains. Drawing on research on competitive altruism, we also predicted and found that when altruism, rather than money, was seen as the primary source of status, the effect of incidental confidence reversed such that lower incidental confidence decreased self‐interested behaviors. Data ruled out alternative explanations and provided consistent evidence for the proposed compensatory mechanism. We also discussed theoretical and practical implications of the present research. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

预期如何影响人们对不愉快事件的体验?

本研究以味觉和痛觉两种感觉通道的体验为对象,探讨预期效价和预期信心如何影响知觉体验的结果及其作用机制。通过基于味觉和痛觉的两个实验,发现预期会影响即时知觉体验,并且预期信心在其中起到调节作用——对预期充满信心时,即时体验和对结果的预期保持一致,预期越积极即时体验越好,预期越消极即时体验越差;而对预期缺乏信心时,即时体验和预期之间呈现背离趋势,预期越积极即时体验越差,预期越消极即时体验则越好。研究结果阐明了预期影响即时体验的机制,对我们理解身心关系也具有重要的理论意义。     

与零假设检验有关的统计分析流程

人们熟知的零假设显著性检验,受到一次次质疑与辩护,地位并未动摇,报告检验结果仍然是统计分析的习惯做法。不过,其局限性促使研究者探寻更多的统计方法如区间估计、效应量分析、检验力分析等。本文先介绍假设检验与置信区间的关系;然后讨论检验力与两类错误率和效应量的关系;最后在理顺上述统计方法的基础上,提供一个可操作的统计分析流程。