Can self-affirmation exacerbate adverse reactions to stress under certain conditions?

Objective: Self-affirmation has repeatedly been shown to reduce adverse psychological and physiological responses to stress. However, it is plausible that self-affirmation could exacerbate negative reactions to stress under certain conditions. The current research explored whether self-affirmation would increase negative psychological responses to a stressor occurring in a central life domain characterised by low levels of control.

Design: Female participants (Study 1 N = 132; Study 2 N = 141) completed baseline measures of anxiety and mood. They were then randomly allocated to complete a self-affirmation or control task, before reading a narrative documenting a stressful birth and imagining themselves in the place of the woman giving birth. After completing this task, participants again reported their levels of anxiety and positive mood.

Main outcome measures: Anxiety and positive mood assessed at follow-up.

Results: Study 1 demonstrated that self-affirmed women experienced increased anxiety and less positive mood at follow-up, compared both to baseline and to women in the control condition. Study 2 revealed that the effect of self-affirmation on outcomes was moderated by fear of childbirth.

Conclusion: These results provide preliminary evidence that self-affirmation may worsen negative responses to stressors under certain conditions and for certain individuals.     

Cultural differences in distraction processing: influence of context at retrieval

Cultural differences in information processing affect perceptual judgment, attention, and memory. We investigated whether cultural differences in processing patterns, specifically East Asian participants’ tendency to encode holistically, compared to Western tendencies to process analytically, affect performance on an implicit memory test. First, participants completed a 1-back task on pictures with superimposed distracting words. After a delay filled with a computerised Corsi block task, they performed a word fragment task in which some fragments could be completed with the distracting words from the 1-back task. Critically, fragments were presented with the same pictures as previously seen (matched condition), with no pictures (control condition), or with pictures from other trials on the 1-back task (mismatched condition). Non-Asian Canadian participants showed virtually no priming for distraction, independent of the reinstatement of encoding context. East Asian Canadian participants showed superior priming for fragments that had been paired with their original pictures. They did not show evidence of a detriment for the mismatched, relative to control, condition.     

Changes in infant visual attention when observing repeated actions

Infants’ early visual preferences for faces, and their observational learning abilities, are well-established in the literature. The current study examines how infants’ attention changes as they become increasingly familiar with a person and the actions that person is demonstrating. The looking patterns of 12- (n = 61) and 16-month-old infants (n = 29) were tracked while they watched videos of an adult presenting novel actions with four different objects three times. A face-to-action ratio in visual attention was calculated for each repetition and summarized as a mean across all videos. The face-to-action ratio increased with each action repetition, indicating that there was an increase in attention to the face relative to the action each additional time the action was demonstrated. Infant’s prior familiarity with the object used was related to face-to-action ratio in 12-month-olds and initial looking behavior was related to face-to-action ratio in the whole sample. Prior familiarity with the presenter, and infant gender and age, were not related to face-to-action ratio. This study has theoretical implications for face preference and action observations in dynamic contexts.     

The Role of Gesture in Supporting Mental Representations: The Case of Mental Abacus Arithmetic

People frequently gesture when problem‐solving, particularly on tasks that require spatial transformation. Gesture often facilitates task performance by interacting with internal mental representations, but how this process works is not well understood. We investigated this question by exploring the case of mental abacus (MA), a technique in which users not only imagine moving beads on an abacus to compute sums, but also produce movements in gestures that accompany the calculations. Because the content of MA is transparent and readily manipulated, the task offers a unique window onto how gestures interface with mental representations. We find that the size and number of MA gestures reflect the length and difficulty of math problems. Also, by selectively interfering with aspects of gesture, we find that participants perform significantly worse on MA under motor interference, but that perceptual feedback is not critical for success on the task. We conclude that premotor processes involved in the planning of gestures are critical to mental representation in MA.     

How the Abstract Becomes Concrete: Irrational Numbers Are Understood Relative to Natural Numbers and Perfect Squares

Mathematical cognition research has largely emphasized concepts that can be directly perceived or grounded in visuospatial referents. These include concrete number systems like natural numbers, integers, and rational numbers. Here, we investigate how a more abstract number system, the irrationals denoted by radical expressions like , is understood across three tasks. Performance on a magnitude comparison task suggests that people interpret irrational numbers (specifically, the radicands of radical expressions) as natural numbers. Strategy self‐reports during a number line estimation task reveal that the spatial locations of irrationals are determined by referencing neighboring perfect squares. Finally, perfect squares facilitate the evaluation of arithmetic expressions. These converging results align with a constellation of related phenomena spanning tasks and number systems of varying complexity. Accordingly, we propose that the task‐specific recruitment of more concrete representations to make sense of more abstract concepts (referential processing) is an important mechanism for teaching and learning mathematics.     

