The Logic of Analogy in the Law

This paper deals with two issues in the field of reasoning by analogy in the law. The one issue is whether there exists such a thing as analogous rule application, or whether there is only the ‘normal’ application of a broadened rule. It is argued that if rules, as the entities made by a legislator, are distinguished from generalised solutions for cases, the idea of analogous application of rules makes sense. It is also shown how the so-called ‘reason-based model of rule application’, in contrast to the traditional modus ponens or subsumption model, makes it easy to give a logical account of analogous rule application. The other issue is how to argue logically about whether two cases are sufficiently similar to adopt the outcome of the one case for the other case. Section 3 provides a general logical model to establish this. The model is based on the comparison of the reasons for and against a particular solution in the two cases.     

Life and Death Matters: Losing a Sense of the Value of Human Beings

The essay combines a specific and a more general theme. In attacking ‘the doctrine of the sanctity of human life’ Singer takes himself thereby to be opposing the conviction that human life has special value. I argue that this conviction goes deep in our lives in many ways that do not depend on what Singer identifies as central to that ‘doctrine’, and that his attack therefore misses its main target. I argue more generally that Singer’s own moral philosophy affords only an impoverished and distorted sense of the value of human life and human beings. In purporting to dig below the supposedly illusion–ridden surface of our thinking about value, Singer in fact often leads us away from the robust terrain of our lived experience into rhetorical, and sometimes brutal, fantasy.     

Robustness of the rule-learning effect in 7-month-old infants: A close,multicenter replication of Marcus et al. (1999)

We conducted a close replication of the seminal work by Marcus and colleagues from 1999, which showed that after a brief auditory exposure phase, 7-month-old infants were able to learn and generalize a rule to novel syllables not previously present in the exposure phase. This work became the foundation for the theoretical framework by which we assume that infants are able to learn abstract representations and generalize linguistic rules. While some extensions on the original work have shown evidence of rule learning, the outcomes are mixed, and an exact replication of Marcus et al.'s study has thus far not been reported. A recent meta-analysis by Rabagliati and colleagues brings to light that the rule-learning effect depends on stimulus type (e.g., meaningfulness, speech vs. nonspeech) and is not as robust as often assumed. In light of the theoretical importance of the issue at stake, it is appropriate and necessary to assess the replicability and robustness of Marcus et al.'s findings. Here we have undertaken a replication across four labs with a large sample of 7-month-old infants (N = 96), using the same exposure patterns (ABA and ABB), methodology (Headturn Preference Paradigm), and original stimuli. As in the original study, we tested the hypothesis that infants are able to learn abstract “algebraic” rules and apply them to novel input. Our results did not replicate the original findings: infants showed no difference in looking time between test patterns consistent or inconsistent with the familiarization pattern they were exposed to.     

Effects of consequences of advice on patterns of rule control and rule choice

Rules in the form of advice can inaccurately state the effects of recommended responses by overstating or understating size of the consequences. Three experiments investigated the effects of such inaccuracies on patterns of rule control and rule choice with female college students. In Experiment 1, signaled accurate, overstated, or understated rules specified that a given number of points would be earned by pressing a designated key. For some subjects, rules specified a number of points to be gained; for other subjects, rules specified a number of points to be lost from an amount given earlier. Point totals stated in the inaccurate rules averaged 25% more (overstated) or 25% less (understated) than those received. When subjects could choose either the response specified in the rule or an alternative response that produced an unpredictable number of points, they showed greater sensitivity to the inaccuracy of overstated rules than understated rules. In trials at the end of the experiment in which subjects could choose which rule to see, subjects did not always choose accurate rules and often chose inaccurate rules for which they had shown less sensitivity earlier. Experiment 2 replicated this pattern in which subjects could choose which type of rule to see on a greater number of trials. Some evidence suggested that subjects prefer an improvement from the outcomes promised to those later received. In Experiment 3, rules misstated by averages of 25% and 50% were compared. Evidence suggested that increasing the size of the misstatement reduced the discrimination of inaccurate rules from accurate ones.     

On the origins of naming and other symbolic behavior

We identify naming as the basic unit of verbal behavior, describe the conditions under which it is learned, and outline its crucial role in the development of stimulus classes and, hence, of symbolic behavior. Drawing upon B. F. Skinner's functional analysis and the theoretical work of G. H. Mead and L. S. Vygotsky, we chart how a child, through learning listener behavior and then echoic responding, learns bidirectional relations between classes of objects or events and his or her own speaker-listener behavior, thus acquiring naming-a higher order behavioral relation. Once established, the bidirectionality incorporated in naming extends across behavior classes such as those identified by Skinner as the mand, tact, and intraverbal so that each becomes a variant of the name relation. We indicate how our account informs the specification of rule-governed behavior and provides the basis for an experimental analysis of symbolic behavior. Furthermore, because naming is both evoked by, and itself evokes, classes of events it brings about new or emergent behavior such as that reported in studies of stimulus equivalence. This account is supported by data from a wide range of match-to-sample studies that also provide evidence that stimulus equivalence in humans is not a unitary phenomenon but the outcome of a number of different types of naming behavior.     

问题解决产生式规则解决物理学问题研究

用问题解决产生式系统编制样例题和试干题,可使学生掌握样例题中所蕴含着的产生式规则,表明能在较短时间内掌握教学计划中所规定的知识内容,图式获得较快,而规则自动化有较高要求。     

Five Private Language Arguments

This paper distinguishes five key interpretations of the argument presented by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations I, §258. I also argue that on none of these five interpretations is the argument cogent. The paper is primarily concerned with the most popular interpretation of the argument: that which that makes it rest upon the principle that one can be said to follow a rule only if there exists a ‘useable criterion of successful performance’ (Pears) or ‘operational standard of correctness’ (Glock) for its correct application. This principle, I suggest, is untrue. The private language argument upon which it rests therefore fails.