The case for a dual-process theory of transitive reasoning

Ever since its popularisation by Piaget around 60 years ago, transitive reasoning (deductively-inferring A > C from premises A > B and B > C) has been of psychological interest both as a mental phenomenon and as a tool in areas of psychological discourse. However, the focus of interest in it has shifted periodically first from child development, to learning disability, to non-humans and currently to cognitive and clinical neuroscience. Crucially, such shifts have always been plagued by one core question – the question of which of two competing paradigms (extensive-training paradigm versus non-training paradigm) is valid for assessing transitive reasoning as originally conceived in Piagetian research. The continued avoidance of this question potentially undermines several important findings recently reported: Such as about exactly what is involved in deducing transitive inferences, which brain regions are critical for reaching transitive inference, and what links exist between weakened deductive transitivity and mental illnesses like schizophrenia. Here, we offer the view that both of the competing paradigms are indexing transitivity, but each one tends to tap a different aspect of it. Then, we summarise studies from child and adult cognitive psychology, disabilities research, and from cognitive neuroscience. These, together with studies of non-human reasoning, seem to afford a theory of transitive reasoning that has two major components; one deductive but the other associative. It is proposed that only a dual-process theory of transitivity (having analytic versus intuitive routes approximate to deductive versus associative processing respectively) can account both for the variety of findings and the apparently-disparate paradigms. However, fuzzy-trace theory (“Gist” processes and representations), if not already embodying such a dual-process theory, will need to be incorporated into any complete theory.     

An update on the Conceptual-Production Systems model of apraxia: evidence from stroke

Limb apraxia is a neurological disorder characterized by an inability to pantomime and/or imitate gestures. It is more commonly observed after left hemisphere damage (LHD), but has also been reported after right hemisphere damage (RHD). The Conceptual-Production Systems model (Roy, 1996) suggests that three systems are involved in the control of purposeful movements: the conceptual, the production and the sensory/perceptual system. Depending on which system is damaged different patterns of apraxia are expressed. To determine the apraxia pattern, pantomime, delayed, and concurrent imitation tasks need to be administered, as well as conceptual tasks assessing one's knowledge of actions. Based on the model, eight patterns of apraxia should emerge. The purpose of this study is to determine whether these patterns are in fact observed in stroke patients and examine their frequency. If the performance of most stroke patients falls into one of the patterns, then we would have strong support for the conceptual-production model. Stroke (34 LHD and 39 RHD) patients and 27 age- and education-matched healthy controls participated in the study. Participants were assessed in four task modalities: pantomime, delayed imitation, concurrent imitation and conceptual knowledge (two tasks were used: tool naming by action and action identification). Patients were categorized as impaired on a task if they scored 2 SD below the mean performance of the controls for gesture production tasks, or below a cut-off score on the conceptual tasks. They were then classified into patterns depending on their performance on the four task modalities. Most patients (86%) fell into one of seven patterns originally predicted from the Conceptual-Production Systems model. The two most common patterns were deficits in pantomime and imitation with preserved gesture recognition and conduction apraxia (selective deficit in imitation). Four new patterns emerged, but mostly single cases of these were found. Overall, the study provides strong support for the Conceptual-Production Systems model.     

Is Sexism a Gender Issue? A Motivated Social Cognition Perspective on Men's and Women's Sexist Attitudes Toward Own and Other Gender

The present research investigated the antecedents of ambivalent sexism (i.e., hostile and benevolent forms) in both men and women toward own and other gender. In two heterogeneous adult samples (Study 1: N = 179 and Study 2: N = 222), it was revealed that gender itself was only a minor predictor of sexist attitudes compared with the substantial impact of individual differences in general motivated cognition (i.e., need for closure). Analyses further showed that the relationship between need for closure and sexism was mediated by social attitudes (i.e., right‐wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation), which were differently related to benevolent and hostile forms of sexism. In the discussion, it is argued that sexism primarily stems from individual differences in motivated cognitive style, which relates to peoples' perspective on the social world, rather than from group differences between men and women. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

不确定感与从众：决断性与结构需求的中介作用

不确定感伴随从众的现象普遍存在,然而其内在加工过程及个体差异仍不明确。对804名大学生被试进行问卷调查,结果显示：（1）不确定感与从众正相关;（2）决断性与结构需求完全中介不确定感与从众的关系,且存在性别差异;二者关系上,女性更大程度上受决断性的中介,其次为结构需求;男性受决断性和结构需求的平行中介。结果支持不确定−认同理论和认知闭合两阶段模型观点,为不确定状态下不同性别人群从众行为的管理提供了理论依据。     

What is “Intervention”?

