Unconscious cues bias first saccades in a free-saccade task

Visual–spatial attention can be biased towards salient visual information without visual awareness. It is unclear, however, whether such bias can further influence free-choices such as saccades in a free viewing task. In our experiment, we presented visual cues below awareness threshold immediately before people made free saccades. Our results showed that masked cues could influence the direction and latency of the first free saccade, suggesting that salient visual information can unconsciously influence free actions.     

Conscious awareness is required for holistic face processing

Investigating the limits of unconscious processing is essential to understand the function of consciousness. Here, we explored whether holistic face processing, a mechanism believed to be important for face processing in general, can be accomplished unconsciously. Using a novel “eyes-face” stimulus we tested whether discrimination of pairs of eyes was influenced by the surrounding face context. While the eyes were fully visible, the faces that provided context could be rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression. Two experiments with three different sets of face stimuli and a subliminal learning procedure converged to show that invisible faces did not influence perception of visible eyes. In contrast, surrounding faces, when they were clearly visible, strongly influenced perception of the eyes. Thus, we conclude that conscious awareness might be a prerequisite for holistic face processing.     

Boundary conditions for the influence of unfamiliar non-target primes in unconscious evaluative priming: The moderating role of attentional task sets

Evaluative priming by masked emotional stimuli that are not consciously perceived has been taken as evidence that affective stimulus evaluation can also occur unconsciously. However, as masked priming effects were small and frequently observed only for familiar primes that there also presented as visible targets in an evaluative decision task, priming was thought to reflect primarily response activation based on acquired S–R associations and not evaluative semantic stimulus analysis. The present study therefore assessed across three experiments boundary conditions for the emergence of masked evaluative priming effects with unfamiliar primes in an evaluative decision task and investigated the role of the frequency of target repetition on priming with pictorial and verbal stimuli. While familiar primes elicited robust priming effects in all conditions, priming effects by unfamiliar primes were reliably obtained for low repetition (pictures) or unrepeated targets (words), but not for targets repeated at a high frequency. This suggests that unfamiliar masked stimuli only elicit evaluative priming effects when the task set associated with the visible target involves evaluative semantic analysis and is not based on S–R triggered responding as for high repetition targets. The present results therefore converge with the growing body of evidence demonstrating attentional control influences on unconscious processing.     

Unconscious reward facilitates motion perceptual learning

Reward signal plays an important role in guiding human learning behaviour. Recent studies have provided evidence that reward signal modulates perceptual learning of basic visual features. Typically, the reward effects on perceptual learning were accompanied with consciously presented reward during the learning process. However, whether an unconsciously presented reward signal that minimizes the contribution of attentional and motivational factors can facilitate perceptual learning remains less well understood. We trained human subjects on a visual motion detection task and subliminally delivered a monetary reward for correct response during the training. The results showed significantly larger learning effect for high reward-associated motion direction than low reward-associated motion direction. Importantly, subjects could neither discriminate the relative values of the subliminal monetary reward nor correctly report the reward-direction contingencies. Our findings suggest that reward signal plays an important modulatory role in perceptual learning even if the magnitude of the reward was not consciously perceived.     

The divergent effects of fear and disgust on unconscious inhibitory control

Previous studies have shown that negative emotional distracters impair conscious inhibitory control. Recent research has shown that inhibitory control can be triggered unconsciously; therefore, in Experiment 1, we aimed to investigate whether negative emotional distracters affect unconscious inhibitory control. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, we examined whether fearful and disgusting distracters have differential effects on unconscious inhibitory control. Participants were instructed to perform a masked Go/No-Go task superimposed on a negative or neutral image cue (Experiment 1) or on a fearful, disgusting or neutral image cue (Experiment 2). Results showed that negative emotional distracters impaired unconscious inhibitory control; furthermore, disgusting distracters impeded unconscious inhibitory control when compared to fearful ones. This study is the first to provide evidence that fear and disgust may affect unconscious inhibitory control differently. These results expand the understanding of the relationship between emotions and inhibitory control.     

