How big is big? Relative and absolute properties in memory

Previous studies of semantic memory have overlooked an important distinction among so-called “property statements”. Statements with relative adjectives (e.g., Flamingos are big) imply a comparison to a standard or reference point associated with an immediate superordinate category (a flamingo is big for a bird), while the truth of statements with absolute adjectives (e.g., Flamingos are pink) is generally independent of such a standard. To examine the psychological consequences of this distinction, we asked subjects in Experiment 1 to verify sentences containing either relative or absolute adjectives embedded in either predicate-adjective (PA) constructions (e.g., A flamingo is big (pink)) or predicate-noun (PN) constructions (e.g. A flamingo is a big (pink) bird), where the predicate noun was the immediate superordinate. Reaction times (RTs) and errors for relative sentences decreased when the superordinate was specified, but remained constant for absolute sentences. These data also suggest that the truth value of relative sentences depends, not just on the superordinate, but also on a more global standard for everyday, human-oriented objects. Experiment 2 extends these results in showing that ratings of the truth of relative sentences are a function of the difference in size between an instance and its superordinate standard (e.g., between the size of a flamingo and that of an average bird) and the difference between the instance and the standard for everyday objects. Experiment 3 replicated these findings using reaction time as the dependent measure.     

The stutterer's reaction to the telephone as a speaking situation

A review of the literature indicates that one of the most commonly feared talking situations among stutterers is speaking on the telephone. One hundred-thirty stutterers who feared speaking on the telephone were interviewed regarding their fear of telephone calling and answering, the age at which they began to fear calling and answering, and their fear reactions to eight specific telephone calling situations.Data was analyzed for all subjects, male/female, black/white, and mild/moderate/ severe stuttering groups. Analysis indicated that telephone calling was judged to be more feared than telephone answering with the exception of the black stutterers. Acquisition of fear of the telephone occured earlier for telephone answering than for calling within most subgroups. When general reactions to the eight telephone situations were considered, the black stutterers had the most severe fear reactions while the male and moderate stutterers had the least severe reactions.     

Individual differences in intelligence: A reappraisal of the confluence model

The confluence model posits that an individual's intellectual development is a function of the intellectual environment he or she is exposed to in the home. Families with many children spaced close together are presumed to have intellectual environments inferior to those of families with few children spaced far apart. To date, the major support for the confluence model has come from analyses of the family size-birth order means of large aggregate data sets. Analyses of the individual scores of some of those same aggregate data sets, however, do not substantiate the confluence model. Explained variance for the aggregate (90%+) reduce to less than 3% in the individual analyses. A recommendation is made to shift the focus of the confluence model from family configuration variables to family interaction varibles utilizing longitudinal data from individuals.     

Differences in intelligence and automatic memory processes

Intelligence-related differences in memory have been viewed as dependent upon control rather than structural memory processes. A test of this notion was made by comparing retarded and nonretarded persons on a subject-paced continuous recognition memory task which was judged to be nonstrategic. The stimuli were computer-generated faces and words. Analyses of pacing rates and posttest interviews provided no consistent evidence for strategy use. Differences in memory between the retarded and nonretarded subjects were attributed to differences in automatic aspects of encoding.     

Learning conditional frequencies in a probability learning task

The study was prompted by a theoretical discussion of probability learning by Estes (1976). In three separate experiments, subjects were presented with frequency information in the form of wins and losses among 3 teams, and later predicted future wins and losses. Frequencies were devised so that conditional win frequencies for a pair of teams were either inconsistent or consistent with marginal win frequencies for each team. In experiment 1, when subjects predicted future events on the basis of known past frequencies, predictions were generally based on conditional frequencies. In experiment 2 six blocks of observations were presented, with predictions following each block. What little learning did occur was in the direction of the conditional frequencies. Subjects in experiment 3 were able to learn conditional frequencies when given explicit instructions to do so. Results were discussed in terms of a two-stage hypothesis generation model that might operate within the framework of an associative theory of probability learning.