Is “Intelligent Design” Unavoidable—Even by Howard Van Till? A Response

Howard Van Till has long been a critic of interventionist conceptions of God's creative activity, and he places the "intelligent design" position in that category. Yet certain lines of reasoning in Van Till's own work can best be understood as arguing for design. It is likely that this reasoning will eventually bring Van Till into conflict with an increasingly naturalistic scientific community.     

Should Religious Naturalists Promote a Naturalistic Religion?

Religious naturalism refers here to a view of reality, and it will be contrasted with versions of supernaturalism and of atheistic naturalism. Naturalistic religion refers to certain varieties of religion, especially some inspired by the universality of science and the need for a global ethics. In this essay I explicate why a religious naturalist need not advocate a naturalistic religion. Rather, a religious naturalist can build upon the heritage of religious traditions and be open to, but at the same time be agnostic about, the idea of a nonnatural ground of reality . The religious naturalism I defend has been criticized from various directions: one reviewer in this journal considered it too much indebted to the traditions, and hence "reactionary" and supernaturalistic; another considered it too minimalist in its religion ("virtually nonexistent") as a consequence of the preference for a too sober version of naturalism. My distinction between religious naturalism and naturalistic religion may answer some of these objections.     

Competence and processing in children's grammar of relative clauses

We report two toy-manipulation experiments investigating 4–5-year-old children's interpretations of relative clauses. In the first experiment we show that the frequency with which relatives modifying the matrix direct object are interpreted as referring to the matrix subject is sensitive to the nature of the material in the relative. Animacy of the relative direct object leads to an increase in subject coreference errors for relatives; a similar effect of animacy was not found for infinitival complements. We propose that such errors arise when the child's sentence processor is taxed. In our second experiment we compare children's interpretations of relatives to their interpretations of temporal participial complements. Children eschewed coreference between the complement and the object of a passive prepositional phrase in the case of temporal participials but not in the case of relatives. We interpret this result as evidence that children are capable of analyzing relatives as constituents of the NP node, and hence that this node is recursive in their grammars. We discuss the results of both experiments in the context of a two-stage parsing model, arguing that our data fit a picture of children's linguistic abilities in which the 4-year-old has a sophisticated competence grammar and a parsing mechanism of essentially the same structure as the adult's. We compare our approach to a number of other approaches to children's relative clause interpretations in the literature, arguing that these alternatives are too structure-specific and can lead to underestimations of the child's competence grammar. We conclude that our analysis is compatible with a picture of acquisition in which the child's competence grammar of relatives is not qualitatively different from the adult's.     

Believing one’s reasons are good

Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called “Inferential Internalist” principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to that latter belief as well. While such principles and their close relatives figure centrally in a wide variety of recent epistemological discussions, there is confusion in the literature about what, precisely, Inferential Internalism commits one to and whether it is so much as coherent. This paper (1) articulates a broader framework for understanding the notion of epistemic responsibility, (2) motivates Inferential Internalism on the basis of considerations about the basing relation, epistemic responsibility, and parallels with practical deliberation, (3) defends Inferential Internalism against charges of incoherence leveled by James Van Cleve and Paul Boghossian, and (4) shows that contrary to a currently widespread view, Inferential Internalism is coherent even if foundationalism and the a priori are rejected. The paper closes with a preliminary argument for an affirmative answer to the initiating question about the requirements of epistemic responsibility.     

THE SEMANTIC STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AS AN ARGUMENT AGAINST INTELLIGENT DESIGN

Abstract. This paper examines the impact of two formalizations of evolutionary biology on the antiselectionist critiques of the Intelligent Design (ID) movement. It looks first at attempts to apply the syntactic framework of the physical sciences to biology in the twentieth century, and to their effect upon the ID movement. It then examines the more heuristic account of biological‐theory structure, namely, the semantic model. Finally, it concludes by advocating the semantic conception and emphasizing the problems that the semantic model creates for ID's negative and positive theses.     

Heymans' temperamental dimensions in personality research

In this article an overview is given of personality research related to the temperamental system of the Dutch philosopher and psychologist Gerard Heymans (1852–1930). After a sketch of this three-dimensional typology, three domains of research are briefly described. The first is a line of research on the system itself and its applications in differential psychology. In the second, the role of its dimensions in modern trait psychology is sketched. In the third line of thought the Heymans categories are viewed and investigated as dimensions of person perception.     

A developmental study of learning disabilities and memory

Seven-, ten-, and thirteen-year-old learning-disabled (LD) and non-learning-disabled (NORM) children were presented specially structured lists of 38 words each and tested for free recall. Each list contained only four semantically related words. Two of the four related words were presented contiguously (serial positions 9 and 10) and the other two words were spaced (serial positions 20 and 30). All children recalled disproportionately more adjacent words (item 9 or 10) than any other words. Spaced words (items 20 and 30) were less likely to be recalled by the younger children than by the older children and by the LDs than by the NORMS. These findings provided support for the distinction between automatic and purposive semantic processing. NORMs' recall was governed by purposive semantic processing to a greater extent than was LDs' recall. However, no group or age differences were observed in automatic semantic processing.     

The logic of how-questions

Philosophers and scientists are concerned with the why and the how of things. Questions like the following are so much grist for the philosopher’s and scientist’s mill: How can we be free and yet live in a deterministic universe?, How do neural processes give rise to conscious experience?, Why does conscious experience accompany certain physiological events at all?, How is a three-dimensional perception of depth generated by a pair of two-dimensional retinal images?. Since Belnap and Steel’s pioneering work on the logic of questions, Van Fraassen has managed to apply their approach in constructing an account of the logic of why-questions. Comparatively little, by contrast, has been written on the logic of how-questions despite the apparent centrality of questions such as How is it possible for us to be both free and determined? to philosophical enterprise.¹ In what follows I develop a logic for how-questions of various sorts including how-questions of cognitive resolution, how-questions of manner, how-questions of method, of means, and of mechanism.