归纳推论—演绎推论的不对称性在中国文化背景下的表现

归纳推论-演绎推论的不对称性是指人们在社会交往中会做出较多的归纳推论,而较少做出演绎推论,但这种社会推论倾向亦受到了文化及语言的影响.本研究目的是检验该现象在中国文化背景下的表现.采用Maass等人提出的研究范式,在一个实验中同时引发被试做出归纳和演绎两种推论,使用特别选取的特质形容词和相应的行为信息,用录音呈现实验材料.因变量为: (1)正确再认实际呈现过的材料; (2)正确拒绝没有呈现过的材料; (3)虚报没有呈现过的材料; (4)从已呈现的材料中做出推论的数量.统计被试做出各类反应的次数及反应时间.结果表明,中国被试并没有表现出对归纳推论的偏向,研究讨论了这一现象的文化影响.     

The Relation of Parental Guilt Induction to Child Internalizing Problems When a Caregiver Has a History of Depression

The purpose of this study was to examine the relation between parental guilt induction and child internalizing problems in families where a caregiver had experienced depression. A total of 107 families, including 146 children (age 9–15), participated. Child-reported parental guilt induction, as well as three more traditionally studied parenting behaviors (warmth/involvement, monitoring, and discipline), were assessed, as was parent-report of child internalizing problem behavior. Linear Mixed Models Analysis indicated parental guilt induction was positively related to child internalizing problems in the context of the remaining three parenting behaviors. Implications of the findings for prevention and intervention parenting programs are considered.     

Popper versus Wittgenstein on Truth, Necessity, and Scientific Hypotheses

Most philosophers of science maintain Confirmationism's central tenet, namely, that scientific theories are probabilistically confirmed by experimental successes. Against this dominant (and old) conception of experimental science, Popper's well-known, anti-inductivistic Falsificationism (’Deductivism’) has stood, virtually alone, since 1934. Indeed, it is Popper who tells us that it was he who killed Logical Positivism. It is also pretty well-known that Popper blames Wittgenstein for much that is wrong with Logical Positivism, just as he despises Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian philosophers for abdicating philosophy's true mission. What is not well-known, however, especially because Popper neglected to tell us in 1934, is that Wittgenstein is very much an ally. It was Wittgenstein who rejected induction in the strongest possible terms as early as 1922, and it was Wittgenstein who similarly rejected Confirmationism approximately four years prior to Popper. The aims of this paper are to illuminate the substantial agreements between Popper and Wittgenstein and, by doing so, to clarify their important disagreement regarding the status of “strictly universal,” scientific theories (or hypotheses). This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

When Is Genetic Reasoning Not Fallacious?

Attempts to evaluate a belief or argument on the basis of its cause or origin are usually condemned as committing the genetic fallacy. However, I sketch a number of cases in which causal or historical factors are logically relevant to evaluating a belief, including an interesting abductive form that reasons from the best explanation for the existence of a belief to its likely truth. Such arguments are also susceptible to refutation by genetic reasoning that may come very close to the standard examples given of supposedly fallacious genetic reasoning.     

不同历史时期谬误研究的特点

本文主要讨论了不同时期逻辑学家对逻辑谬误研究的特点。古希腊时期对谬误作出全面系统研究的是亚里士多德。亚里士多德对谬误的解决方法一般地说是经验的,没有形成一套行之有效的规则。文艺复兴时期,培根等人批判经院哲学,探讨了人类产生谬误的根源。这时期的谬误研究特点是：一是重视在归纳法的应用中产生的谬误;二是突出逻辑问题。现代逻辑学家如柯比等人则在前人的基础上,对谬误作出了更全面、更精确的分类,并且对各种谬误的解释和举例也更确切,从而使谬误理论更好地为实践服务。     

Epistemic instrumentalism,exceeding our grasp

In the concluding chapter of Exceeding our Grasp Kyle Stanford outlines a positive response to the central issue raised brilliantly by his book, the problem of unconceived alternatives. This response, called "epistemic instrumentalism", relies on a distinction between instrumental and literal belief. We examine this distinction and with it the viability of Stanford's instrumentalism, which may well be another case of exceeding our grasp.     

Human content in affect-inducing stimuli: A secondary analysis of the international affective picture system

We report a secondary analysis of the international affective picture system (IAPS), the broadest available standardized sample of emotional stimuli, which confirmed our prediction that the distribution of slides across the valence and arousal dimensions would be related to human versus inanimate slide content. Pictures depicting humans are over-represented in the high arousal/positive and high arousal/negative areas of affective space as compared to inanimate pictures, which are especially frequent in the low arousal/neutral valence area. Results pertaining to dominance ratings and gender differences in valence and arousal ratings further suggest that there are qualitative differences between emotional reactions to animal or human slide content and responses to nonsocial still photos. Researchers need to be mindful of this distinction when selecting affect-inducing stimuli.

认知神经科学视角的催眠研究述评

催眠被广泛的应用在临床心理治疗中, 但是, 关于催眠方面的研究却相当匮乏, 而且相当模糊。近年来, 随着fMRI, ERP和PET等技术的引入, 我们对催眠引导和催眠暗示有了更加深入的理解。对于疼痛和幻觉的研究表明, 至少对于高暗示性被试而言, 催眠暗示可以引起与真实刺激同样的大脑皮层的激活; 而催眠后暗示对于注意策略的调控, 可以使原有的认知过程发生改变, 其中之一是使用催眠后暗示来抑制“Stroop效应”语义加工过程; 催眠后遗忘更是实现了内隐记忆和外显记忆遗忘的分离。未来研究者将继续从探讨催眠本身的神经属性和催眠暗示所引起的认知过程的改变两个角度去认识催眠, 揭开催眠的实质。     

Philosophy of science in Estonia

This paper presents a survey of the philosophy of science in Estonia. Topics covered include the historical background (science at the 17th century Academia Gustaviana, in the 19th century, during the Soviet period) and an overview of the current situation and main areas of research (the problem of demarcation, a critique of the traditional understandings of science, φ-science, classical and non-classical science, the philosophy of chemistry, the problem of induction, the sociology of scientific knowledge, semiotics as a methodology).     

Structure and strength in causal induction

We present a framework for the rational analysis of elemental causal induction-learning about the existence of a relationship between a single cause and effect-based upon causal graphical models. This framework makes precise the distinction between causal structure and causal strength: the difference between asking whether a causal relationship exists and asking how strong that causal relationship might be. We show that two leading rational models of elemental causal induction, DeltaP and causal power, both estimate causal strength, and we introduce a new rational model, causal support, that assesses causal structure. Causal support predicts several key phenomena of causal induction that cannot be accounted for by other rational models, which we explore through a series of experiments. These phenomena include the complex interaction between DeltaP and the base-rate probability of the effect in the absence of the cause, sample size effects, inferences from incomplete contingency tables, and causal learning from rates. Causal support also provides a better account of a number of existing datasets than either DeltaP or causal power.