Examining effects of preconscious mere exposure: An inattentional blindness approach

An increase in affective preference for stimuli, which a person has been repeatedly exposed to, is known as mere exposure effect. This effect has been shown for stimuli that are processed subliminally, that is, below the threshold of awareness. This study fills a current research gap by investigating mere exposure effects under processing that is preconscious, which follows from a high stimulus strength but absence of top-down amplification. In three experiments (N = 240 in total) preconscious processing was evoked using an inattentional blindness paradigm, which allowed the processing of stimuli (nonwords or Chinese symbols) under complete inattention. Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not find a mere exposure effect in our experiments. We expand the current state of knowledge by discussing the distractor devaluation effect and the attentional set of participants as possible reasons for the absence of the mere exposure effect. Directions for future investigations are outlined.     

Unconscious attention modulates the silencing effect of top-down predictions

The brain is considered to be proactive in that it continuously generates predictions about external environment stimuli. Recent Bayesian models of perception have demonstrated that prediction and attention operate synergistically to optimize stimulus processing. However, the relation between prediction and unconscious attention remains unclear given the relative neglect of unconscious attention in scholarly literatures. To investigate this issue, twenty participants (12 women) performed an orientation identification task in which a circular grating appeared either in the left or in the right visual field in a single 30–40 min session, during which 64-channel EEG data were acquired. Behavioral results showed an unconscious-attended effect and a facilitated effect. Importantly, prediction-related P1 and N1 silencing effects were observed in the unconscious-attended condition, probably reflecting that unconscious attention improves the precision of top-down predictions at an early stage of processing, thereby increasing the synaptic gain of predictor neurons. Moreover, unlike the early ERP components, P3 revealed a reversed pattern of results, which displayed a silencing effect of prediction only in the unattended condition, suggesting that the influence of unconscious attention on the silencing effect may change over time.     

Identifying words that emerge into consciousness: Effects of word valence and unconscious previewing

Words with negative valence capture attention and this increase in attentional resources typically enhances perceptual processing. Recently, data using continuous flash suppression (CFS) appear to contradict this. In prior research when Chinese words were unconsciously presented in CFS and contrast was raised until the word was identified, RTs to identify words with negative valence were slower than RTs to words with neutral valence. This result might be limited to situations where a logographic writing system is used and could reflect a type of cognitive aftereffect where previewing the word causes habituation. Data (N = 60) indicate that results generalize from a logographic (Chinese) to an orthographic writing system (English). In addition, when words were previewed in CFS RTs were slowed for words with negative valence relative to words with neutral valence and this was reversed when words were shown binocularly. Implications for theories of unconscious word processing and cognitive aftereffects are discussed.     

Once the money is in sight: Distinctive effects of conscious and unconscious rewards on task performance

Monetary rewards facilitate performance on behavioral and cognitive tasks, even when these rewards are perceived without conscious awareness. Also, recent research suggests that consciously (vs. unconsciously) perceived rewards may prompt people to more strongly concentrate on task stimuli and details. Here we propose that the latter is sometimes dysfunctional, in that it prevents improvements in task performance. We used an Attentional Blink paradigm, in which such enhanced concentration on task stimuli is detrimental to performance. Participants were consciously (supraliminally) or unconsciously (subliminally) exposed to a high-value or low-value coin that they could earn by performing well on an Attentional Blink trial. As hypothesized, high-value rewards increased performance when they were presented subliminally, while this performance benefit vanished when high-value rewards were presented consciously. We discuss this finding in the context of recent research on unconscious goal pursuit.     

The relationship between the objective identification threshold and priming effects does not provide a definitive boundary between conscious and unconscious perceptual processes

The Objective Threshold/Strategic Model (OT/S) proposes that strong, qualitative inferences of unconscious perception can be made if the relationship between perceptual sensitivity (typically priming effects) and stimulus visibility is nonlinear and nonmonotonic. The model proposes a nadir in priming effects at the objective identification threshold (identification d′ = 0). These predictions were tested with masked semantic priming and repetition priming of a lexical decision task. The visibility of the prime stimuli was systematically varied above and below the objective identification threshold. The obtained relationship between prime visibility and priming facilitation was nonlinear, but the results failed to confirm a nadir in priming effects at the objective identification threshold. We conclude that the objective identification threshold does not necessarily indicate the point where presumably unconscious priming effects might be inhibited by conscious cognitive processes.     

