Conscious and unconscious forms of memory in different implicit tests

This study investigated how shallow processing (complexity rating), deep processing (pleasantness rating), and semantic generation (translating from English) of Chinese words affects conscious memory (CM) and unconscious memory (UM) of the words with three implicit tests: word association, word identification, and word-stem completion. A metacognition-based dissociation procedure was used to estimate the two forms of memory for each test. Except for the shallow condition preceding the word-association test, all three study conditions produced a positive effect on the estimate of CM. The estimate of UM did not benefit from any of the study conditions in the word-association test, it benefited from the shallow and deep conditions but did not benefit from the generation condition in the stem-completion test, and it benefited from the shallow condition but did not benefit from the deep and generation conditions in the word-identification test. Implications of these results for CM and UM operations are discussed.     

What lies beneath: Parenting style and implicit self-esteem

The current studies extend previous research on self-esteem by examining one of the likely origins of implicit self-esteem. Three studies showed that young adult children who reported that their parents were more nurturing reported higher implicit self-esteem compared with those whose parents were less nurturing. Studies 2 and 3 added a measure of overprotectiveness and revealed that children who reported that their parents were overprotective also reported lower implicit self-esteem. Moreover, Study 3 revealed that mothers’ independent reports of their early interactions with their children were also related to children’s level of implicit self-esteem. In all three studies, these findings remained reliable when we controlled statistically for participants’ explicit self-esteem. These findings contribute to a growing body of literature validating the construct of implicit self-esteem.     

Unconscious semantic priming in the absence of partial awareness

In a recent paper in Psychological Science, Kouider and Dupoux reported obtaining unconscious Stroop priming only when subjects had partial awareness of the masked distractor words (i.e., could consciously perceive subword features that enabled reconstruction of whole words). Kouider and Dupoux conjectured that semantic priming occurs only when such partial awareness is present. The present experiments tested this conjecture in an affective categorization priming task that differed from Kouider and Dupoux’s in using masked distractors that subjects had practiced earlier as visible words. Experiment 1 showed priming from practiced words when subjects had no partial awareness of those words. Experiment 2 showed that, in the absence of partial awareness, practiced words yielded priming but not-practiced words did not. Experiment 3 corroborated Experiment 1 and 2s results using a different test of partial awareness. These results suggest that unconscious processing (rather than partial awareness) of subword elements drives masked semantic priming by practiced words.     

Positive Psychotherapy’s Theory of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Capacity to Know</Emphasis> as Explication of Unconscious Contents

Positive Psychotherapy (PPT), founded by Dr. Nossrat Peseschkian, a Persian Bahá’í who has lived in Europe for many years, assumes the functional capacities of the unconscious to be ‘basic capacities.’ PPT makes a distinction between actual capacities and basic capacities. The basic capacities are the capacity to love and the capacity to know. These basic capacities are comprehensive categories underpinning primary and secondary capacities. Based upon Bahá’í teachings, this therapy accepts belief as an implicit aspect of healthy psychological functioning. Moreover, contents of the unconscious in PPT are the conflicts between capacities, and undifferentiated and undeveloped actual capacities.

Formation of semantic associations between subliminally presented face-word pairs

Recent evidence suggests that consciousness of encoding is not necessary for the rapid formation of new semantic associations. We investigated whether unconsciously formed associations are as semantically precise as would be expected for associations formed with consciousness of encoding during episodic memory formation. Pairs of faces and written occupations were presented subliminally for unconscious associative encoding. Five minutes later, the same faces were presented suprathreshold for the cued unconscious retrieval of face-occupation associations. Retrieval instructions required participants to classify the presented individuals according to their putative (1) regularity of income, (2) length of education, and (3) creativity value of occupational activity. The three instructions yielded more classifications consistent with a person’s occupation if the person had been subliminally presented with his written occupation versus a meaningless word (control condition). This suggests that consciousness is not necessary to encode, long-term store, and retrieve semantically precise associations between primarily unrelated items.     

Unconscious transfer of meaning to brands

We examine semantic conditioning in a consumer context. We subliminally paired neutral ideographs with attributes. In experiment 1, the ideographs served as primes during a lexical decision task and slowed down response times to target words with the opposite semantic meaning. In experiment 2, the ideographs served as brand names of beverages, and attitudinal responses to them were less favorable when the associated attributes were incongruent with existing schemas. These results showed that semantic conditioning (1) can occur unconsciously, (2) can have significant and meaningful consequences for brand evaluation, and (3) influences subsequent attitudinal responses via conceptual disfluency processes.     

Conscious and unconscious discriminations between true and false memories

When subjects give higher confidence or memory ratings to a test word in a recognition test, do they simply raise their criterion without making better discrimination, or do they raise both criterion and true discrimination between the studied words (SW) and the lures? Given that previous studies found subjects’ false alarm responses to lures slower than to SW, and recognition latency inversely correlated with the confidence rating, can the latency difference between the lures and SW be accounted for by confidence or memory ratings? The present results showed that when subjects gave higher confidence or memory ratings, both their bias and sensitivity were raised, indicating that they could consciously distinguish the lures from the SW. However, a latency difference between true and false recognitions persisted after confidence and memory ratings were held constant, suggesting an unconscious source of discrimination between the two types of memory.     

The influence of expertise and of physical complexity on visual short-term memory consolidation

This paper examines controversial claims about the merit of “unconscious thought” for making complex decisions. In four experiments, participants were presented with complex decisions and were asked to choose the best option immediately, after a period of conscious deliberation, or after a period of distraction (said to encourage “unconscious thought processes”). In all experiments the majority of participants chose the option predicted by their own subjective attribute weighting scores, regardless of the mode of thought employed. There was little evidence for the superiority of choices made “unconsciously”, but some evidence that conscious deliberation can lead to better choices. The final experiment suggested that the task is best conceptualized as one involving “online judgement” rather than one in which decisions are made after periods of deliberation or distraction. The results suggest that we should be cautious in accepting the advice to “stop thinking” about complex decisions.     

Stimulus/response learning in masked congruency priming of faces: Evidence for covert mental classifications?

Reaction times for categorization of a probe face according to its sex or fame were contrasted as a function of whether the category of a preceding, sandwich-masked prime face was congruent or incongruent. Prime awareness was measured by the ability to later categorize the primes, and this was close to chance and typically uncorrelated with priming. When prime faces were never presented as visible probes within a test, priming was not reliable; when prime faces were also seen as probes, priming was only reliable if visible and masked presentation of faces were interleaved (not simply if primes had been visible in a previous session). In the latter case, priming was independent of experimentally induced face–response or face–category contingencies, ruling out any simple form of stimulus–response learning. We conclude that the reliable masked congruency priming reflects bindings between stimuli and multiple, abstract classifications that can be generated both overtly and covertly.     

Inhibition from blinked category labels: Combining the attentional blink and the semantic priming paradigm

In the present experiment we combined the attentional blink and the semantic priming paradigm. We used category labels as primes and category exemplars as targets. The prime stimuli were embedded into a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream and presented at varying positions after a to-be-identified stimulus, albeit the stimulus–onset asynchrony between primes and targets remained constant throughout the experiment. As a result, participants’ prime awareness was reduced in some trials although the prime duration was always at levels usually considered to elicit awareness (60 ms). After each RSVP there was a forced choice discrimination test to assess participants’ prime awareness. When subjects could not identify the prime stimuli we observed slower responses to related as compared to unrelated targets. This result confirms results found with repeated masked primes. However, whereas former studies assessed unawareness rather coarsely at the level of individual participants, here unawareness was tested on a trial-by-trial basis.