The effects of motion on in-vehicle touch screen system operation: A battle management system case study

The use of in-vehicle touch screen devices is currently common in both military and civilian vehicles; despite this, the effects of motion on touch screen device operation within vehicles remains largely unexplored. This article describes a study that examined, using driving simulation, the influences of motion on performance, workload and usability when using a touch screen in-vehicle battle management system. Acting in the role of battle management system operator, 20 participants undertook four simulated drives, two under high motion (representative of an unsealed road) and two under normal motion (representative of a sealed road), whilst performing various battle management tasks. In the high motion condition, lower accuracy and longer task completion times were found, along with greater levels of subjective and physiological workload and lower levels of perceived device usability, when compared to the normal motion condition. The findings indicate that, compared to normal motion, the high motion condition impaired key aspects of battle management system operation. In closing, the importance of considering motion and its effects during touch screen system design is discussed.     

Insensitivity and oversensitivity to answer diagnosticity in hypothesis testing

Two experiments examined how people perceive the diagnosticity of different answers (“yes” and “no”) to the same question. We manipulated whether the “yes” and the “no” answers conveyed the same amount of information or not, as well as the presentation format of the probabilities of the features inquired about. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with only the percentages of occurrence of the features, which most straightforwardly apply to the diagnosticity of “yes” answers. In Experiment 2, participants received in addition the percentages of the absence of features, which serve to assess the diagnosticity of “no” answers. Consistent with previous studies, we found that participants underestimated the difference in the diagnosticity conveyed by different answers to the same question. However, participants' insensitivity was greater when the normative (Bayesian) diagnosticity of the “no” answer was higher than that of the “yes” answer. We also found oversensitivity to answer diagnosticity, whereby participants valued as differentially diagnostic two answers that were normatively equal in terms of their diagnosticity. Presenting to participants the percentages of occurrence of the features inquired about together with their complements increased their sensitivity to the diagnosticity of answers. We discuss the implications of these findings for confirmation bias in hypothesis testing.     

Context affects the interpretation of low but not high numerical probabilities: A hypothesis testing account of subjective probability

Low numerical probabilities tend to be directionally ambiguous, meaning they can be interpreted either positively, suggesting the occurrence of the target event, or negatively, suggesting its non-occurrence. High numerical probabilities, however, are typically interpreted positively. We argue that the greater directional ambiguity of low numerical probabilities may make them more susceptible than high probabilities to contextual influences. Results from five experiments supported this premise, with perceived base rate affecting the interpretation of an event’s numerical posterior probability more when it was low than high. The effect is consistent with a confirmatory hypothesis testing process, with the relevant perceived base rate suggesting the directional hypothesis which people then test in a confirmatory manner.     

Evidence for an antagonistic interaction between reward and punishment sensitivity on striatal activity: A verification of the Joint Subsystems Hypothesis

The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory proposes that the Behavioral Approach System (BAS) comprises dopaminergic brain regions and underpins reward sensitivity causing impulsivity. It has been shown in a supraliminal priming task that highly reward sensitive subjects have a larger reaction time (RT) priming effect and make more commission errors to prime-incongruent targets. We adapted a similar task to event-related fMRI and hypothesized that (1) high reward sensitivity is associated with increased activation in dopaminergic brain regions, the ventral striatum in particular, (2) that BAS related personality traits predict impulsivity and (3) that the BAS effects are larger after adjusting for the interactive influence of trait avoidance, as predicted by the Joint Subsystems Hypothesis. Fourteen healthy females participated in the fMRI experiment and were scored on sensitivity to reward (SR) and trait avoidance, i.e., sensitivity to punishment (SP) and neuroticism (N). SR scores were adjusted by SP and N scores. As hypothesized, adjusted SR scores predicted, more than SR scores alone, activity in the ventral striatum (left caudate nucleus and nucleus accumbens). SR+/ SP− scores predicted increased impulsiveness, i.e., a right side RT priming effect. These results support the Joint Subsystems Hypothesis.     

Remembering,imagining, false memories & personal meanings

The Self-Memory System encompasses the working self, autobiographical memory and episodic memory. Specific autobiographical memories are patterns of activation over knowledge structures in autobiographical and episodic memory brought about by the activating effect of cues. The working self can elaborate cues based on the knowledge they initially activate and so control the construction of memories of the past and the future. It is proposed that such construction takes place in the remembering–imagining system – a window of highly accessible recent memories and simulations of near future events. How this malfunctions in various disorders is considered as are the implication of what we term the modern view of human memory for notions of memory accuracy. We show how all memories are to some degree false and that the main role of memories lies in generating personal meanings.     

Social understanding through direct perception? Yes,by interacting

This paper comments on Gallagher’s recently published direct perception proposal about social cognition [Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 535–543]. I show that direct perception is in danger of being appropriated by the very cognitivist accounts criticised by Gallagher (theory theory and simulation theory). Then I argue that the experiential directness of perception in social situations can be understood only in the context of the role of the interaction process in social cognition. I elaborate on the role of social interaction with a discussion of participatory sense-making to show that direct perception, rather than being a perception enriched by mainly individual capacities, can be best understood as an interactional phenomenon.