Implicit learning of semantic preferences of English words by Chinese learners

The aim of the present study was to explore whether Chinese learners could implicitly learn the semantic preferences of novel English words. In training, participants learned four novel verbs and were exposed to a set of verb-noun phrases that included these new words. What the participants were not told was that the use of the verbs depended on the concreteness of the nouns (i.e., the semantic preference rule). In testing, participants were required to choose between two possible verbs (one of which violated the semantic preference rule) for nouns that never occurred in training. The results showed that participants acquired unconscious knowledge of semantic preferences under incidental learning conditions, as measured by verbal reports and structural knowledge attributions. Our results provide further evidence for implicit learning of semantic preferences, suggesting that implicit learning is an important mechanism in the acquisition of L2 collocations.     

Overstepping the boundaries of free choice: Folk beliefs on free will and determinism in real world contexts

We know little about the commonality of folk beliefs around applications of psychological research on the unconscious control of behaviours. To address this, in Experiment 1 (N = 399) participants volunteered examples of where research on the unconscious has been applied to influence their behaviours. A subset of these were presented in Experiment 2 (N = 198) and Experiment 3 (N = 100). Participants rated the extent to which the behaviour being influenced in these contexts was: (1) via the unconscious, (2) free, (3) the result of prior conscious intentions, (4) under conscious control. Relative to judgements about the extent to which behaviour was influenced via the unconscious, the remaining judgements regarding conscious control of behaviours were either higher (e.g., political contexts) or lower (e.g., therapy). This study is the first to show, using ecologically valid examples, the folk beliefs people share on psychological constructs concerning free will and determinism.     

Unconscious cues bias first saccades in a free-saccade task

Visual–spatial attention can be biased towards salient visual information without visual awareness. It is unclear, however, whether such bias can further influence free-choices such as saccades in a free viewing task. In our experiment, we presented visual cues below awareness threshold immediately before people made free saccades. Our results showed that masked cues could influence the direction and latency of the first free saccade, suggesting that salient visual information can unconsciously influence free actions.     

Conscious awareness is required for holistic face processing

Investigating the limits of unconscious processing is essential to understand the function of consciousness. Here, we explored whether holistic face processing, a mechanism believed to be important for face processing in general, can be accomplished unconsciously. Using a novel “eyes-face” stimulus we tested whether discrimination of pairs of eyes was influenced by the surrounding face context. While the eyes were fully visible, the faces that provided context could be rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression. Two experiments with three different sets of face stimuli and a subliminal learning procedure converged to show that invisible faces did not influence perception of visible eyes. In contrast, surrounding faces, when they were clearly visible, strongly influenced perception of the eyes. Thus, we conclude that conscious awareness might be a prerequisite for holistic face processing.     

Boundary conditions for the influence of unfamiliar non-target primes in unconscious evaluative priming: The moderating role of attentional task sets

Evaluative priming by masked emotional stimuli that are not consciously perceived has been taken as evidence that affective stimulus evaluation can also occur unconsciously. However, as masked priming effects were small and frequently observed only for familiar primes that there also presented as visible targets in an evaluative decision task, priming was thought to reflect primarily response activation based on acquired S–R associations and not evaluative semantic stimulus analysis. The present study therefore assessed across three experiments boundary conditions for the emergence of masked evaluative priming effects with unfamiliar primes in an evaluative decision task and investigated the role of the frequency of target repetition on priming with pictorial and verbal stimuli. While familiar primes elicited robust priming effects in all conditions, priming effects by unfamiliar primes were reliably obtained for low repetition (pictures) or unrepeated targets (words), but not for targets repeated at a high frequency. This suggests that unfamiliar masked stimuli only elicit evaluative priming effects when the task set associated with the visible target involves evaluative semantic analysis and is not based on S–R triggered responding as for high repetition targets. The present results therefore converge with the growing body of evidence demonstrating attentional control influences on unconscious processing.     

Unconscious reward facilitates motion perceptual learning

Reward signal plays an important role in guiding human learning behaviour. Recent studies have provided evidence that reward signal modulates perceptual learning of basic visual features. Typically, the reward effects on perceptual learning were accompanied with consciously presented reward during the learning process. However, whether an unconsciously presented reward signal that minimizes the contribution of attentional and motivational factors can facilitate perceptual learning remains less well understood. We trained human subjects on a visual motion detection task and subliminally delivered a monetary reward for correct response during the training. The results showed significantly larger learning effect for high reward-associated motion direction than low reward-associated motion direction. Importantly, subjects could neither discriminate the relative values of the subliminal monetary reward nor correctly report the reward-direction contingencies. Our findings suggest that reward signal plays an important modulatory role in perceptual learning even if the magnitude of the reward was not consciously perceived.     

