The case for a dual-process theory of transitive reasoning

Ever since its popularisation by Piaget around 60 years ago, transitive reasoning (deductively-inferring A > C from premises A > B and B > C) has been of psychological interest both as a mental phenomenon and as a tool in areas of psychological discourse. However, the focus of interest in it has shifted periodically first from child development, to learning disability, to non-humans and currently to cognitive and clinical neuroscience. Crucially, such shifts have always been plagued by one core question – the question of which of two competing paradigms (extensive-training paradigm versus non-training paradigm) is valid for assessing transitive reasoning as originally conceived in Piagetian research. The continued avoidance of this question potentially undermines several important findings recently reported: Such as about exactly what is involved in deducing transitive inferences, which brain regions are critical for reaching transitive inference, and what links exist between weakened deductive transitivity and mental illnesses like schizophrenia. Here, we offer the view that both of the competing paradigms are indexing transitivity, but each one tends to tap a different aspect of it. Then, we summarise studies from child and adult cognitive psychology, disabilities research, and from cognitive neuroscience. These, together with studies of non-human reasoning, seem to afford a theory of transitive reasoning that has two major components; one deductive but the other associative. It is proposed that only a dual-process theory of transitivity (having analytic versus intuitive routes approximate to deductive versus associative processing respectively) can account both for the variety of findings and the apparently-disparate paradigms. However, fuzzy-trace theory (“Gist” processes and representations), if not already embodying such a dual-process theory, will need to be incorporated into any complete theory.     

What is “Intervention”?

I begin by noting that several theologians and others object to special divine action (divine intervention and action beyond conservation and creation) on the grounds that it is incompatible with science. These theologians are thinking of classical Newtonian science; I argue that in fact classical science is in no way incompatible with special divine action, including miracle. What is incompatible with special divine action is the Laplacean picture, which involves the causal closure of the universe. I then note that contemporary, quantum mechanical science doesn't even initially appear to be incompatible with special divine action. Nevertheless, many who are well aware of the quantum mechanical revolution (including some members of the Special Divine Action Project) still find a problem with special divine action, hoping to find an understanding of it that doesn't involve divine intervention. I argue that their objections to intervention are not sound. Furthermore, it isn't even possible to say what intervention is, given the quantum mechanical framework. I conclude by offering an account of special divine action that isn't open to their objections to intervention.     

Prosodic boundaries, comma rules, and brain responses: the closure positive shift in ERPs as a universal marker for prosodic phrasing in listeners and readers

Just as the false comma in this sentence, shows punctuation can influence sentence processing considerably. Pauses and other prosodic cues in spoken language serve the same function of structuring the sentence in smaller phrases. However, surprisingly little effort has been spent on the question as to whether both phenomena rest on the same mechanism and whether they are equally efficient in guiding parsing decisions. In a recent study, we showed that auditory speech boundaries evoke a specific positive shift in the listeners' event-related brain potentials (ERPs) that indicates the sentence segmentation and resulting changes in the understanding of the utterance (Steinhauer et al., 1999a). Here, we present three ERP reading experiments demonstrating that the human brain processes commas in a similar manner and that comma perception depends crucially on the reader's individual punctuation habits. Main results of the study are: (1) Commas can determine initial parsing as efficiently as speech boundaries because they trigger the same prosodic phrasing covertly, although phonological representations seem to be activated to a lesser extent. (2) Independent of the input modality, this phrasing is reflected online by the same ERP component, namely the Closure Positive Shift (CPS). (3) Both behavioral and ERP data suggest that comma processing varies with the readers' idiosyncratic punctuation habits. (4) A combined auditory and visual ERP experiment shows that the CPS is also elicited both by delexicalized prosody and while subjects replicate prosodic boundaries during silent reading. (5) A comma-induced reversed garden path turned out to be much more difficult than the classical garden path. Implications for psycholinguistic models and future ERP research are discussed.     

