Critical thinking ability and belief in the paranormal

A study was conducted to assess the relationship between critical thinking and belief in the paranormal. 180 students from three departments (psychology, arts, computer science) completed one measure of reasoning, the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), and a scale of paranormal experiences. Half of the subjects filled out the Cornell Critical Thinking Test (Ennis & Millmann, 1985) and the Watson–Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser, 2002), respectively. The results show no significant correlations between critical thinking and paranormal belief or experiences. Reasoning ability, however, had a significant effect on paranormal belief scores, but not on paranormal experiences. Subjects with lower reasoning ability scored higher on Traditional Paranormal Belief and New Age Philosophy than did subjects with higher reasoning abilities. Results suggest that those who have better reasoning abilities scrutinise to a greater extent whether their experiences are sufficient justification for belief in the reality of these phenomena.     

Threat, Authoritarianism, and Selective Exposure to Information

We examined the hypothesis that threat alters the cognitive strategies used by high authoritarians in seeking out new political information from the environment. In a laboratory experiment, threat was manipulated through a "mortality salience" manipulation used in research on terror management theory ( Pyszczynski, Solomon & Greenberg, 2003 ). Subjects (N = 92) were then invited to read one of three editorial articles on the topic of capital punishment. We found that in the absence of threat, both low and high authoritarians were responsive to salient norms of evenhandedness in information selection, preferring exposure to a two-sided article that presents the merits of both sides of an issue to an article that selectively touts the benefits of the pro or con side of the issue. However, in the presence of threat, high but not low authoritarians became significantly more interested in exposure to an article containing uniformly pro-attitudinal arguments, and significantly less interested in a balanced, two-sided article. Finally, a path analysis indicated that selective exposure to attitude-congruent information led to more internally consistent policy attitudes and inhibited attitude change. Discussion focuses on the role of threat in conditioning the cognitive and attitudinal effects of authoritarianism.     

Determining who to question, what to ask, and how much information to ask for: the development of inquiry in young children

To obtain reliable information, it is important to identify and effectively question knowledgeable informants. Two experiments examined how age and the ease of distinguishing between reliable and unreliable sources influence children’s ability to effectively question those sources to solve problems. A sample of 3- to 5-year-olds was introduced to a knowledgeable informant contrasted with an informant who always gave inaccurate answers or one who always indicated ignorance. Children were generally better at determining which informant to question when a knowledgeable informant was contrasted with an ignorant informant than when a knowledgeable informant was contrasted with an inaccurate informant. In some cases, age also influenced the ability to determine who to question and what to ask. Importantly, in both experiments, the strongest predictor of accuracy was whether children had acquired sufficient information; successful problem solving required integrating knowledge of who to question, what to ask, and how much information to ask for.     

Circular reasoning

Good informal arguments offer justification for their conclusions. They go wrong if the justifications double back, rendering the arguments circular. Circularity, however, is not necessarily a single property of an argument, but may depend on (a) whether the argument repeats an earlier claim, (b) whether the repetition occurs within the same line of justification, and (c) whether the claim is properly grounded in agreed‐upon information. The experiments reported here examine whether people take these factors into account in their judgments of whether arguments are circular and whether they are reasonable. The results suggest that direct judgments of circularity depend heavily on repetition and structural role of claims, but only minimally on grounding. Judgments of reasonableness take repetition and grounding into account, but are relatively insensitive to structural role.     

Working memory, inhibition, and fluid intelligence as predictors of performance on Tower of Hanoi and London tasks

The contributions of working memory, inhibition, and fluid intelligence to performance on the Tower of Hanoi (TOH) and Tower of London (TOL) were examined in 85 undergraduate participants. All three factors accounted for significant variance on the TOH, but only fluid intelligence accounted for significant variance on the TOL. When the contribution of fluid intelligence was accounted for, working memory and inhibition continued to account for significant variance on the TOH. These findings support argument that fluid intelligence contributes to executive functioning, but also show that the executive processes elicited by tasks vary according to task structure.     

