Attention switching and working memory spans

Barrouillet and Camos () concluded from their developmental study on working memory that when performing complex span tasks, individuals maintain memory items by switching rapidly their attention from processing to storage while performing the concurrent task. Thus, a processing component that would require a continuous attentional focusing should have a highly detrimental effect on span. The present study verifies two predictions issuing from this hypothesis by comparing the classical self‐paced reading and operation span tasks with new computer‐paced tasks in adults. First, any increase in the pace at which the processing component of a working memory span task has to be performed impedes switching and then leads to lower spans. Second, when presented at a fast pace, even simple activities such as reading letters or adding and subtracting 1 to small numbers have an effect on spans as detrimental as complex activities like reading and understanding sentences or solving complex equations.     

When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model

When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. The high-logic, low belief-bias group's relatively unbiased responses came at the cost of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of observed effects.     

Rapid-response versus free-time selection tasks using different logical connectives

When reasoning with conditional statements (i.e., if [not] p then [not] q), people tend to display matching bias: Options that match the entities named in the rule are selected even when logically inappropriate. Three different Wason selection tasks were administered under free-time and rapid-response formats. For the latter, individual cards were presented for one second, and required a response within a further one second. Previous research using these formats (Roberts & Newton, 2001) has shown that this increases matching bias, in line with the action of preconscious heuristic processes which direct attention towards relevant aspects of a problem, but whose action can be overturned if there is sufficient time to apply analytic reasoning processes. The selection tasks administered included a standard abstract conditional task, a disjunctive version (i.e., either [not] p or [not] q), and a conditional task in which the cards showed explicitly negated values. Both conditional tasks demonstrated matching bias, but under rapid-response presentation, matching bias only increased for the standard conditional and disjunctive tasks. Overall, the data support Evans’ (e.g., 2006) heuristic-analytic framework albeit with some caveats, and it is suggested that the broad question, of whether individual selection task formats show or do not show matching bias, requires more detailed investigation.     

Phonological coding in reading comprehension: The importance of individual differences

Abstract

In two experiments, texts were presented word by word at a fixed pace to subjects high or low in test anxiety, under various concurrent interference conditions: no interference, articulatory suppression, finger tapping, unattended meaningful speech, reversed (meaningless) speech and nonword (meaningless) speech. High-anxiety subjects produced overt articulation more frequently than low-anxiety subjects, especially in the speech conditions. There was an interaction between anxiety and interference on comprehension performance: Conditions thought to interfere with phonological coding (i.e. articulatory suppression and nonword speech) were detrimental to comprehension for high but not for low-anxiety subjects; in contrast, there were no differences in comprehension performance as a function of anxiety under conditions causing no (proper) phonological interference (i.e. no interference, finger tapping and reversed speech). There were mixed results in the meaningful speech condition, partly attributable to its semantic interference component. These findings reveal that the use and importance of phonological coding in reading comprehension vary with differences in test anxiety-high-anxiety subjects are vulnerable to disruptive effects on phonological coding. This suggests that high-anxiety individuals are especially likely to resort to speech-based coding during reading, and that phonological coding has a compensatory role for them.     

The compatibility heuristic in non-categorical hypothetical reasoning: Inferences between conditionals and disjunctions

A new theory explains how people make hypothetical inferences from a premise consistent with several alternatives to a conclusion consistent with several alternatives. The key proposal is that people rely on a heuristic that identifies compatible possibilities. It is tested in 7 experiments that examine inferences between conditionals and disjunctions. Participants accepted inferences between conditionals and inclusive disjunctions when a compatible possibility was immediately available, in their binary judgments that a conclusion followed or not (Experiment 1a) and ternary judgments that included it was not possible to know (Experiment 1b). The compatibility effect was amplified when compatible possibilities were more readily available, e.g., for ‘A only if B’ conditionals (Experiment 2). It was eliminated when compatible possibilities were not available, e.g., for ‘if and only if A B’ bi-conditionals and exclusive disjunctions (Experiment 3). The compatibility heuristic occurs even for inferences based on implicit negation e.g., ‘A or B, therefore if C D’ (Experiment 4), and between universals ‘All A’s are B’s’ and disjunctions (Experiment 5a) and universals and conditionals (Experiment 5b). The implications of the results for alternative theories of the cognitive processes underlying hypothetical deductions are discussed.     

