Mistaking the instance for the rule: A critical analysis of the truth-table evaluation paradigm

Many studies probe for interpretations of < if A then C> by having people evaluate truth-table cases (<A and C>, < A and not-C>, < not-A and C>, < not-A and not-C>) as making the rule true or false, or being irrelevant. We argue that a single case can never prove a general rule to be true, as philosophy of science has taught any researcher. Giving participants the impossible “true” option would therefore bias results away from this response. In Experiment 1 people judged instead whether cases make a rule false, do not make the rule false, or are irrelevant to the rule. The experimental group (N = 44) showed a significant increase in not-false responses compared with true responses of the control group (N = 39). In Experiments 2 and 3 the experimental groups judged whether cases make a rule true, corroborate it (i.e., make the rule more plausible, but neither true nor false), make it false, or are irrelevant. There was a significant reduction of irrelevant responses as compared to the default true/false/irrelevant task for the control groups. Even < A and C> cases were often no longer considered to make an < if A then C> rule true and were correctly judged to corroborate (vs. verify) rules. Results corroborate our conceptual analyses of the unsuitable “true” response option and put into question arguments that hinge on the presumed likelihood by which people consider truth contingencies to make a rule “true”.     

The interrelationship between speeded and unspeeded divergent thinking and reasoning, and the role of mental speed

The relationship between intelligence and creativity is still subject to substantial debate in the research literature. In the present study, we focused on core dimensions of both constructs, that is divergent thinking and reasoning. We hypothesized their relationship to depend both on the speededness of test tasks and on the subject's mental speed, positing that with increasing speededness of the tasks, mental speed would have a stronger impact on task outcomes. We disentangled the effects of task speededness and mental speed experimentally, testing 261 participants (mean age 14.48 years) with 12 divergent thinking and 12 reasoning tasks, 6 of each under power conditions, 6 time-constrained. In addition, we assessed mental speed with 6 tasks. We analyzed the data through structural equation modeling. Results confirmed our expectations: test speededness contributed significantly to mental speed variance in divergent thinking task performance. Divergent thinking assessed under time constraints was fully explained by divergent thinking assessed under power conditions and by mental speed. Divergent thinking and reasoning showed no correlation when controlling for mental speed. Our findings suggest that the correlations between divergent thinking and reasoning are mainly the result of variance both constructs share with mental speed, and that timed versus untimed test-taking plays a minor role.     

Power of the desired self: Influence of induced perceptions of the self on reasoning

This research shows that the motivation to posses a desired characteristic (or to avoid an undesired one) results in self-perceptions that guide people’s use of base rate in the Lawyer–Engineer problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). In four studies, participants induced to believe (or recall, Exp. 2) that a rational cognitive style is success-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style failure-conducive) subsequently viewed themselves as more rational and relied more on base rate in their probability estimates than those induced to believe that a rational cognitive style is failure-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style success-conducive). These findings show that the desired self had an influence on reasoning in the self-unrelated lawyer–engineer task, since the use of base rates was mediated by changes in participants’ perceptions of their own rationality. These findings therefore show that the desired self, through the working self-concept that it entails, constitutes another factor influencing people’s use of distinct modes of reasoning.     

An overview of algorithmic approaches to compute optimum entropy distributions in the expert system shell MECore (extended version)

The expert system shell MECore provides a series of knowledge management operations to define probabilistic knowledge bases and to reason under uncertainty. To provide a reference work for MECore algorithmics, we bring together results from different sources that have been applied in MECore and explain their intuitive ideas. Additionally, we report on our ongoing work regarding further development of MECore's algorithms to compute optimum entropy distributions and provide some empirical results. Altogether this paper explains the intuition of important theoretical results and their practical implications, compares old and new algorithmic approaches and points out their benefits as well as possible limitations and pitfalls.     

Information becomes evidence when an explanation can incorporate it into a causal framework

Recognizing information as evidence is central to the development of scientific reasoning. When does information about an event come to be treated as evidence relevant to explaining the event? We asked whether this was increasingly likely to happen when an explanation becomes available that can incorporate both the event and the information into a single causal framework. In three studies, we presented participants with events for which there were two possible and plausible explanations (a baseline and one of two alternative explanations), as well as with two pieces of background information. While all explanations could account for the event, only one alternative explanation (the “target” explanation) could incorporate both the event and the background information into a single causal framework. The results indicated that information is more likely to be seen as evidentially relevant to an event when there is an explanation available that can accommodate both the event and the information into a single casual framework than when such an explanation is lacking. Furthermore, the presence of this information renders the target alternative increasingly plausible. That is, it is the interdependence of explanation or theory and evidence that allows us to realize that some information is likely to be evidential. However, for this to happen, the relation between explanation and information must be made salient, either by explicitly asking about it (as we did in Study 1) or by fleshing out the target explanation (as we did in Study 3).     

Understanding dynamic and static displays: using images to reason dynamically

We examined expert meteorologists as they created a weather forecast while working in a naturalistic environment. We examined the type of external representation they chose to examine (a static image, a sequence of static images, or a dynamic display) and the kind of information they extracted from those representations (static or dynamic). We found that even though weather is an extremely dynamic domain, expert meteorologists examined very few animations, examining primarily static images. However, meteorologists did extract large amounts of dynamic information from these static images, suggesting that they reasoned about the weather by mentally animating the static images rather than letting the software do it for them.     

Jumping to conclusions and the continuum of delusional beliefs

The present study examined the jumping to conclusions reasoning bias across the continuum of delusional ideation by investigating individuals with active delusions, delusion prone individuals, and non-delusion prone individuals. Neutral and highly self-referent probabilistic reasoning tasks were employed. Results indicated that individuals with delusions gathered significantly less information than delusion prone and non-delusion prone participants on both the neutral and self-referent tasks, (p<.001). Individuals with delusions made less accurate decisions than the delusion prone and non-delusion prone participants on both tasks (p<.001), yet were more confident about their decisions than were delusion prone and non-delusion prone participants on the self-referent task (p=.002). Those with delusions and those who were delusion prone reported higher confidence in their performance on the self-referent task than they did the neutral task (p=.02), indicating that high self-reference impacted information processing for individuals in both of these groups. The results are discussed in relation to previous research in the area of probabilistic reasoning and delusions.     

基于IRT模型的儿童图形推理能力动态评估研究

MRMLC模型是一种常见的动态评估项目反应理论模型。本研究结合小学儿童图形推理能力发展的特点,采用前测-干预-后测的动态评估模式,对来自江西省北部的四到六年级共177名儿童的图形推理能力进行了基于MRMLC模型的动态评估。研究结果表明通过动态评估我们不仅可以获知儿童图形推理能力的当前水平;而且,还可以进一步分析和比较儿童在各测量情景所测的潜在水平。     

Expertise in complex decision making: the role of search in chess 70 years after de Groot

One of the most influential studies in all expertise research is de Groot's (1946) study of chess players, which suggested that pattern recognition, rather than search, was the key determinant of expertise. Many changes have occurred in the chess world since de Groot's study, leading some authors to argue that the cognitive mechanisms underlying expertise have also changed. We decided to replicate de Groot's study to empirically test these claims and to examine whether the trends in the data have changed over time. Six Grandmasters, five International Masters, six Experts, and five Class A players completed the think-aloud procedure for two chess positions. Findings indicate that Grandmasters and International Masters search more quickly than Experts and Class A players, and that both groups today search substantially faster than players in previous studies. The findings, however, support de Groot's overall conclusions and are consistent with predictions made by pattern recognition models.