Time, tense, truth

A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterances, but sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike other views, the present proposal can meet the challenges faced both by the A and the B theory.     

Correspondence truth and scientific realism

I argue that one good reason for Scientific Realists to be interested in correspondence theories is the hope they offer us of being able to state and defend realistic theses in the face of well-known difficulties about modern physics: such theses as, that our theories are approximately true, or that they will tend to approach the truth. I go on to claim that this hope is unlikely to be fulfilled. I suggest that Realism can still survive in the face of these difficulties, as a claim about the kind of theories we want to aim for. I relate this conception of Realism to various contemporary discussions, both by realists and antirealists.     

On the alleged impossibility of coherence

If coherence is to have justificatory status, as some analytical philosophers think it has, it must be truth-conducive, if perhaps only under certain specific conditions. This paper is a critical discussion of some recent arguments that seek to show that under no reasonable conditions can coherence be truth-conducive. More specifically, it considers Bovens and Hartmann’s and Olsson’s “impossibility results,” which attempt to show that coherence cannot possibly be a truth-conducive property. We point to various ways in which the advocates of a coherence theory of justification may attempt to divert the threat of these results.     

Reading is believing: the truth effect and source credibility

Five experiments explored how source reliability influences people’s tendency to rate statements as more credible when they were encountered earlier (the truth effect). Undergraduates read statements from one reliable source and one unreliable source. Statements read multiple times were perceived as more valid and were more often correctly identified on a general knowledge test than statements read once or not at all. This occurred at varying retention intervals whether the statements originated from a reliable or unreliable source, when people had little memory for the statements themselves or their source, and when the discrediting information about the sources came either before or after reading the facts. While repetition aided recognition and source accuracy, both were unaffected by the reliability of the source. Consistent with the source monitoring framework, familiarity may create an illusion of truth for statements when people lack source-specifying cues, especially cues regarding the reliability of the source.     

交往情景下个体对说谎的理解及其道德评价

研究探讨了个体理解交往情景下说谎／说真话概念及其道德评价上的年龄差异,以及事实成份、交往动机与交往情景因素在其中的作用。结果表明：(1)3岁到4岁是说谎概念理解的转折点;(2)除3岁儿童外,大部分被试依据事实成份来理解谎前真话;(3)从小学开始,随着年龄的增长,个体对“白谎”与直率真话的道德评价中越来越多地考虑到交往动机或情景因素。     

詹姆士真理观中的休谟因素

与常识的和传统的符合论真理观相比,由詹姆士第一次明确阐述的实用主义真理观有着诸多不同的特点,以及体现在这些特点中的不同的哲学内涵。这些特点和内涵都是怎样产生的呢?在认识论发展的历史进程中有无其根源?该文拟通过联系休谟的经验主义,尤其是他的因果理论,来追溯实用主义真理观的认识论根源。     

假想的道德两难情境下小学儿童对说谎或说真话的抉择

研究探讨了294名7、9、11岁的小学儿童在道德两难情境下对说谎或说真话的道德行为抉择。结果表明,在个人谎故事条件下,随着年龄的增长,儿童越来越倾向于选择说真话;在集体谎故事条件下,11岁儿童比7岁、9岁儿童更倾向于选择说谎。7岁儿童已具有初步的集体观念,随着年龄的增长,小学儿童的集体观念日趋稳定。随着年龄的增长,小学儿童更多地从诚实、为集体或为个人等多个方面来陈述说谎或说真话的理由。     

Epistemology without metaphysics

The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to use epistemic norms to gather the facts with which to evaluate epistemic norms; relatedly, it discusses how epistemic norms can rationally evolve. It concludes with some discussion of the impact of this view on “ground level” epistemology.