Generalized concepts of syntactically and semantically trivial differences and instant-based and period-based time ontologies

It is argued that there are interesting cases in which two axiomatic systems syntactically and semantically non-trivially different in the standard sense are rather to be classified as only trivially different. For a strict comparison of the systems of such a kind the generalized concepts of syntactically and semantically trivial differences are formally defined. As an example, it is shown that an instant-based time system and a period-based time system sketched in the paper are just trivially different in the defined sense in spite of the fact that, contrary to Quine's famous requirement, the variables of the two systems can never range over the elements of one and the same basic set. What is the same in relation to both systems is time topology.     

The Metaphorical Conception of Scientific Explanation: Rereading Mary Hesse

Summary  In 1997, five decades after the publication of the landmark Hempel-Oppenheim article “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”([1948], 1970) Wesley Salmon published Causality and Explanation, a book that re-addresses the issue of scientific explanation. He provided an overview of the basic approaches to scientific explanation, stressed their weaknesses, and offered novel insights. However, he failed to mention Mary Hesse’s approach to the topic and analyze her standpoint. This essay brings front and center Hesse’s approach to scientific explanation formulated in the 1960s and argues that rereading Hesse’s account one can overcome the criticisms addressed towards another influential theory of explanation that of Bas van Fraassen’s. Furthermore, it could bring the traditional philosophy of science into a fruitful conversation with science and technology studies and gender studies in science, technology and medicine.     

Stances and Epistemology: Values,Pragmatics, and Rationality

Bas van Fraassen has argued that many philosophical positions should be understood as stances rather than factual beliefs. This paper discusses the vexed question of whether and how such stances can be rationally justified. It argues that stances may be justified pragmatically, in terms of both their epistemic fruits and their coherence with our values, both epistemic and non‐epistemic. It also examines van Fraassen's version of epistemological voluntarism, which has received considerable attention of late, and shows that it provides a theoretical framework, and approach to epistemology, within which the pragmatic and value‐based forms of justification appropriate to stance choice find a natural home.     

Impairment of voice and face recognition in patients with hemispheric damage

Voice and face recognition were tested in 21 left- and 9 right-hemisphere-damaged patients. Test materials were photographs and recordings of famous political and entertainment personalities. Pathological face recognition (prosopagnosia) and voice recognition (phonagnosia) were both significantly more prevalent in the right-hemisphere group. Only one instance of prosopagnosia and one of phonagnosia were observed in the left-hemisphere group, all of whom were aphasic. Of the right-hemisphere cases, there were four instances of each agnosia, with three patients showing a dual impairment. These findings are discussed in relation to differential modes of processing by the two cerebral hemispheres.