Prediction and unconscious attention operate synergistically to facilitate stimulus processing: An fMRI study

There is considerable evidence that prediction and attention aid perception. However, little is known about the possible neural mechanisms underlying the impact of prediction and unconscious attention on perception, probably due to the relative neglect of unconscious attention in scholarly literature. Here, we addressed this issue using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We adopted a variant of the double-cue paradigm, in which prediction and attention were factorially manipulated by two separate cues (prediction and attention cues). To manipulate consciousness, the attention cues were presented subliminally and supraliminally. Behaviorally, we reported an unconscious-attended effect in the predictable trials and a conscious-attended effect in the unpredictable trials. On the neural level, it was shown that prediction and unconscious attention interacted in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). More specifically, there was a significantly decreased activation in dlPFC for predictable relative to unpredictable stimuli in the unconscious-attended trials, but not in the unconscious-unattended trials. This result suggests that prediction and unconscious attention operate synergistically to facilitate stimulus processing. This is further corroborated by the subsequent functional connectivity analysis, which revealed increased functional connectivity between the left dlPFC and the premotor cortex for predictable versus unpredictable stimuli in the unconscious-attended trials.     

Neural synchronization as a hypothetical explanation of the psychoanalytic unconscious

Cognitive scientists have tried to explain the neural mechanisms of unconscious mental states such as coma, epileptic seizures, and anesthesia-induced unconsciousness. However these types of unconscious states are different from the psychoanalytic unconscious. In this review, we aim to present our hypothesis about the neural correlates underlying psychoanalytic unconscious. To fulfill this aim, we firstly review the previous explanations about the neural correlates of conscious and unconscious mental states, such as brain oscillations, synchronicity of neural networks, and cognitive binding. By doing so, we hope to lay a neuroscientific ground for our hypothesis about neural correlates of psychoanalytic unconscious; parallel but unsynchronized neural networks between different layers of consciousness and unconsciousness. Next, we propose a neuroscientific mechanism about how the repressed mental events reach the conscious awareness; the lock of neural synchronization between two mental layers of conscious and unconscious. At the last section, we will discuss the data about schizophrenia as a clinical example of our proposed hypothesis.     

On the Conjunction of Basic Assumptions in the Enlarged Group

According to Bion, group mentality is inspired by three basic assumptions (dependence, fightflight, pairing) dominating in turn. No conjunctions of basic assumptions seem to be possible. The author, however, formulates the hypothesis that such conjunctions may take place in weakly structured enlarged groups, midway between small groups and the institutional larger groups described by Freud and Bion as Church, Army and Aristocracy. A case study is here presented, wherein the group session appears to be dominated by a baFF+baP conjunction (i.e. a combination of fight-flight and pairing emerging simultaneously). The in-depth analysis highlights the shared unconscious fantasy corresponding to this conjunction, i.e. the Weapon-Baby fantasy. Having split the parental couple into a good one and a bad one, the group expects the good couple to generate a Divine Baby capable of leading the war against the bad couple. The "good" pairing thus evoked, however, is nothing but a combined object, only capable of faecal offspring: a Stool Baby, which can only be used to be thrown against the Enemy. Similar fantasies can be found at the individual level in manic-personality pseudo-creativity. At the social level, the same baFF+baP conjunction seems to apply as well to political movements such as Hitlerism.     

Conscious thoughts from reflex-like processes: A new experimental paradigm for consciousness research

The contents of our conscious mind can seem unpredictable, whimsical, and free from external control. When instructed to attend to a stimulus in a work setting, for example, one might find oneself thinking about household chores. Conscious content thus appears different in nature from reflex action. Under the appropriate conditions, reflexes occur predictably, reliably, and via external control. Despite these intuitions, theorists have proposed that, under certain conditions, conscious content resembles reflexes and arises reliably via external control. We introduce the Reflexive Imagery Task, a paradigm in which, as a function of external control, conscious content is triggered reliably and unintentionally: When instructed to not subvocalize the name of a stimulus object, participants reliably failed to suppress the set-related imagery. This stimulus-elicited content is considered ‘high-level’ content and, in terms of stages of processing, occurs late in the processing stream. We discuss the implications of this paradigm for consciousness research.     

Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action?

David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action‐related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception‐related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action ( Bruno & Franz, 2009 ; Dassonville & Bala, 2004 ; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008 ; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008 ). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process ( Schenk & McIntosh, 2010 ). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action‐guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi‐conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division.