Inhibitory control gains from higher-order cognitive strategy training

The present study examined the transfer of higher-order cognitive strategy training to inhibitory control. Middle school students enrolled in a comprehension- and reasoning-focused cognitive strategy training program and passive controls participated. The training program taught students a set of steps for inferring essential gist or themes from materials. Both before and after training or a comparable duration in the case of the passive controls, participants completed a semantically cued Go/No-Go task that was designed to assess the effects of depth of semantic processing on response inhibition and components of event-related potentials (ERP) related to response inhibition. Depth of semantic processing was manipulated by varying the level of semantic categorization required for response selection and inhibition. The SMART-trained group showed inhibitory control gains and changes in fronto-central P3 ERP amplitudes on inhibition trials; whereas, the control group did not. The results provide evidence of the transfer of higher-order cognitive strategy training to inhibitory control and modulation of ERPs associated with semantically cued inhibitory control. The findings are discussed in terms of implications for cognitive strategy training, models of cognitive abilities, and education.     

Implication and reasoning in mental state attribution: Comments on Jane Heal's theory of co-cognition

Simulation theory explains third-person mental state attribution in terms of an attributor's ability to imaginatively mimic other people's mental processes. Jane Heal's version of simulation theory, which she calls a theory of “co-cognition,” maintains that one can know and can predict others’ beliefs primarily by thinking about what their antecedent beliefs imply. I argue that Heal's account of belief attribution elides crucial differences between reasoning and merely discovering relations among propositions.     

基于认知诊断的动态评估—以儿童图形推理能力为例

以认知诊断和动态评估两者基本的心理计量模型:MLTM for MS和MRMLC相结合作为切入点,提出了基于认知诊断的动态评估方案及数据统计分析方法。为探讨该方案和数据分析方法的可行性,以儿童图形推理能力为例展开实证研究。研究结果显示:(1)基于认知诊断的动态评估方案是可以实现的、其数据分析方法也是可行的;(2)该方案不仅可以测量潜在水平,还可以测量其涉及的认知成分和策略的变化;(3)无论是当前水平还是潜在水平,高年级儿童都更擅长采用较复杂、有效的认知加工成分和策略。     

A process model of the understanding of uncertain conditionals

To build a process model of the understanding of conditionals we extract a common core of three semantics of if-then sentences: (a) the conditional event interpretation in the coherencebased probability logic, (b) the discourse processingtheory of Hans Kamp, and (c) the game-theoretical approach of Jaakko Hintikka. The empirical part reports three experiments in which each participant assessed the probability of 52 if-then sentencesin a truth table task. Each experiment included a second task: An n-back task relating the interpretation of conditionals to working memory, a Bayesian bookbag and poker chip task relating the interpretation of conditionals to probability updating, and a probabilistic modus ponens task relating the interpretation of conditionals to a classical inference task. Data analysis shows that the way in which the conditionals are interpreted correlates with each of the supplementary tasks. The results are discussed within the process model proposed in the introduction.     

The relationship between dietary restraint and deficits in reasoning about causes of obesity

Abstract

Objective: Increased levels of dietary restraint are associated with deficits on many cognitive tasks. Less is known about how individual differences in restraint influences complex cognition such as reasoning which is the focus of this research.

Design: Two experimental studies are reported. In study 1, participants (n?=?158) completed a causal conditional reasoning task with statements about weight-related and general causal relationships. Study 2 replicated and extended study 1. Participants (n?=?108) completed a causal conditional reasoning task focusing on behavioural causes of weight change or general statements.

Main outcome measure: Causal conditional reasoning task performance.

Results: In study 1, levels of dietary restraint were negatively associated with reasoning abilities for weight-related statements only. Study 2 replicated the negative association between dietary restraint and reasoning finding the effect in both weight-related, and general, causal judgements.

Conclusion: The novel findings show that individual differences in dietary restraint have a wider relationship with cognition than previously demonstrated. Results tentatively support theoretical explanations of a reduction in cognitive capacity, rather than differences in belief, explaining reasoning deficits. These findings open an interesting avenue for research and might have implications for effective decision making about personal health behaviours, such as food choice.