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121.
胰岛素抵抗与2型糖尿病关系的新思考 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
胰岛素抵抗(IR)与2型糖尿病关系密切,对IR的认识,经历了几十年反复的过程,胰岛素抵抗综合征(IRS)的提出使2型糖尿病防治观念发生了根本的转变,提出了2型糖尿病防治新策略:从以降糖治疗为主到全面防治心血管疾病.对IR的认识和IR与2型糖尿病的关系,体现了辩证唯物主义认识论和系统论的观点. 相似文献
122.
Kevin Patrick Tobia 《Metaphilosophy》2015,46(4-5):575-594
Many philosophers claim to employ intuitions in their philosophical arguments. Others contest that no such intuitions are used frequently or at all in philosophy. This article suggests and defends a conception of intuitions as part of the philosophical method: intuitions are special types of philosophical assumptions to which we are invited to assent, often as premises in argument, that may serve an independent function in philosophical argument and that are not formed through a purely inferential process. A series of philosophical case studies shows that intuitions in these arguments contain the relevant features. The view has implications for philosophical method, offering a compromise between opponents on the divisive debate of the merits of experimental philosophy: experimental philosophy provides an especially useful role in philosophical assumption analysis. 相似文献
123.
124.
人类基因组图谱研究能给我们带来什么 总被引:15,自引:4,他引:11
方福德 《医学与哲学(人文社会医学版)》2000,21(11):16-20
人类基础组研究在过去10年中取得了重要成果,推动了生命科学的迅猛发展。人类基因组研究给我们带来了什么?首先是带来了新的观念,促使人们从整体综合的认识论高度去认识生命现象的发生原理,其次,在方法论上,开创了以高通量、大规模为特点的研究方式。人类基因组研究将成为21世纪科技发展的优先领域。 相似文献
125.
Henry SG 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2006,27(3):187-213
The evidence-based medicine movement advocates basing all medical decisions on certain types of quantitative research data and has stimulated protracted controversy and debate since its inception. Evidence-based medicine presupposes an inaccurate and deficient view of medical knowledge. Michael Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge both explains this deficiency and suggests remedies for it. Polanyi shows how all explicit human knowledge depends on a wealth of tacit knowledge which accrues from experience and is essential for problem solving. Edmund Pellegrino’s classic treatment of clinical judgment is examined, and a Polanyian critique of this position demonstrates that tacit knowledge is necessary for understanding how clinical judgment and medical decisions involve persons. An adequate medical epistemology requires much more qualitative research relevant to the clinical encounter and medical decision making than is currently being done. This research is necessary for preventing an uncritical application of evidence-based medicine by health care managers that erodes good clinical practice. Polanyi’s epistemology shows the need for this work and provides the structural core for building an adequate and robust medical epistemology that moves beyond evidence-based medicine.An erratum to this article can be found at 相似文献
126.
Dawn E. Schrader 《Journal of Adult Development》2004,11(2):87-101
Students report feeling safe to express and challenge their beliefs and assumptions in some classrooms and interactions but not in others. This paper proposes a definition of intellectual safety derived from student responses to their experience of safety or threat in college classrooms, and explores students' experience of intellectual safety in relation to epistemological development. Intellectual safety defined here has two components: epistemic fit or lack of fit between student and professor's epistemology, and moral climate. Students can be challenged in their world-views and feel either threatened, unsafe, and uncomfortable, or supported and safe despite possible discomfort. Experiencing an intellectually safe moral climate may create conditions and opportunities for epistemological reflection and change. Using concepts from moral theory, including moral type and moral perspectives of justice and care, I describe features of an intellectually safe moral climate during the cognitively and emotionally difficult time of epistemological development. 相似文献
127.
从佛教量论看翻译的实质及类型划分--兼论翻译理论中的不可译性问题 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
本文首先从佛教量论的角度对翻译的实质做出界定,指出翻译的实质是一种为他(社会性)的比量活动。根据翻译为他比量的实质,可以引导出翻译的两种类型:比知翻译和喻知翻译。比知翻译是具有事先直接约定性的语言传递活动;喻知翻译是没有事先直接约定的语言传递活动。根据从佛教量论对翻译实质和类型的规定,本文分析了不可译性问题,揭示出不可译性在认识论上的误区,指出不可译性是不可知论或怀疑论在翻译领域的显现。 相似文献
128.
George F. R. Ellis 《Zygon》1999,34(4):601-607
Nancey Murphy has been influential in the religion-and-science field through her espousal of the work of Imre Lakatos, more recently developed into a three-tier approach to the joint epistemology of scientific and religious thought incorporating also the ideas of Hempel and MacIntyre. She has proposed a substantial influence of the radical reformed tradition on science and has demonstrated the nature of social influences on the form of Darwinism. She has developed important links between ethics and the science-theology debate and has examined in depth ideas associated with hierarchical structuring, supervenience, and the nature of the soul. Together these form a unique and sharply focused contribution to the understanding of the relation between science and religion. 相似文献
129.
Peter Jacco Sas 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(1):131-153
This paper examines the question whether foundational epistemology (“FE”) can be replaced by naturalized epistemology (“NE”).
First, it argues that Quine's defense of NE is inadequate since it is only based on arguments showing the impossibility of
the logical empiricist version of FE rather than on arguments for the impossibility of FE as such. Second, it proposes that
a more promising argument for the impossibility of FE can be found in the Münchhausen-trilemma which aims at showing that
ultimate foundations (and, hence, FE) are unattainable. However, Karl-Otto Apel has shown that this trilemma is unconclusive
since it uncritically presupposes the premise that all argumentation is deductive in nature. Apel's argument implies that
FE is possible if and only if it is possible to devise a non-deductive foundation (“NDF”). It is argued, however, that the
possibility of NDF cannot be demonstrated. This leads to a situation called the Multatuli-dilemma: we cannot prove the possibility
of ultimate foundations nor can we prove the impossibility of ultimate foundations. This dilemma shows that the discussion
about the possibility of FE is pointless. Thus, it suggests that it is legitimate to replace FE by NE. Barry Stroud and Henri
Lauener, however, argue that this replacement is not feasible since NE is not capable of refuting scepticism (Stroud) or justifying
methodological rules (Lauener). But these objections are shown to be mistaken: First, epistemological scepticism is practically
impossible and, hence, does not pose a serious threat to NE. Second, NE is capable of justifying methodological norms if and
only if it makes use of so-called internal justifications. Thus, the final conclusion of this paper is that FE can be replaced
by NE.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
130.
Mariam Thalos 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(2):317-339
The radical probabilist counsels the prudent never to put away uncertainty, and hence always to balance judgment with probabilities
of various sizes. Against this counsel I shall advise in favor of the practice of full belief — at least for some occasions.
This advice rests on the fact that it is sometimes in a person's interests to accept certain propositions as a means of bringing
it about that others recognize oneself as having accepted those propositions. With the pragmatists, therefore, I shall reject
the view that belief formation must in every instance be a truth-directed affair. Unlike the pragmatists, however, I shall
conclude that the enterprise of belief formation is not directed exclusively, or even primarily, at attaining knowledge. In other words, pursuit of that which it profits to believe, on the one hand, and pursuit of knowledge on the other, are
distinct enterprises, which overlap (when they do) only accidentally.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献