The ethical dimension of analytical psychology

The centrality of the ethical dimension in Carl Gustav Jung's analytical psychology is demonstrated through careful reference to fundamental moments in the Jungian text. Tracking Jung's statements about the primacy of the ‘moral function’ (or ‘moral factor’) in the cure of neurosis as well as in the process of individuation, the ethical nature of the psychotherapeutic praxis proposed by Jung is highlighted. This allows us to see the ethical aspect of psychological conflicts, and thus to understand better why individuation can be seen as a ‘moral achievement’. Finally, the intelligible ethical structure of Jungian psychotherapeutic praxis is exposed.     

Aristotle's Metaphysics: Form,Matter and Identity

ABSTRACT

The example of the Spanish poet’s amnesia, mentioned by Spinoza in the scholium of proposition 39 of part IV of the Ethics in order to elucidate his conception of death, has given rise to many controversies in the scholarly interpretations, which in most cases maintain that the poet dies and that Spinoza himself thought this way. However, the matter is more complex than it at first appears and in this article I take a different path by reconstructing this scholium anew and providing an alternative interpretation. The comparison with selected passages of part V highlights the presence of a bi-conditional between the ratio of motion and rest that a body possesses, and its aptitude to be affected and affect in many more ways. In particular, the latter allows us to acknowledge the continuity of the poet’s individuality, expressed in his mind–body union grounded by the parallelism theory. As a result, the poet case has a crucial explanatory role for Spinoza’s theory of the eternity of the human mind and if one misunderstands the former, the latter is also misconceived.     

On the Complexity and Wholeness of Human Beings: Husserlian Perspectives

Abstract

At the beginning of Being and Time, Heidegger rejects Husserl’s classical phenomenology on three grounds: he claims that Husserlian phenomenology is impaired by indeterminate concepts, by naïve personalism, and by obscurities in its account of individuation. The paper studies the validity of this early critique by explicating Husserl’s discourse on human persons as bodily-spiritual beings and by clarifying his account of the principles by which such beings can be individuated. The paper offers three types of considerations. After a summary of Heidegger’s early critique of Husserl, the second section of the paper distinguishes between two dimensions of Husserl’s discourse on human persons. It argues that Husserl does not put forward one analysis of the being of humans, but explicates two different accounts and then studies critically their mutual relations of dependency: on the one hand, the naturalistic account of human beings as layered beings and on the other hand the personalistic account of human beings as peculiar kinds of unified wholes in which the mental and the bodily are inextricably intertwined. The third section of the paper clarifies Husserl’s theory of individuation and its consequences for our discourse on human persons. Finally, the fourth section explicates the conceptual means by which Husserl develops his account of human beings as persons. The paper ends in drawing some conclusions for contemporary philosophical anthropology.     

Where East meets West: in the house of individuation

The psychological process of individuation as experienced in Jungian work may lead to states of consciousness that resemble advanced spiritual developments across religious traditions and cultures. This is where Westerners may reach a common ground with the East. In the essentials and with respect to the final goal there is little difference among the many ways to the self, even if the cultural features in the landscape are disparate. In late stage Jungian analysis and individuation and in what Erich Neumann calls ‘centroversion’, the personal and the impersonal aspects of the personality accumulate around the ego‐self axis to form a composite identity. In this complex structure the ego does not vanish but is joined to the impersonal archetypal levels of the psyche and identity thus becomes at once individual and archetypal. This is the third stage of conjunction as described by Jung in Mysterium Coniunctionis and it is identical to the type of consciousness depicted in the final scenes of Zen Buddhism's Ten Ox‐Herding Pictures.     

中国传统的音乐治疗研究

音乐是人心理活动的产物,同时音乐还具有一定的治疗作用。音乐疗法是集心理学、医学、生理学、哲学、音乐、艺术于一体的综合性的新兴学科,作为一门应用科学,逐渐被社会所接受,并日趋成熟。中国有丰富的音乐治疗的思想。特别是五音疗法,反映了传统的“天人合一”思想。五音疗法整合了人与自然、社会的相互作用和影响;体现了对音乐与情绪及脏腑之间的互动关系;突现了音声与人格情志、脏气等的关系。五音疗法匹配了人体的不同脏腑,把五音、五行、五脏、人格配属用于音乐治疗实践。     

