Does Cooperation in the Laboratory Reflect the Operation of a Broad Trait?

The Dictator Game, a face valid measure of altruism, and the Trust Game, a face valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, are among the most widely used behavioural measures in human cooperation research. Researchers have observed considerable covariation among these and other economic games, leading them to assert that there exists a general human propensity to cooperate that varies in strength across individuals and manifests itself across a variety of social settings. To formalize this hypothesis, we created an S‐1 bifactor model using 276 participants' Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions. The general factor had significant, moderate associations with self‐reported and peer‐reported altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. Thus, the positive covariation among economic games is not reducible to the games' shared situational features. Two hundred participants returned for a second session. The general factor based on Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions from this session did not significantly predict self‐reported and peer‐reported cooperation, suggesting that experience with economic games causes them to measure different traits from those that are reflected in self‐assessments and peer‐assessments of cooperativeness. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

听觉预测编码：对声音重复和变化的神经反应

预测编码被认为是脑与复杂环境交互的重要机制之一, 有效感知外界环境并对未来事件做出预测, 对个体生存有着至关重要的意义。人类大脑会基于感觉输入以迭代的方式持续优化表征外部环境的内部模型, 并不断预测接下来的感觉输入。以听觉模态为例, 人类及动物对声音重复和听觉变化的神经反应(如失匹配负波和刺激特异性适应)是大脑预测编码的重要体现, 表现为重复抑制和预测误差。结合人类和动物模型在此理论框架下开展跨物种研究将有助于加深我们对听觉加工, 甚至是大脑工作机制的认识。     

In money we trust? The use of financial compensations to repair trust in the aftermath of distributive harm

Trust is vital yet vulnerable in economic exchange relations. In these relations, a widely used strategy in response to distributive harm consists of having the transgressor pay a financial compensation to the victim. This research examines whether financial compensations can increase trust towards a transgressor, and whether the size of the compensation is relevant to this process. We hypothesized and found that whether larger compensations will elicit more trust, depends on how clear the perpetrator’s intention to transgress was. Experiment 1 revealed that trust perceptions increased more by a slight overcompensation of the inflicted harm as compared to an exact or a partial compensation, but not if the transgressor’s bad intentions became clear through the use of deception in the violation. In Experiments 2 and 3, we replicated these findings and further showed that it is not the use of deception per se, but rather the attribution of bad intent that moderates the effect of compensation size. Experiment 4, using a trust game paradigm revealed that this effect not only occurs for small overcompensations, but also for larger overcompensations.     

Testing multiple motives in feedback seeking: The interaction of instrumentality and self protection motives

Research indicates that information received from feedback seeking is valuable for both individual and organizational outcomes. Previous research examining the feedback seeking process has consistently suggested that individual's feedback behaviors are directly influenced by three motives. Specifically, individuals are instrumentally motivated to obtain valued information but are also motivated to protect and/or enhance their ego and to protect others' impressions of them (Ashford, Blatt and VandeWalle, 2003). The current study simultaneously examined these motives by testing the interactive effects of them on feedback seeking behavior. As predicted, they did significantly interact and the results present a deeper understanding of these motives and how employees weigh various factors in deciding whether to seek feedback within the organization.