International Human Rights and National Discretion

This paper argues that the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights couldserve as a model for an international court ofhuman rights to be builtupon the United Nations Committee on HumanRights. It argues that theconcerns states might have over the surrenderof a significant portion oftheir national sovereignity might be lessenedif such an internationalcourt were to incorporate the margin ofappreciation doctrine employed bythe European Court of Human Rights. Thisdoctrine is intended to respectthe customs and traditions of sovereign statesin dealing with humanrights issues, while maintaining that somerights such as the right not tobe tortured will be considered as basic andwill stand independently ofthe customs and traditions of sovereignstates.     

Executive Heads and the Role of Intergovernmental Organizations: Expansionist Leadership in the United Nations and the European Union

Despite considerable advances in methods to examine leaders' personal characteristics using at–a–distance assessment, few studies have applied such techniques outside of the national level. This study reveals that such approaches can provide analytical leverage for examining executive heads of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). The personal characteristics of six United Nations Secretaries–General and four European Union Commission Presidents were measured via content analysis of their responses to questions. Separately, their behavior in office was measured via historical accounts and analyses. In general, executive heads with higher expansionist leadership style scores displayed a greater willingness to try to enhance the status of their organizations.     

论庄存与的《公羊》学

庄存与的《公羊》学虽然受到赵《春秋属辞》的影响 ,但主要限于治学体例 ,而在治学立场上 ,二者其实有根本的歧异。庄存与克服了赵以策书之体说《春秋》的倾向 ,并注重《春秋》例辞背后的立场。这点直接上承汉代《公羊》学。不过 ,庄氏《春秋》学在某些具体的事例解释上与汉代《公羊》学也有差异。庄氏的特点在于对《春秋》变辞的引申与发挥 ,并补充了汉代《公羊》学未曾论述的诸多方面 ,为后人理解《公羊》大义提供了新的线索。     

Advances in designing instruction based on examples

This commentary reviews the evidence for nine principles for how to design effective example-based instruction, drawing from the articles in this special issue.     

JUST WAR THEORY,HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION,AND THE NEED FOR A DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION

The primary purpose of government is to secure public goods that cannot be achieved by free markets. The Coordination Principle tells us to consolidate sovereign power in a single institution to overcome collective action problems that otherwise prevent secure provision of the relevant public goods. There are several public goods that require such coordination at the global level, chief among them being basic human rights. The claim that human rights require global coordination is supported in three main steps. First, I consider Pogge's and Habermas's analyses as alternatives to Hobbesian conceptions of justice. Second, I consider the core conventions of international law, which are in tension with the primacy of state sovereignty in the UN system. Third, I argue that the just war tradition does not limit just causes for war to self‐defense; it supports saving innocent third parties from crimes against humanity as a just reason for war. While classical authors focused less on this issue, the point is especially clear in twentieth‐century just war theories, such as those offered by the American Catholic bishops, Jean Elshtain, Brian Orend, and Michael Walzer. Against Walzer, I argue that we add intractable military tyranny to the list of horrors meriting intervention if other ad bellum conditions are met. But these results require us to reexamine the “just authority” of first resort to govern such interventions. The Coordination Principle implies that we should create a transnational federation with consolidated powers in place of a treaty organization requiring near‐unanimity. But to be legitimate, such a global institution must also be directly answerable to the citizens of its member states. While the UN Security Council is inadequate on both counts, a federation of democracies with a directly elected executive and legislature could meet both conditions.     

The functional theory of human values: From intentional overlook to first acknowledgement—A reply to Schwartz (2014)

Schwartz has been aware of the Functional Theory of Values for over a decade. For the first time, Schwartz (2014) acknowledges the Gouveia theory and provides considerations based on the Gouveia, Milfont, and Guerra (2014) study. In this reply we present a historical overview of the development of the theory, noting unwarranted barriers to the publication of our work. We then address his comments, focusing on the theoretical innovations of the theory and remarking that recent refinements of Schwartz’s model were already evident in the Gouveia theory. Hypotheses tested in Gouveia et al. (2014) are also re-tested and supported with European Social Survey data using the Schwartz PVQ-21. We conclude by summarizing current projects that offer further opportunities to continue the theoretical debate.     

Economics Weak and Strong: Ecological Economics and Human Survival

Mounting evidence suggests that the human impact on the planet is reaching the point where the Earth's ecosystems will not be able to support the level of human occupation. The global economy also seems to be generating income disparities that threaten the social stability of even the most developed economies. Although both these trends are rooted in the operation of the global market economy, standard economics has surprisingly little to offer in the way of policies that might allow us to survive the twenty-first century with our current social and environmental systems intact. This article examines our current predicament from the point of view of neoclassical welfare economics and the alternative framework of ecological economics. We argue that ecological economics, by placing the study of economics squarely within human society and ecosystems, can lead the way to make economics both scientifically credible and policy relevant.     

Examining arguments against quantitative research: “Case studies” illustrating the challenge of finding a sound philosophical basis for a human sciences approach to psychology

This article offers a close examination of critiques of quantitative research by Michell, 2011, Marecek, 2011, and Morawski (2011). One goal is to show that these three critics actually share with most mainstream quantitative researchers commitments to the Cartesian framework, even though this is not obvious because Cartesianism can appear in different guises. As a result of these commitments, the three theorists advance criticisms of mainstream quantitative research that fail to identify its key failings, put forward flawed views about how we should conduct research, and offer misguided criticisms of an approach I advocate called explicitly interpretive quantitative research. Another goal is to use the examination of the three critiques as a vehicle for clarifying the participatory perspective, a philosophical viewpoint that departs from the Cartesian framework. With regard to research methodology, the participatory perspective provides the basis for explicitly interpretive quantitative research, leads to ideas about changes we should make in how we conduct qualitative research, and treats quantitative and qualitative research as fundamentally similar because both should be pursued as interpretive modes of inquiry. I suggest that my analyses of the three critiques of quantitative research – or “case studies,” as I call these analyses – also may prove useful to researchers and theorists who want to develop a human sciences approach to other issues besides research methodology by helping them (1) recognize when lines of thinking that seem to depart from the mainstream actually represent variants of Cartesianism, and (2) consider what the participatory perspective might have to offer if they were to use it as the philosophical basis for their efforts.     

The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice

Many Protestant denominations have or recently had policies that prohibit “self‐avowed practicing homosexuals” from being ordained. By only prohibiting “practicing” homosexuals, proponents of these policies claim that they do not discriminate against homosexuals as a group since, technically, a homosexual can still be ordained as long as she is “non‐practicing.” In other words, a condemnation of homosexual practice is not the same as a condemnation of homosexual persons. I argue that this is not the case; the rhetoric of homosexual practice does, in fact, amount to a condemnation of gays and lesbians. It does so by conflating the two things it claims to keep separate—homosexual conduct and homosexual identity. I demonstrate this conflation by analyzing the history of this rhetoric and how it has been adjudicated in church court decisions from the United Methodist Church and the Presbyterian Church (USA).