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61.
Michael McDermott 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2009,38(4):465-470
Deflationists say that the equivalence between ‘p is true’ and p is all there is to the meaning of ‘true’. “Use” theories
generally construe meaning as acceptance conditions. I argue: (i) there are certain obvious objections to a deflationary theory
of truth so formulated; but (ii) they can be overcome if we employ a graded notion of use, i.e. a notion of assertability;
but (iii) there appear to be certain further difficulties which cannot be overcome in this way. 相似文献
62.
Aline Sevenants Walter Schroyens Kristien Dieussaert Walter Schaeken Géry d'Ydewalle 《Thinking & reasoning》2013,19(4):409-433
Two types of truth table tasks are used investigating mental representations of conditionals: a possibilities-based and a truth-based one. In possibilities tasks, participants indicate whether a situation is possible or impossible according to the conditional rule. In truth tasks participants evaluate whether a situation makes the rule true or false, or is irrelevant with respect to the truth of the rule. Comparing the two-option version of the possibilities task with the truth task in Experiment 1, the possibilities task yields logical answer patterns whereas the truth task yields defective patterns. Adding the irrelevant option to the possibilities task in Experiment 2 leads to a considerable amount of defective patterns in the possibilities task, but still to more logical patterns in the possibilities task than in the truth task. Experiment 3 shows that directionality matters since rule-to-situation tasks yield more logical answer patterns than do situation-to-rule tasks. We conclude that both task types are not comparable as such since wording, number of options and directionality influence the results. 相似文献
63.
Jochim Hansen Alice Dechêne Michaela Wänke 《Journal of experimental social psychology》2008,44(3):687-691
The present experiment tested the hypothesis that perceptual fluency affects truth judgments especially when the fluency has changed. Participants were asked to judge the truth of statements that were printed in different colors. Perceptual fluency was manipulated by color contrast. Change versus no change of fluency was manipulated by using preceding statements that had the same or a different contrast. As expected, highly fluent statements were judged as more probably true than statements with a low fluency but this effect occurred only when the high fluency meant a change from previous fluency. The role of discrepancies in subjective experiences in terms of their informativeness for social judgments is discussed. 相似文献
64.
Statements’ rated truth increases when people encounter them repeatedly. Processing fluency is a central variable to explain this truth effect. However, people experience processing fluency positively, and these positive experiences might cause the truth effect. Three studies investigated positivity and fluency influences on the truth effect. Study 1 found correlations between elicited positive feelings and rated truth. Study 2 replicated the repetition-based truth effect, but positivity did not influence the effect. Study 3 conveyed positive and negative correlations between positivity and truth in a learning phase. We again replicated the truth effect, but positivity only influenced judgments for easy statements in the learning phase. Thus, across three studies, we found positivity effects on rated truth, but not on the repetition-based truth effect: We conclude that positivity does not explain the standard truth effect, but the role of positive experiences for truth judgments deserves further investigation. 相似文献
65.
Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism (EAP) is a novel kind of alethic pluralism. It is ecumenical in that it widens the scope of alethic pluralism by allowing for a normatively deflated truth property alongside a variety of normatively robust truth properties. We establish EAP by showing how Wright’s Inflationary Arguments fail in the domain of taste, once a relativist treatment of the metaphysics and epistemology of that domain is endorsed. EAP is highly significant to current debates on the nature of truth insofar as it involves a reconfiguration of the dialectic between deflationists and pluralists. 相似文献
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68.
Anna Migliozzi 《The International journal of psycho-analysis》2016,97(4):1019-1034
Does the concept of evil deserve special formulation in the realm of psychoanalytic thought? In agreement with authors such as Meltzer (1992) and De Masi (2003) and through selected moments from a boy's long analysis, I will propose a definition of evil as a state of mind, characterized by disregard for the human quality of the object and the destruction of meaning and meaningfulness of life in and for others. Evil drains, perverts and strips symbols of intentions and goals, leaving them empty of emotional significance. In my patient, the state of mind that he called evil exerted a seductive appeal and was accompanied by a sadistic excitement that he elevated into a state of sexualized well‐being, which progressively perverted and destroyed emotional meaning, contributing to his confusion and desperation. Confronting this pathological configuration and describing the situation that I felt existed within his mind and between us, and rearticulating emotional meaning where it had been perverted, cannibalized or left empty, was the principal – and at times only – clinical instrument available to lead him out of his descent into nothingness. 相似文献
69.
Jay Newhard 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):345-352
Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth.
The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition
expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.”
In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition
is false. I conclude that the philosophical motivation for contextual theories of truth fails.
相似文献
Jay NewhardEmail: |
70.
Alice Dechêne Christoph Stahl Michaela Wänke 《Journal of experimental social psychology》2009,45(5):1117-1122
When participants are repeatedly presented with an unfamiliar stimulus, this stimulus is rated as more likable (mere-exposure effect) or more valid (truth effect) as compared with a similar non-repeated stimulus. Both effects have been discussed as effects of fluency. Typical research designs on these effects involve a test phase in which ratings of both repeated and non-repeated stimuli are required. Based on research on moderators of fluency effects, we propose that the procedure of assessing the effects with mixed lists of repeated and non-repeated stimuli contributes strongly to the emergence of both effects. Two experiments found that the truth effect and the mere-exposure effect were strongly moderated by whether mixed lists or only repeated items were used at the test phase: whereas strong effects occurred in a context of repeated and non-repeated stimuli, the effects vanished with only repeated stimuli. Methodological and theoretical implications are discussed. 相似文献