Children's detection and awareness of textual anomaly

Children of 8 and 11 years were assessed in two experiments for their sensitivity to textual anomaly. In Experiment 1, subjects read stories containing two target lines, one appropriate and the other anomalous in relation to previously given information. Both age groups read the anomalous line more slowly than the appropriate line, but in a subsequent test of comprehension monitoring, the older group was more likely than the younger group to pick out the anomalous line as not fitting in with the rest of the story. Experiment 2 produced similar results: both 8- and 11-year-old children read an anomalous line more slowly, but 11-year-olds were more likely than 8-year-olds to cite the anomalous line or part of it when questioned about the possible presence of a line that did not fit in with the rest of the story. The results indicate that an age change in comprehension monitoring as indexed by citation or selection of a textual anomaly need not be contingent upon a parallel age change in constructive processing as indexed by modulation of reading rate.     

On the problems of being more or less the same

Sixty children aged 2–3 to 5-2 were given four quantity tasks which tested their understanding of more and same. Two tasks involved addition, two involved judgment of static quantities. One of each type of task required a manipulative response, and one of each required a yes/no judgment. The tasks involved judgments of equality and inequality. Tasks involving a manipulative response were significantly easier than those involving a yes/no judgment, indicating that the nature of the response required of the child is crucial. All other differences were negligible, indicating that the other task variables investigated do not affect the child's ability to respond correctly. The ability to make accurate responses was not strongly associated with counting ability. There was a significant difference in the children's counting responses depending on the method used to elicit it.     

Factors underlying the social readjustment rating scale

The Social Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS) was administered to 185 subjects whose age ranged from 21 to 61 yr. The responses were factor analyzed for a principal axis solution followed by isopromax oblique rotation. All the items were loaded and clustered under five factors labeled as follows: (1) personal growth, maturation, and renewal; (2) tension and uncertainty; transitions in personal or occupational situations; (3) changes in one's usual routine and relationship; (4) significant changes in family or mirriage; and (5) personal catastrophies. Males scored significantly higher than females on factors 4 and 5. There were no age differences in the obtained scores. The finding of the factorial structure was thought to add credence to the scale especially in view of past criticism. Implications for future research were also discussed.     

A biased random walk model for two choice reaction times

This paper generalizes Stone's (1960, Psychometrika 25, 251–260) random walk model of two choice response times (RTs) that is based on the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) and that predicts equal correct and incorrect RTs to the same response. The generalized version allows a bias of the type found in signal detection theory to enter directly into the accumulation process so that ambivalent evidence may be seen as slightly favoring one alternative. The resulting biased SPRT model can predict any relation between correct and incorrect mean RTs. In particular, unlike the special symmetric case of Link and Heath's (1975, Psychometrika 40, 77–105) relative judgment theory (RJT), the biased SPRT model can predict that correct mean RTs are faster for one response but slower for the other. The biased SPRT model, the classical SPRT model, and the symmetric RJT model are all fit to the data of an RT deadline experiment reported by Green and Luce (1973, Attention and performance, New York: Academic Press) and it is shown that, of the three, the biased SPRT model provides the best account. Finally, a method for incorporating the same sort of bias into RJT models is sketched out.     

The relative efficacy of simulation experiments

A complex in-basket simulation and a paper-and-pencil scenario experiment were used to study relationships between organizational leadership and gender. Separate samples completed identical attitude instruments in the independent studies. Analysis revealed that substantially more of the total variance was accounted for in the simulation study than in the scenario investigation. Also, more overt, gender-based responses were observed in the scenario study. It was concluded that social simulation may tap a deeper level of psychological process and may elicit more subject involvement than typical experimental methods. Thus, the more complex procedures of the simulation, as compared to those of a typical method such as a scenario study, are justified in the study of organizational behavior.     

Do medical decision analyses' largest gains grow from the smallest trees?

Some decision analysts recommend reserving their models for careful, complete study of complex problems. Others believe simple problem analyses provide the greatest gains. To clarify these issues, I tested: (1) whether simple published analyses compared to complex ones, produced results as non-intuitive; and (2) whether non-intuitiveness represented analytic gain (or equivalently, intuitive loss). Very limited data also examined (3) the gain from adding model intricacy for a given problem vs. selecting more complex problems for analysis. To assess two non-intuitiveness measures, 75 subjects (33 physicians and 42) non-physicians stated their intuitive preferences in 40 (22 published and 18 unpublished) medical dilemmas. For both physicians and non-physicians, simpler models (those with lees than 30 terminal branches in the decision tree) had about one third the non-intuitiveness of more complex ones. Three tests also supported the premise that analyses outperform intuition, therefore that on average the formers' non-intuitiveness reflects less analytic gain. In addition, for different models of the same problem, tree complexity did not correlate with gain. Thus, simpler trees may not generally gain less because they inadequately describe problems. Instead, simpler analyses may represent simpler problems, with more similar intuitive and formal solutions. If so, these findings may help us avoid some costly but unnecessary simple analyses.     

Influence of a televised model's vocalization pattern on infants

To assess the influence of a televised model's vocalizations on the vocal patterns of infant viewers, 32 infants at 6 months of age were presented either a televised adult model repeating a novel phoneme pattern (/ba/ba/ba/ba) or a control televised presentation of adult conversation selected from typical daytime programming. Sequential analyses of infant vocalizations revealed that infants exposed to the televised model altered their vocalization pattern, as indicated by a significant increase over base line levels in their production of a patterned series of discrete vocalizations. Infants exposed to the televised conversation showned no increase in this pattern of vocalization, and none of the infants in the study produced the novel phoneme (/ba/). The results indicate that televised presentation of discrete, repeated vocalizations can have an influence on the vocalization pattern of infants. The potential role of television in infant development is discussed.     

The form of analog size information in memory

The information used to choose the larger of two objects from memory was investigated in two experiments that compared the effects of a number of variables on the performance of subjects who either were instructed to use imagery in the comparison task or were not so instructed. Subjects instructed to use imagery could perform the task more quickly if they prepared themselves with an image of one of the objects at its normal size, rather than with an image that was abnormally big or small, or no image at all. Such subjects were also subject to substantial selective interference when asked to simultaneously maintain irrelevant images of digits. In contrast, when subjects were not specifically instructed to use imagery to reach their decisions, an initial image at normal size did not produce significantly faster decisions than no image, or a large or small image congruent with the correct decision. The selective interference created by simultaneously imaging digits was reduced for subjects not told to base their size comparisons on imagery. The difficulty of the size discrimination did not interact significantly with any other variable. The results suggest that subjects, unless specifically instructed to use imagery, can compare the size of objects in memory using information more abstract than visual imagery.