Unconscious activation of task sets

Using an explicit task cuing paradigm, we tested whether masked cues can trigger task-set activation, which would suggest that unconsciously presented stimuli can impact cognitive control processes. Based on a critical assessment of previous findings on the priming of task-set activation, we present two experiments with a new method to approach this subject. Instead of using a prime, we varied the visibility of the cue. These cues either directly signaled particular tasks in Experiment 1, or certain task transitions (i.e., task repetitions or switches) in Experiment 2. While both masked task and transition cues affected task choice, only task cues affected the speed of task performance. This observation suggests that task-specific stimulus–response rules can be activated only by masked cues that are uniquely associated with a particular task. Taken together, these results demonstrate that unconsciously presented stimuli have the power to activate corresponding task sets.     

Are there unconscious perceptual processes?

Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of unconscious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and colleagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight patients. Vision for action has also come under scrutiny. Recent findings seem to show that information processed by the dorsal stream for online action contributes to visual awareness. Some interpret these results as showing that some dorsal stream processes are conscious visual processes (e.g., Gallese, 2007; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). The aim of this paper is to provide new support for the more traditional view that blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious perceptual processes. I argue that individuals with blindsight do not have access to the kind of purely qualitative color and size information which normal individuals do. So, even though people with blindsight have a kind of cognitive consciousness, visual information processing in blindsight patients is not associated with a distinctly visual phenomenology. I argue further that while dorsal stream processing seems to contribute to visual awareness, only information processed by the early dorsal stream (V1, V2, and V3) is broadcast to working memory. Information processed by later parts of the dorsal stream (the parietal lobe) never reaches working memory and hence does not correlate with phenomenal awareness. I conclude that both blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious visual processes.     

Detecting conscious awareness from involuntary autonomic responses

Can conscious awareness be ascertained from physiological responses alone? We evaluate a novel learning-based procedure permitting detection of conscious awareness without reliance on language comprehension or behavioural responses. The method exploits a situation whereby only consciously detected violations of an expectation alter skin conductance responses (SCRs). Thirty participants listened to sequences of piano notes that, without their being told, predicted a pleasant fanfare or an aversive noise according to an abstract rule. Stimuli were presented without distraction (attended), or while distracted by a visual task to remove awareness of the rule (unattended). A test phase included occasional violations of the rule. Only participants attending the sounds reported awareness of violations and only they showed significantly greater SCR for noise occurring in violation, vs. accordance, with the rule. Our results establish theoretically significant dissociations between conscious and unconscious processing and furnish new opportunities for clinical assessment of residual consciousness in patient populations.     

Is there a "special relationship" between unconscious emotions and visual imagery? Evidence from a mental rotation test

There is an increasing interest in the relationship between imagery and emotion (e.g., Holmes & Mathews, 2005). The present research examined whether unconscious emotions affect visual imagery. In particular, participants were invited to perform a mental rotation test following subliminal presentation of happy, sad and neutral expressions. This study revealed an increase in mental rotation abilities after unconscious visual processing of emotional expressions. Altogether, these findings support the hypothesis of a bidirectional relationship between imagery and emotions.     

The amygdala is involved in affective priming effect for fearful faces

The object of this study was to investigate whether the amygdala is involved in affective priming effect after stimuli are encoded unconsciously and consciously. During the encoding phase, each masked face (fearful or neutral) was presented to participants six times for 17ms each, using a backward masking paradigm. During the retrieval phase, participants made a fearful/neutral judgment for each face. Half of the faces had the same valence as that seen during encoding (congruent condition) and the other half did not (incongruent condition). Participants were divided into unaware and aware groups based on their subjective and objective awareness assessments. The fMRI results showed that during encoding, the amygdala elicited stronger activation for fearful faces than neutral faces but differed in the hemisphere according to the awareness level. During retrieval, the amygdala showed a significant repetition priming effect, with the congruent faces producing less activation than the incongruent faces, especially for fearful faces. These data suggest that the amygdala is important in unconscious retrieving of memories for emotional faces whether they are encoded consciously or unconsciously.