Do Smarter People Employ Better Decision Strategies? The Influence of Intelligence on Adaptive Use of the Recognition Heuristic

Within the adaptive toolbox approach, it has repeatedly been shown that, on average, people tend to adapt their decision strategies to the decision context. Building upon these results, we investigated whether individuals systematically differ in their ability to successfully adapt to the situation when applying the fast‐and‐frugal recognition heuristic (RH). In decisions between recognized and unrecognized choice objects, individuals can base their choices solely on recognition, as predicted by the RH, or they can use further knowledge retrieved from memory. Since intelligence has been conceived as the ability to successfully adapt to different situations, we expected intelligence to influence the degree of adaptive use of the RH. To test this hypothesis, we first re‐analyzed data that referred to a decision domain for which RH‐use is known to perform well. As expected, individual RH‐use increased with general intelligence. Next, we designed an experiment addressing individual RH‐use in two new decision domains, one domain for which RH‐use was less effective than knowledge‐use and another domain for which both strategies were about equally effective. In addition, we tested whether fluid or crystallized intelligence best predicts adaptive use of the RH. RH‐use was found to decrease with fluid but not crystallized intelligence when RH‐use was less effective than use of further knowledge. In contrast, there was no significant association between either type of intelligence and RH‐use when none of the two strategies was optimal. We conclude that adaptive use versus non‐use of the RH is moderated by fluid intelligence. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moral Learning,Rationality, and the Unreliability of Affect

James Woodward and John Allman [2007, 2008] and Peter Railton [2014, 2016] argue that our moral intuitions are products of sophisticated rational learning systems. I investigate the implications that this discovery has for intuition-based philosophical methodologies. Instead of vindicating the conservative use of intuitions in philosophy, I argue that what I call the rational learning strategy fails to show philosophers are justified in appealing to their moral intuitions in philosophical arguments without giving reasons why those intuitions are trustworthy. Despite the fact that our intuitions are outputs of surprisingly sophisticated learning mechanisms, we do not have reason to unreflectively trust them when offering arguments in moral philosophy.     

Facial expression coding in children and adolescents with autism: Reduced adaptability but intact norm-based coding

Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) can have difficulty recognizing emotional expressions. Here, we asked whether the underlying perceptual coding of expression is disrupted. Typical individuals code expression relative to a perceptual (average) norm that is continuously updated by experience. This adaptability of face-coding mechanisms has been linked to performance on various face tasks. We used an adaptation aftereffect paradigm to characterize expression coding in children and adolescents with autism. We asked whether face expression coding is less adaptable in autism and whether there is any fundamental disruption of norm-based coding. If expression coding is norm-based, then the face aftereffects should increase with adaptor expression strength (distance from the average expression). We observed this pattern in both autistic and typically developing participants, suggesting that norm-based coding is fundamentally intact in autism. Critically, however, expression aftereffects were reduced in the autism group, indicating that expression-coding mechanisms are less readily tuned by experience. Reduced adaptability has also been reported for coding of face identity and gaze direction. Thus, there appears to be a pervasive lack of adaptability in face-coding mechanisms in autism, which could contribute to face processing and broader social difficulties in the disorder.     

Linking metaphor comprehension with analogical reasoning: Evidence from typical development and autism spectrum disorder

We examined the relationship between metaphor comprehension and verbal analogical reasoning in young adults who were either typically developing (TD) or diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). The ASD sample was highly educated and high in verbal ability, and closely matched to a subset of TD participants on age, gender, educational background, and verbal ability. Additional TD participants with a broader range of abilities were also tested. Each participant solved sets of verbal analogies and metaphors in verification formats, allowing measurement of both accuracy and reaction times. Measures of individual differences in vocabulary, verbal working memory, and autistic traits were also obtained. Accuracy for both the verbal analogy and the metaphor task was very similar across the ASD and matched TD groups. However, reaction times on both tasks were longer for the ASD group. Additionally, stronger correlations between verbal analogical reasoning and working memory capacity in the ASD group indicated that processing verbal analogies was more effortful for them. In the case of both groups, accuracy on the metaphor and analogy tasks was correlated. A mediation analysis revealed that after controlling for working memory capacity, the inter-task correlation could be accounted for by the mediating variable of vocabulary knowledge, suggesting that the primary common mechanisms linking the two tasks involve language skills.     

Relationships Among Sleep Disturbance,Reward System Functioning,Anhedonia, and Depressive Symptoms

Recent models propose reward system dysfunction as a key mediator of the relationship between sleep and depression and anhedonia. This study explored interrelationships among sleep disturbance, depressive symptoms, anhedonia, and reward responsiveness. Two-hundred and sixty undergraduate students completed questionnaires and a daily diary paradigm assessing sleep, reward responsiveness, depression, anhedonia, and positive affect over 1 week. Baseline sleep disturbance was associated with depressive symptoms, anhedonia, and reward responsiveness. Daily diary sleep parameters showed differential associations with anticipatory versus consummatory reward responsiveness and positive affect. Poorer sleep quality, shorter sleep duration, and longer awakening after sleep onset predicted blunted anticipatory and consummatory reward responsiveness, while increased sleep onset latency and lower sleep efficiency predicted only decreased consummatory reward responsiveness. All sleep indices, except sleep onset latency, were associated with positive affect. Findings demonstrate unique associations between disparate sleep disturbance and reward responsiveness elements, highlighting new treatment mechanisms for anhedonia and depression.