I begin by noting that several theologians and others object to special divine action (divine intervention and action beyond conservation and creation) on the grounds that it is incompatible with science. These theologians are thinking of classical Newtonian science; I argue that in fact classical science is in no way incompatible with special divine action, including miracle. What is incompatible with special divine action is the Laplacean picture, which involves the causal closure of the universe. I then note that contemporary, quantum mechanical science doesn't even initially appear to be incompatible with special divine action. Nevertheless, many who are well aware of the quantum mechanical revolution (including some members of the Special Divine Action Project) still find a problem with special divine action, hoping to find an understanding of it that doesn't involve divine intervention. I argue that their objections to intervention are not sound. Furthermore, it isn't even possible to say what intervention is, given the quantum mechanical framework. I conclude by offering an account of special divine action that isn't open to their objections to intervention.     

概率大小、损益结果和认知闭合需要对模糊规避的影响

模糊规避是指在相同奖赏的情况下,决策者会力图规避从主观上判断具有模糊概率的事件而偏好具有相同精确概率的事件。本研究探讨了概率大小、损益结果和认知闭合需要对模糊规避的影响。研究发现,在小概率受益的情况下,个体倾向于模糊寻求;在中概率受益的情况下,个体倾向于模糊规避;在高概率受益的情况下,个体倾向于模糊规避;在小概率损失的情况下,个体倾向于模糊规避;在中概率损失的情况下,个体倾向于模糊规避;在高概率损失的情况下,个体倾向于模糊寻求。但是,研究并未发现认知闭合需要对模糊规避有预测作用。     

Differences in Mathematical Performance,Creativity Potential,and Need for Cognitive Closure between Chinese and Australian Students

Research has shown that Chinese students outperform students from several Western countries on mathematics performance while some evidence has suggested that Western students perform more strongly on tests of creativity. One potential mechanism for these differences may be a higher need for cognitive closure among Chinese students. The current research compared performance on tests of mathematics and creativity among 50 students of Chinese background and 49 Australian students of Anglo‐Saxon background. As predicted, Chinese students performed better on mathematics while Australian students performed better on the measure of creativity. Australian students also had a lower score on one subscale of the need for cognitive closure, preference for predictability. Across the sample, preference for predictability showed small but significant negative correlations with several measures of creativity and positive correlations with several measures of mathematics. These findings were interpreted with respect to characteristic educational practices in both nations.     

Motivational determinants of reasoning about social relations: The role of need for cognitive closure

The role of need for cognitive closure (NFCC) in reasoning about social relations was investigated. Participants learned pairwise liking/disliking relations between people who could also be categorised on the basis of nationality and then had to group them into social cliques. The social clique structures were either consistent or inconsistent with the nationality categorisation, and the diagnostic information that was necessary to determine the number of cliques appeared either early or late in the information sequence. We expected participants under conditions of high (vs low) NFCC to rely more on heuristic processing. As predicted, high (vs low) NFCC participants were less accurate in their representations of cliques when the clique structure was inconsistent with the nationality category (Study 1 and 2) and when the diagnostic information was presented late (Study 1). The implications regarding the influence of NFCC on reasoning and the role of specific NFCC manipulations are discussed.     

Getting one step closer to deduction: Introducing an alternative paradigm for transitive inference

Transitive inference is claimed to be “deductive”. Yet every group/species ever reported apparently uses it. We asked 58 adults to solve five-term transitive tasks, requiring neither training nor premise learning. A computer-based procedure ensured all premises were continually visible. Response accuracy and RT (non-discriminative nRT) were measured as is typically done. We also measured RT confined to correct responses (cRT). Overall, very few typical transitive phenomena emerged. The symbolic distance effect never extended to premise recall and was not at all evident for nRT; suggesting the use of non-deductive end-anchor strategies. For overall performance, and particularly the critical B?D inference, our findings indicate that deductive transitive inference is far more intellectually challenging than previously thought. Contrasts of our present findings against previous findings suggest at least two distinct transitive inference modes, with most research and most computational models to date targeting an associative mode rather than their desired deductive mode. This conclusion fits well with the growing number of theories embracing a “dual process” conception of reasoning. Finally, our differing findings for nRT versus cRT suggest that researchers should give closer consideration to matching the RT measure they use to the particular conception of transitive inference they pre-held.