Competing roles for the subfactors of need for closure in committing the fundamental attribution error

Webster’s (1993) finding that the need for closure (NFC) trait predicts the fundamental attribution error (FAE) is well-cited but has mixed support. After detailing failed replications and contradictory findings, this article reports an attempt to verify the positive NFC–FAE relation using the questioner–contestant paradigm. Rarely investigated but potentially vital to the field, this research also considered the two orthogonal subfactors of NFC, decisiveness and need for structure (Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997). Results showed that need for structure predicted, overall NFC partially predicted, but decisiveness attenuated the FAE. Thus, Webster’s finding was both replicated and reversed by different aspects of NFC. Decisiveness adds to a short list of trait moderators of the FAE. Implications are discussed for how to measure NFC.     

感知环境不确定性与环境扫描对认知变化的影响——认知闭合需要与认知需要的调节作用

对426名大学生进行问卷调查,考察了感知环境不确定性对认知变化的影响,环境扫描行为的中介作用以及认知闭合需要与认知需要对两阶段中介模型的调节作用。结果发现：（1）感知环境不确定性能够正向预测认知变化水平,并且环境扫描行为的两个维度都起到中介作用;（2）认知闭合需要能够负向调节中介模型的前后两个阶段;（3）认知需要对环境扫描有直接正向作用,并且对关注程度的促进更大,但是负向调节扫描频率和认知变化之间的关系。     

Rules for Reasoning from Knowledge and Lack of Knowledge

In this paper, the traditional view that argumentum ad ignorantiam is a logical fallacy is challenged, and lessons are drawn on how to model inferences drawn from knowledge in combination with ones drawn from lack of knowledge. Five defeasible rules for evaluating knowledge-based arguments that apply to inferences drawn under conditions of lack of knowledge are formulated. They are the veridicality rule, the consistency of knowledge rule, the closure of knowledge rule, the rule of refutation and the rule for argument from ignorance. The basic thesis of the paper is that knowledge-based arguments, including the argument from ignorance, need to be evaluated by criteria for epistemic closure and other evidential rules that are pragmatic in nature, that need to be formulated and applied differently at different stages of an investigation or discussion. The paper helps us to understand practical criteria that should be used to evaluate all arguments based on knowledge and/or ignorance.

Need for closure and dealing with uncertainty in decision making context: The role of the behavioral inhibition system and working memory capacity

The aim of the present study was to investigate the moderated mediation model of the relationship between the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), need for closure (NFC) and working memory capacity (WMC) in the decision making process. It was assumed that NFC works as a motivational mechanism that enables individuals high in BIS to deal with uncertainty; therefore, NFC mediates the effect of BIS on behavior in a decision-making situation. Moreover, as uncertainty management requires cognitive resources, we expected WMC to moderate this relationship. In line with our hypothesis, we found that NFC mediated the relationship between BIS and the information search about the job candidates, and this effect occurred only for individuals high in WMC. We discuss these results in the context of effective self-regulation, as well as motivational and cognitive determinants of effort.     

Reasoning from transitive premises: An EEG study

Neuroimaging studies have contributed to a major advance in understanding the neural and cognitive mechanisms underpinning deductive reasoning. However, the dynamics of cognitive events associated with inference making have been largely neglected. Using electroencephalography, the present study aims at describing the rapid sequence of processes involved in performing transitive inference (A B; B C therefore “A C”; with AB meaning “A is to the left of B”). The results indicate that when the second premise can be integrated into the first one (e.g. A B; B C) its processing elicits a P3b component. In contrast, when the second premise cannot be integrated into the first premise (e.g. A B; D C), a P600-like components is elicited. These ERP components are discussed with respect to cognitive expectations.     

Meaning and Conversational Impropriety in Sceptical Contexts

According to “disjunctivist neo‐Mooreanism”—a position Duncan Pritchard develops in a recent book—it is possible to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses, even though it is conversationally inappropriate to claim such knowledge. In a recent paper, on the other hand, Pritchard expounds an “überhinge” strategy, according to which one cannot know the denials of sceptical hypotheses, as “hinge propositions” are necessarily groundless. The present article argues that neither strategy is entirely successful. For if a proposition can be known, it can also be claimed to be known. If the latter is not possible, this is not because certain propositions are either “intrinsically” conversationally inappropriate (as Pritchard claims in his book) or else “rationally groundless” (as Pritchard claims in his paper), but rather that we are dealing with something that merely presents us with the appearance of being an epistemic claim.     

Shaping reality vs. hiding from reality: Reconsidering the effects of trait need for closure on information search

For tentative and final decisions on real and artificial issues, three studies revealed a positive relation between trait need for closure and selective approach to supportive (vs. unsupportive) information. Specifically, individuals with high (vs. low) trait need for closure selected more decision-supportive information and less decision-challenging information for viewing. Furthermore, Study 1 showed that the effect of trait need for closure functioned independently of authoritarianism and dogmatism, and Study 3 showed that the effect of trait need for closure on selective approach to decision-supportive information was mediated by a current concern to get closure on the experimental issue. These findings provide a new understanding of how trait need for closure shapes post-decisional information search and decision making.     

Why schema-violations are sometimes preferable to schema-consistencies: The role of interest and openness to experience

We investigated the appraisal processes and personality antecedents that regulate people’s attraction to schema-violations - targets and objects that disconfirm schema- and stereotype-based expectancies. In two studies a preference for schema-violations (vs. consistencies) correlated positively with openness to experience, and negatively with the need for structure. In the second study, schema-violations were seen as more surprising (by all individuals), decreasing intentions to approach schema-violations, but were also seen as more interesting (by those higher in openness to experience), increasing intentions to approach and accept schema-violations. This suggests that two opposing processes - appraisals of surprise and appraisals of interest - regulate reactions to schema-violations, and that these processes are bounded by individual differences in openness to experience.