Working with countertransference

The transference-countertransference relationship is only one of five modalities of relationship that research has identified as potentially present in the therapeutic encounter. This paper gives the background and definition to one aspect of this - the countertransference - and traces the development of the concept from Freud's first use of the term in 1910 to the contemporary view that it is a useful tool of psychotherapy. The first part explains its connection with the Kleinian concept of projective identification and discusses its elaboration by the object relations school. There is general acceptance nowadays that the countertransference contains a great deal of information about the client's psychological world. It is therefore important to understand this process and the authors have identified three main dimensions to countertransference. These are its vector (or direction and force), its variance (the quality it represents), and its valence (its effect on the client). The second part of the article illustrates, through the use of example and metaphor, how these three dimensions are defined and can be recognized. Common themes and paradigms of countertransference are identified and discussed along with some ways in which experience has shown how these might be contained and worked with constructively. Finally, a clinical vignette is presented in which some of the dimensions of countertransference are identified and used to understand the client's psychic world and foster therapeutic change.     

An Ethics for the Psychoanalyst in the Postmodern Age

Abstract

Paul Roazen, How Freud worked. First-hand accounts of patients Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1995.     

New approaches to understanding unconscious processes: Implicit and explicit memory systems

Abstract

Freud viewed the unconscious as being roughly equivalent to dynamically repressed wishes, needs, and motivations. Findings from developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis, and neuroscience over the past 40 years have dramatically changed our views of unconscious processes and the human mind. It is now clear that Freud's dynamic unconscious is only a minor segment of information that is processed at subsymbolic, implicit, and automatic levels. Only a fraction of this information is further processed at explicit conscious levels. Moreover, the vast majority of the information that remains nonconscious is adaptive and has major consequences for development. We examine some clinical implications of these views.     

Clinical Relevance of Social Character and Social Unconscious

The author discusses his recollection of Erich Fromm's views on psychoanalytic work with patients, including the author's treatment of a patient. The remembrance involves Fromm's clinical thinking on social character and the social unconscious, and its relevance to present-day clinical work. The author presents, in detail, his treatment of a 37-year old successful woman which addresses certain of today's clinical views on gender differences that resonate and differ with Fromm's thinking on the treatment of the marketing personality.     

Explicit feedback maintains implicit knowledge

The role of feedback was investigated with respect to conscious and unconscious knowledge acquired during artificial grammar learning (AGL). After incidental learning of training sequences, participants classified further sequences in terms of grammaticality and reported their decision strategy with or without explicit veridical feedback. Sequences that disobeyed the learning structure conformed to an alternative structure. Feedback led to an increase in the amount of reported conscious knowledge of structure (derived rules and recollections) but did not increase its accuracy. Conversely, feedback maintained the accuracy of unconscious knowledge of structure (intuition or familiarity-based responses) which otherwise degraded. Results support a dual-process account of AGL. They suggest that implicit learning of the to-be-rejected structure at test contaminates familiarity-based classifications whereas feedback allows competing familiarity signals to be contextualised, which is incompatible with theories that consider familiarity context-insensitive.     

Highly correlated stimuli do not necessarily facilitate the measurement of unconscious perception: Exclusion failure is hard to find in forced-choice tasks

Persaud and McLeod (2008) report that unconscious perception is easier to measure with forced-choice exclusion tasks when the stimuli are highly similar, such as choosing between the letters ‘h’ and ‘b’. The high degree of stimulus similarity may decrease conscious awareness of the target stimuli while leaving unconscious cognition intact. The present experiments used forced-choice exclusion tasks (i.e., choosing the opposite of a masked target stimulus) with the aim of replicating these findings. No evidence of relevant perception – either conscious or unconscious – was obtained with short duration targets. The forced-choice exclusion task was correctly performed at longer target durations (25 ms and higher), which suggests conscious perception of the target stimuli. We conclude that increasing stimulus similarity does not reliably produce exclusion failure effects and does not appear to facilitate the measurement of unconscious cognition.     

Interoceptive awareness and unaware fear conditioning: are subliminal conditioning effects influenced by the manipulation of visceral self-perception?

Research has shown repeatedly that attention influences implicit learning effects. In a similar vein, interoceptive awareness might be involved in unaware fear conditioning: The fact that the CS is repeatedly presented in the context of aversive bodily experiences might facilitate the development of conditioned responding. We investigated the role of interoceptive attention in a subliminal conditioning paradigm. Conditioning was embedded in a spatial cueing task with subliminally presented cues that were followed by a masking stimulus. Response times to the targets that were either validly or invalidly predicted by the cues served as index of conditioning. Interoceptive attention was manipulated between-subjects. Half the participants completed a heartbeat detection task before conditioning. This task tunes attention to one’s own bodily signals. We found that conditioned responding was facilitated in this latter group of participants. These results are in line with the hypothesis that a rise interoceptive attention enhances unaware conditioned responding.     

No watershed for overflow: Recent work on the richness of consciousness

A familiar and enduring controversy surrounds the question of whether our phenomenal experience “overflows” availability to cognition: do we consciously see more than we can remember and report? Both sides to this debate have long sought to move beyond naïve appeals to introspection by providing empirical evidence for or against overflow. Recently, two notable studies—Bronfman, Brezis, Jacobson, and Usher (2014) and Vandenbroucke, Sligte, Fahrenfort, Ambroziak, and Lamme (2012)—have purported to provide compelling evidence in favor of overflow. Here I explain why the data from both studies are wholly consistent with a “no overflow” interpretation. Importantly, when framed purely in representational or informational terms, this “no overflow” interpretation agrees with the interpretations respectively offered by both Bronfman et al. (2014) and Vandenbroucke et al. (2012). The difference only emerges when additional assumptions are made concerning which representations correspond to elements in conscious experience. The assumptions made by overflow theorists are contentious and poorly motivated. However, challenging them simply reopens the original controversy. The upshot is a sobering moral: we still do not know how to move beyond appeals to naïve introspection in establishing the nature and limits of our ordinary experience.