Social categorization and individuation in the own‐age bias

Young adults recognize other young adult faces more accurately than older adult faces, an effect termed the own‐age bias (OAB). The categorization‐individuation model (CIM) proposes that recognition memory biases like the OAB occur as unfamiliar faces are initially quickly categorized. In‐group faces are seen as socially relevant which motivates the processing of individuating facial features. Outgroup faces are processed more superficially with attention to category‐specific information which hinders subsequent recognition. To examine the roles of categorization and individuation in the context of the OAB, participants completed a face recognition task and a speeded age categorization task including young and older adult faces. In the recognition task, half of the participants were given instructions aimed to encourage individuation of other‐age faces. An OAB emerged that was not influenced by individuation instructions, but the magnitude of the OAB was correlated with performance in the categorization task. The larger the categorization advantage for older adult over young adult faces, the larger the OAB. These results support the premise that social categorization processes can affect the subsequent recognition of own‐ and other‐age faces, but do not provide evidence for the effectiveness of individuation instructions in reducing the OAB.     

Color-function categories that prime infants to use color information in an object individuation task

There is evidence for developmental hierarchies in the type of information to which infants attend when reasoning about objects. Investigators have questioned the origin of these hierarchies and how infants come to identify new sources of information when reasoning about objects. The goal of the present experiments was to shed light on this debate by identifying conditions under which infants’ sensitivity to color information, which is slow to emerge, could be enhanced in an object individuation task. The outcome of Experiment 1 confirmed and extended previous reports that 9.5-month-olds can be primed, through exposure to events in which the color of an object predicts its function, to attend to color differences in a subsequent individuation task. The outcomes of Experiments 2-4 revealed age-related changes in the nature of the representations that support color priming. This is exemplified by three main findings. First, the representations that are formed during the color-function events are relatively specific. That is, infants are primed to use the color difference seen in the color-function events to individuate objects in the test events, but not other color differences. Second, 9.5-month-olds can be led to form more abstract event representations, and then generalize to other colors in the test events if they are shown multiple pairs of colors in the color-function events. Third, slightly younger 9-month-olds also can be led to form more inclusive categories with multiple color pairs, but only when they are allowed to directly compare the exemplars in each color pair during the present events. These results shed light on the development of categorization abilities, cognitive mechanisms that support color-function priming, and the kinds of experiences that can increase infants’ sensitivity to color information.     

Your Self: did you find it or did you make it?

Abstract: In this paper ¹ 1 This is a slightly edited version of a paper that was pre‐circulated to members of the Society of Analtyical Psychology for discussion at the monthly meeting of the ‘analytic group’ on 4^th November 1991. Sub‐headings and some references have been added by the Editor, Warren Colman.
, written in draft form in 1991 and now posthumously published, the late Louis Zinkin ² 2 The late Louis Zinkin was a practising analytical psychologist and group analyst, a training analyst of the S.A.P., honorary consultant psychotherapist and senior lecturer at St George's Hospital, London, and associate of the Group‐Analytic Practice, London. He died on 13^th March 1993.
presents a constructivist view of the self. He considers some of the paradoxes in Jungian definitions of the self and compares these to Winnicott's ‘forbidden question’ regarding the transitional object: ‘Did you find it or did you make it?’. He argues that, for the purposes of a coherent scientific theory, these apparent paradoxes need to be formulated in an internally consistent way. Bemused by the many contradictions in Jung's thinking, he proposes making a fresh start by thinking in terms of people in social interaction with each other rather than as solitary subjects, as Jung did. This leads him to the view that the self comes into existence through continuing interaction with other people. Drawing on the work of Harré and Vygotsky, he suggests that the public self is prior to the private self and that one becomes real through recognition by other people in and through language and culture. The paper was discussed at a meeting held at the Society of Analytical Psychology in November 1991 and an edited version of the taped discussion follows.     

The Problematics of Human Subjectivity: Gilles Deleuze and the Deweyan Legacy

This article is part of alarger project exploring the continuity betweentwo philosophical positions – that of Frenchpoststructuralist Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995)and John Dewey – that appear at first sight tobe separated by time, place and culture. Thescope of the present paper is necessarilylimited and focuses on one aspect of theproject, namely: the problematics ofsubjectivity, or subject formation, inDeleuze's philosophy. Deleuze's position isestablished as pragmatic by virtue of itssharing the value allotted by Dewey toexperiential and experimental inquiry inphilosophy. By drawing initial parallels with anumber of selected Dewey's excerpts, this paperaims to open up a space for the imaginarydialogue between two philosophical thoughts soas to consider a possibility for applyingDeleuze's philosophy to educational theory andpractice in the context of current debates andin a manner continuous with the Deweyan legacy.The paper concludes by affirming Deleuze'splace in the contemporary scholarship on Dewey.