Majority influence,minority influence and conversion behavior: A replication

A recent experiment by Moscovici and Personnaz (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1980, 16, 270–282) showed that whereas a majority produces merely compliance, or a change in the individual's verbal responses, a minority induces conversion, or a true change in one's subjective judgments. Because of the theoretical significance of these findings and because of their inconsistency with data from other experiments, an exact replication and extension of this experiment was performed. There was no evidence of compliance in any social influence condition. Instead, and in contrast to Moscovici and Personnaz, both a majority and a minority produced “conversion” behavior. Subjects' behavior is interpreted as the expression of an improved perception, resulting from a heightened level of attention to the object of judgment under social influence conditions.     

ISLAM AND SCIENCE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL GROUNDS FOR A GENUINE DEBATE

What does it take for Islam and science to engage in a genuine conversation with each other? This essay is an attempt to answer this question by clarifying the conditions which make having such a conversation possible and plausible. I will first distinguish between three notions of conversation: the trivial conversation (which requires sharing a common language and the meaning of its ordinary expressions), superficial conversation (in which although the language is shared, the communicators fail to share the meaning of their theoretical terms), and genuine conversation (which implies sharing the language and the meaning of ordinary as well as theoretical terms). I will then argue that our real concern with regard to the exchange between Islam and science is to be to specify the conditions under which their proponents can engage in a genuine conversation with each other and that such a conversation to take place essentially requires sharing a common ontology. Following Quine, I will argue that Muslims, like the followers of any religion, would have no other choice but to work from within science. Doing so, however, would not prevent Muslims from having a genuine conversation with the proponents of other worldviews because when the shared ontology fails to offer any potentially testable answer to our remaining questions about the world, the Islamic viewpoint can appear as a genuine alternative among other underdetermined ones, deciding between which would be a matter of pragmatic criteria.     

A mathematical model of the interaction between bottom-up and top-down attention controllers in response to a target and a distractor in human beings

Top-down and bottom-up attention are two systems that allocate our neuronal resources for processing different stimuli. To do the tasks efficiently, it is required to suppress irrelevant information. In the presence of both target and distractor, synchronization or desynchronization between the activities of neuronal responses has been observed in different regions of the brain. In the current study, we have proposed a mathematical model to show how the interaction between top-down and bottom-up attention, through synchronization and desynchronization, can lead to the suppression of distractor effects in human beings. The model structure was inspired by the results of neurological studies. The model consists of several oscillating units as a representation of top-down and bottom-up neuronal processing resources. These units communicate with each other through synchronization and desynchronization procedures.Results of simulations showed that how the mutual interaction between top-down and bottom-up units, which was done using synchronization and desynchronization procedures, led to the selective or divided attention between the target and distractor. It was shown that the activity of responsive units to the distractor could be suppressed by a desynchronous signal transmitted from the top-down attention unit. This model suggests a justification for brain waves synchronization or desynchronization during attentionally demand tasks. The proposed model also provides a tool to investigate the effect of some influencing factors such as the distractor intensity or similarity between the distractor and the target on the function of top-down and bottom-up systems.     

On What Empiricism Cannot Be

Bas C. van Fraassen, in his Terry Lectures at Yale University (subsequently published as The Empirical Stance), is concerned to elucidate what empiricism is, and could be, given past and current failures of characterization. He contends that naïve empiricism—the metaphilosophical position that characterizes empiricism in terms of a thesis—is self‐refuting, and he offers a reductio ad absurdum to substantiate this claim. Moreover, in place of naïve empiricism, van Fraassen endorses stance empiricism: the metaphilosophical position that characterizes empiricism in terms of certain attitudes and commitments. The present article, however, argues that van Fraassen begs the question in his reductio of naïve empiricism, and thus that his primary defense of stance empiricism is inadequate.     

A theory-based epistemology of modality

We have some justified beliefs about modal matters. A modal epistemology should explain what’s involved in our having that justification. Given that we’re realists about modality, how should we expect that explanation to go? In the first part of this essay, I suggest an answer to this question based on an analogy with games. Then, I outline a modal epistemology that fits with that answer. According to a theory-based epistemology of modality, you justifiably believe that p if (a) you justifiably believe a theory that says that p and (b) you believe p on the basis of that theory.     

A selectionist explanation for the success and failures of science

I argue that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation for the success of science is superior to the realists’ explanation. Whereas realists argue that our current theories are successful because they accurately reflect the structure of the world, the selectionist claims that our current theories are successful because unsuccessful theories have been eliminated. I argue that, unlike the explanation proposed by the realist, the selectionist explanation can also account for the failures of once successful theories and the fact that sometimes two competing theories are both equally successful.

Perilous thoughts: comment on van Fraassen

Bas van Fraassen’s empiricist reading of Perrin’s achievement invites the question: whose doubts about atoms did Perrin put to rest? This comment recontextualizes the argument and applies the notion of empirical grounding to some contemporary work in behavioral biology.     

Postmetaphysical Thinking or Refusal of Thought? Max Horkheimer’s Materialism as Philosophical Stance

Abstract

Frankfurt School critical theory has long opposed metaphysical philosophy because it ignores suffering and injustice. In the face of such criticism, proponents of metaphysics (for example Dieter Henrich) have accused critical theory of not fully investigating the questions is raises for itself, and falling into partial metaphysical positions, despite itself. If one focuses on Max Horkheimer’s early essays, such an accusation seems quite fitting. There he vociferously attacks metaphysics, but he also develops a theory that pushes toward metaphysical questions. His work can thus seem laden with unpacked metaphysical baggage, and fraught with contradiction. The aim of this paper is to show that Horkheimer’s critique of metaphysics makes sense and is not contradicted by a surreptitious metaphysics. To show this, Horkheimer’s views will be compared with Bas van Fraassen’s in The Empirical Stance. Ultimately, the paper should show that Horkheimer’s early philosophy can be reconstructed in such a way that it employs a ‘materialist stance’.