Time, tense, truth

A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterances, but sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike other views, the present proposal can meet the challenges faced both by the A and the B theory.     

Psychological Illness in Presidents: A Medical Advisory Commission and Disability Determinations

Although the 25th Amendment is intended to provide for instances of presidential disability, critics claim that it is impractical since it requires vice presidents and cabinet members to move overtly against the president—which they are unlikely to do. Also, they warn that medical information about the president is likely to be concealed. To overcome these problems, they recommend that a Medical Advisory Commission be established at the outset of every presidential administration to examine the president annually and then provide formal medical input so that the vice president and cabinet would be "compelled" to act in the presence of medically determined "inability," whether physiological or psychological. This paper argues, however, that such a proposal is badly flawed and quite unworkable, particularly in the case of psychological illness where accurate diagnosis typically depends on long-term, continuous doctor-patient interaction rather than through sporadic and superficial interchange. It concludes that less draconian measures in implementing the Amendment are far more sensible, such as those proposed by the Working Group on Presidential Disability which are discussed here.     

Following the Path to Equality Through Law: Reflections on Baker et al., <Emphasis Type="Italic">Equality: from Theory to Action</Emphasis>

This article assesses the significance of Baker et al., Equality: from Theory to Action from the perspective of current concerns occupying legal equality scholars in the UK, focusing in particular on the practical relevance of equality studies to the kinds of issues arising from the debate over the new Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR). The article highlights and considers key issues, including the delineation of the sphere of inequality protection, the normative content of the concept of equality espoused by law and the potential of law to reach beyond its current limits to embrace the broader dimensions of (in)equality identified in Baker et al.’s account.     

Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?

I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of “true” in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of “true” could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms (“proform”, “antecedent”, etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom’s case that “is true” is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian’s argument against deflationism).     

A coherent moral relativism

Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.     

Correspondence truth and scientific realism

I argue that one good reason for Scientific Realists to be interested in correspondence theories is the hope they offer us of being able to state and defend realistic theses in the face of well-known difficulties about modern physics: such theses as, that our theories are approximately true, or that they will tend to approach the truth. I go on to claim that this hope is unlikely to be fulfilled. I suggest that Realism can still survive in the face of these difficulties, as a claim about the kind of theories we want to aim for. I relate this conception of Realism to various contemporary discussions, both by realists and antirealists.     

On the alleged impossibility of coherence

If coherence is to have justificatory status, as some analytical philosophers think it has, it must be truth-conducive, if perhaps only under certain specific conditions. This paper is a critical discussion of some recent arguments that seek to show that under no reasonable conditions can coherence be truth-conducive. More specifically, it considers Bovens and Hartmann’s and Olsson’s “impossibility results,” which attempt to show that coherence cannot possibly be a truth-conducive property. We point to various ways in which the advocates of a coherence theory of justification may attempt to divert the threat of these results.     

Reading is believing: the truth effect and source credibility

Five experiments explored how source reliability influences people’s tendency to rate statements as more credible when they were encountered earlier (the truth effect). Undergraduates read statements from one reliable source and one unreliable source. Statements read multiple times were perceived as more valid and were more often correctly identified on a general knowledge test than statements read once or not at all. This occurred at varying retention intervals whether the statements originated from a reliable or unreliable source, when people had little memory for the statements themselves or their source, and when the discrediting information about the sources came either before or after reading the facts. While repetition aided recognition and source accuracy, both were unaffected by the reliability of the source. Consistent with the source monitoring framework, familiarity may create an illusion of truth for statements when people lack source-specifying cues, especially cues regarding the reliability of the source.     

Remarks on Grandi’s Comments

This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”

The Semantic Theory of Truth: Field’s Incompleteness Objection

According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2) it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to pass muster, I argue that, within the constraints of a non-reductive physicalism and a holism concerning the concepts of truth, reference and meaning, conceding Field’s physicalistic inadequacy conclusion while rejecting his conceptual deficiency conclusion is a promising reply to the incompleteness objection.