The divergent effects of fear and disgust on unconscious inhibitory control

Previous studies have shown that negative emotional distracters impair conscious inhibitory control. Recent research has shown that inhibitory control can be triggered unconsciously; therefore, in Experiment 1, we aimed to investigate whether negative emotional distracters affect unconscious inhibitory control. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, we examined whether fearful and disgusting distracters have differential effects on unconscious inhibitory control. Participants were instructed to perform a masked Go/No-Go task superimposed on a negative or neutral image cue (Experiment 1) or on a fearful, disgusting or neutral image cue (Experiment 2). Results showed that negative emotional distracters impaired unconscious inhibitory control; furthermore, disgusting distracters impeded unconscious inhibitory control when compared to fearful ones. This study is the first to provide evidence that fear and disgust may affect unconscious inhibitory control differently. These results expand the understanding of the relationship between emotions and inhibitory control.     

Prediction and unconscious attention operate synergistically to facilitate stimulus processing: An fMRI study

There is considerable evidence that prediction and attention aid perception. However, little is known about the possible neural mechanisms underlying the impact of prediction and unconscious attention on perception, probably due to the relative neglect of unconscious attention in scholarly literature. Here, we addressed this issue using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We adopted a variant of the double-cue paradigm, in which prediction and attention were factorially manipulated by two separate cues (prediction and attention cues). To manipulate consciousness, the attention cues were presented subliminally and supraliminally. Behaviorally, we reported an unconscious-attended effect in the predictable trials and a conscious-attended effect in the unpredictable trials. On the neural level, it was shown that prediction and unconscious attention interacted in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). More specifically, there was a significantly decreased activation in dlPFC for predictable relative to unpredictable stimuli in the unconscious-attended trials, but not in the unconscious-unattended trials. This result suggests that prediction and unconscious attention operate synergistically to facilitate stimulus processing. This is further corroborated by the subsequent functional connectivity analysis, which revealed increased functional connectivity between the left dlPFC and the premotor cortex for predictable versus unpredictable stimuli in the unconscious-attended trials.     

Neural synchronization as a hypothetical explanation of the psychoanalytic unconscious

Cognitive scientists have tried to explain the neural mechanisms of unconscious mental states such as coma, epileptic seizures, and anesthesia-induced unconsciousness. However these types of unconscious states are different from the psychoanalytic unconscious. In this review, we aim to present our hypothesis about the neural correlates underlying psychoanalytic unconscious. To fulfill this aim, we firstly review the previous explanations about the neural correlates of conscious and unconscious mental states, such as brain oscillations, synchronicity of neural networks, and cognitive binding. By doing so, we hope to lay a neuroscientific ground for our hypothesis about neural correlates of psychoanalytic unconscious; parallel but unsynchronized neural networks between different layers of consciousness and unconsciousness. Next, we propose a neuroscientific mechanism about how the repressed mental events reach the conscious awareness; the lock of neural synchronization between two mental layers of conscious and unconscious. At the last section, we will discuss the data about schizophrenia as a clinical example of our proposed hypothesis.     

The direction of masked auditory category priming correlates with participants' prime discrimination ability

Semantic priming refers to the phenomenon that participants typically respond faster to targets following semantically related primes as compared to semantically unrelated primes. In contrast, Wentura and Frings (2005) found a negatively signed priming effect (i.e., faster responses to semantically unrelated as compared to semantically related targets) when they used (a) a special masking technique for the primes and (b) categorically related prime-target-pairs (e.g., fruit-apple). The negatively signed priming effect was most pronounced for participants with random prime discrimination performance, whereas participants with high prime discrimination performance showed a positive effect. In the present study we analyzed the after-effects of masked category primes in audition. A comparable pattern of results as in the visual modality emerged: The poorer the individual prime discrimination, the more negative is the semantic priming effect. This result is interpreted as evidence for a common mechanism causing the semantic priming effect in vision as well as in audition instead of a perceptual mechanism only working in the visual domain.