Personality and reasoning ability during retirement age: Report from a Swedish population-based longitudinal study

We examined the association between personality and level and change in reasoning ability in a population-based sample of older adults (62–68 years) using a three-year annual follow-up longitudinal study design (HEARTS; N = 3851). Personality traits were measured using the Mini-IPIP scale and reasoning using a short form of Raven’s Matrices. Findings from a structural equation model, controlling for age, education, and sex, revealed that higher levels on extraversion, conscientiousness, and neuroticism were associated with lower reasoning ability (βs: −0.17 to −0.09). Higher levels of openness were associated with better reasoning (β: 0.16). We found no association with rate of change. This evidence replicates previous findings demonstrating that personality traits are associated with individual differences in cognition among older adults.     

Learning Łukasiewicz logic

The integration between connectionist learning and logic-based reasoning is a longstanding foundational question in artificial intelligence, cognitive systems, and computer science in general. Research into neural-symbolic integration aims to tackle this challenge, developing approaches bridging the gap between sub-symbolic and symbolic representation and computation. In this line of work the core method has been suggested as a way of translating logic programs into a multilayer perceptron computing least models of the programs. In particular, a variant of the core method for three valued Łukasiewicz logic has proven to be applicable to cognitive modelling among others in the context of Byrne’s suppression task. Building on the underlying formal results and the corresponding computational framework, the present article provides a modified core method suitable for the supervised learning of Łukasiewicz logic (and of a closely-related variant thereof), implements and executes the corresponding supervised learning with the backpropagation algorithm and, finally, constructs a rule extraction method in order to close the neural-symbolic cycle. The resulting system is then evaluated in several empirical test cases, and recommendations for future developments are derived.     

Reasoning,biases and dual processes: The lasting impact of Wason (1960)

Wason (1960) published a relatively short experimental paper, in which he introduced the 2-4-6 problem as a test of inductive reasoning. This paper became one of the most highly cited to be published in the Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology and is significant for a number of reasons. First, the 2-4-6 task itself was ingenious and yielded evidence of error and bias in the intelligent participants who attempted it. Research on the 2-4-6 problem continues to the present day. More importantly, it was Wason's first paper on reasoning and one which made strong claims for bias and irrationality in a period dominated by rationalist writers like Piaget. It set in motion the study of cognitive biases in thinking and reasoning, well before the start of Tversky and Kahneman's famous heuristics and biases research programme. I also show here something for which Wason has received insufficient credit. It was Wason's work on this task and his later studies of his four card selection task that led to the first development of the dual process theory of reasoning which is so dominant in the current literature on the topic more than half a century later.     

Arguments in the practical reasoning underlying constructed probability responses

Reasoning is an important cognitive activity in probability assessment, and one that has been understudied. This proposition motivates the paper's three general aims. First, based on research in rhetoric, we present a theoretical means of analyzing the arguments constructed during the reasoning that occurs in probability assessment. Second, from verbal protocol data, we establish that subjects constructed arguments in forming beliefs and assessing the associated probabilities. Third, we analyze the data for the structure of subject's arguments, including argument content and form. Subjects used a limited amount of relevant evidence and used a variety of argument forms that could be characterized by the nature of the knowledge that subjects brought to bear in forming the arguments. Subjects predominantly used causal reasoning, but also employed hierarchical category knowledge, resemblance relationships, and arguments from authority. These findings form a basis for expanding our accounts of probability assessment and for improving assessment practice.     

How our brains reason logically

The aim of this article is to strengthen links between cognitive brain research and formal logic. The work covers three fundamental sorts of logical inferences: reasoning in the propositional calculus, i.e. inferences with the conditional “if...then”, reasoning in the predicate calculus, i.e. inferences based on quantifiers such as “all”, “some”, “none”, and reasoning with n-place relations. Studies with brain-damaged patients and neuroimaging experiments indicate that such logical inferences are implemented in overlapping but different bilateral cortical networks, including parts of the fronto-temporal cortex, the posterior parietal cortex, and the visual cortices. I argue that these findings show that we do not use a single deterministic strategy for solving logical reasoning problems. This account resolves many disputes about how humans reason logically and why we sometimes deviate from the norms of formal logic.