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31.
This article sets forth a detailed theoretical proposal of how the truth of ordinary empirical statements, often atomic in form, is computed. The method of computation draws on psychological concepts such as those of associative networks and spreading activation, rather that the concepts of philosophical or logical theories of truth. Axioms for a restricted class of cases are given, as well as some detailed examples. 相似文献
32.
Perfectionism is a transdiagnostic construct associated with a range of diagnoses, including depression, eating disorders and obsessive compulsive disorder. Treatments that directly target perfectionist cognitions have been shown to successfully reduce associated pathologies. However, the way in which they do this is not clear. We set out to assess the role of one candidate mechanism of action, namely the cognitive process of interpretation of ambiguity. In one experiment we looked for associations between biased interpretation and perfectionism. In a second, we manipulated interpretations, thereby providing a strong test of their aetiological significance. Results from the first experiment confirmed the presence of biased interpretation in perfectionism and demonstrated that these are highly specific to perfection relevant information, rather than reflecting general negativity. The second experiment succeeded in manipulating these perfection relevant interpretations and demonstrated that one consequence of doing so is a change in perfectionist behaviour. Together, these data experimentally demonstrate that biased interpretation of perfection relevant ambiguity contributes to the maintenance of perfectionism, but that it is also possible to reverse this. Clinical implications include the identification of one likely mechanism of therapeutic change within existing treatments, as well as identification of an appropriate evidence-based focus for future treatment development. Targeting underlying functional mechanisms, such as biased interpretation, has the potential to offer transdiagnostic benefits. 相似文献
33.
Stephen Read has presented an argument for the inconsistency of the concept of validity. We extend Read’s results and show
that this inconsistency is but one half of a larger problem. Like the concept of truth, validity is infected with what we
call semantic pathology, a condition that actually gives rise to two symptoms: inconsistency and indeterminacy. After sketching the basic ideas behind
semantic pathology and explaining how it manifests both symptoms in the concept of truth, we present cases that establish
the indeterminacy of validity and that link this indeterminacy with the concept’s inconsistency. Our conclusion is that an
adequate treatment of the semantic pathology thus revealed must deal with both of its symptoms. Further, it must extend to
the occurrences of this condition elsewhere: in the concept of truth, in the other central semantic notions, and even in certain
philosophical concepts outside semantics. 相似文献
34.
Pierre Le Morvan 《Synthese》2008,162(2):251-264
How is epistemic justification related to knowledge? Is it, as widely thought, constitutive of knowledge? Is it merely a means to knowledge, or merely a means to something else, such as truth? In a recent article in this journal, Hofmann (2005, Synthese, 146(3), 357–369) addresses these questions in attempting to defend an important argument articulated by Sartwell (1992, The Journal of Philosophy, 89(4), 167–180) and reconstructed and criticized by Le Morvan (2002, Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 56(2), 151–168). This Sartwellian argument purported to show that, since epistemic justification is of merely instrumental value, it is not constitutive of knowledge. In this paper, I argue that Hofmann’s defense of Sartwell fails, but that its failure brings to light some important lessons concerning the nature of justification and its relationship to truth and knowledge. 相似文献
35.
Katalin Farkas 《Synthese》2008,160(2):269-284
A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal
sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences
is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account
of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterances, but
sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike other views, the present proposal can meet the challenges
faced both by the A and the B theory. 相似文献
36.
Bibace R 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2008,42(1):76-86
My response to Engelmann (2008) will be based on several questions that will allow both its author and the general reader to determine whether the assumptions I make as an interpreter of this complex paper are congruent or incongruent with their own interpretations of the text. The interpretations by the writer, by any commentator, and the diverse interpretations of a general audience together with my own interpretations will, I hope, facilitate some fruitful ‘comparative evaluations.’ I articulate my inferences of the most dense part of the paper, namely the ‘concrete immediate Consciousness and the developing absent outside.’ My hope is to address Engelmann’s question: “Am I in a better disposition to judge modern theories of consciousness?” The last section of my response spells out more personal comments to my all too brief and single encounter with Arno Engelmann. It is there that Arno Engelmann’s fascinating statement “I am a citizen of the world” is addressed through its counterparts in my life. 相似文献
37.
According to the linguistic category model (
[Semin and Fiedler, 1988] and [Semin and Fiedler, 1991]), a person’s behavior can be described at varying levels of abstraction from concrete (e.g., “Lisa slaps Ann”) to abstract (e.g., “Lisa is aggressive”). Research has shown that language abstraction conveys information about the person whose behavior is described (Wigboldus, Semin, & Spears, 2000). However to date, little research has examined the information that language abstraction may convey about describers themselves. In this paper, we report three experiments demonstrating that describers who use relatively abstract language to describe others’ behaviors are perceived to have biased attitudes and motives compared with those describers who use more concrete language. 相似文献
38.
Arvid Båve 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):297-310
I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of “true” in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of “true” could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms (“proform”, “antecedent”, etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom’s case that “is true” is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian’s argument against deflationism). 相似文献
39.
Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative
way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true.
Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude
by considering a few problems such a position might face. 相似文献
40.
Stephen Leeds 《Synthese》2007,159(1):1-21
I argue that one good reason for Scientific Realists to be interested in correspondence theories is the hope they offer us
of being able to state and defend realistic theses in the face of well-known difficulties about modern physics: such theses
as, that our theories are approximately true, or that they will tend to approach the truth. I go on to claim that this hope
is unlikely to be fulfilled. I suggest that Realism can still survive in the face of these difficulties, as a claim about
the kind of theories we want to aim for. I relate this conception of Realism to various contemporary discussions, both by
realists and antirealists. 相似文献