Motivational determinants of reasoning about social relations: The role of need for cognitive closure

The role of need for cognitive closure (NFCC) in reasoning about social relations was investigated. Participants learned pairwise liking/disliking relations between people who could also be categorised on the basis of nationality and then had to group them into social cliques. The social clique structures were either consistent or inconsistent with the nationality categorisation, and the diagnostic information that was necessary to determine the number of cliques appeared either early or late in the information sequence. We expected participants under conditions of high (vs low) NFCC to rely more on heuristic processing. As predicted, high (vs low) NFCC participants were less accurate in their representations of cliques when the clique structure was inconsistent with the nationality category (Study 1 and 2) and when the diagnostic information was presented late (Study 1). The implications regarding the influence of NFCC on reasoning and the role of specific NFCC manipulations are discussed.     

Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise

This paper uses newly available evidence to shed light on the circumstances and causes of the 6 October 1973 Yom Kippur surprise attack of Egyptian and Syrian forces on Israeli positions at the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights. The evidence suggests that an important circumstance that accounts for the surprise effect these actions managed to produce, despite ample warning signs, is traceable to a high need for cognitive closure among major figures in the Israeli intelligence establishment. Such a need may have prompted leading intelligence analysts to "freeze" on the conventional wisdom that an attack was unlikely and to become impervious to information suggesting that it was imminent. The discussion considers the psychological forces affecting intelligence operations in predicting the initiation of hostile enemy activities, and it describes possible avenues of dealing with the psychological impediments to open–mindedness that may pervasively characterize such circumstances.     

The Relationship Between Need for Closure and Conservative Beliefs in Western and Eastern Europe

This work explored the hypothesis that need for closure is associated with the adoption of conservative ideology. Two different studies on eastern and western European samples (Polish and Flemish) supported the hypothesis that need for closure—as measured by Webster and Kruglanski's (1994 ) Need for Closure Scale—is related to conservative beliefs. However, in the second study, a negative relationship between need for closure and economic conservatism in the Polish sample was noted, whereas a positive relationship occurred in the Flemish sample. These results may be accounted for by the Need for Simple Structure factor of Neuberg, Judice, and West (1997 ) and by specific rather than non-specific epistemic processes.     

Premise-pair training for valid tests of serial list organization in macaques

This study evaluated the role of several different training procedures on (1) efficiency of acquisition and (2) organizational characteristics of memory for lists that could be serially ordered. Five macaque monkeys were trained via two-choice object discriminations in a formboard apparatus on several five-item-series tasks that provided different levels of intrasession conditionality. Although ease of acquisition differed for subsets of the constituent pairs, concurrent inclusion of the four premise pairs that defined a list required equivalent amounts of training on every task. All training procedures yielded similar retention-test performances and showed common organizational properties (on both error and latency measures) consistent with the view that lists were retained as internally represented ordered series. Test outcomes emphasized the need for integrated exposition of all concurrent conditional relationships to allow appropriate tests of serial organization. However, if given such training, the monkeys revealed integrated serial memory even though they had never seen many of the possible novel combinations of list items. In overview, their performances offered further definition of the procedures required for valid assessment of inferential properties in comparative cognition. Electronic Publication     

Belief,Credence, and the Preface Paradox

Many discussions of the ‘preface paradox’ assume that it is more troubling for deductive closure constraints on rational belief if outright belief is reducible to credence. I show that this is an error: we can generate the problem without assuming such reducibility. All that we need are some very weak normative assumptions about rational relationships between belief and credence. The only view that escapes my way of formulating the problem for the deductive closure constraint is in fact itself a reductive view: namely, the view that outright belief is credence 1. However, I argue that this view is unsustainable. Moreover, my version of the problem turns on no particular theory of evidence or evidential probability, and so cannot be avoided by adopting some revisionary such theory. In sum, deductive closure is in more serious, and more general, trouble than some have thought.