THE ROAD IS MADE BY WALKING: AN INTRODUCTION

We are living in a time of unprecedented challenges: human activity is now the primary driver shaping the planet and we are perilously close to breaching a variety of critical planetary boundaries—a prelude to the possible extinction of our species. How should we be thinking and acting—as persons, communities, institutions and societies—so as to best understand and respond to these challenges? What contribution can the field of science and religion make to develop the knowledge needed to negotiate the civilizational transition we face? Such questions were addressed through a series of dialogues at the 62nd annual conference of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science in June of 2016—“How Can We Know? Co‐Creating Knowledge in Perilous Times.” This essay sets the background to these challenges and introduces the set of articles in this themed section.     

The Wiseman and the Sage:Metaphysics as Wisdom in Aristotle and the Neo-Confucian School of Principle

Among scholars of classical philosophy in the West, it is not uncommon to hesitate about the existence of metaphysics in non-Western philosophical traditions. At times, the dilemma seems due to culture-specific ideas or standards about what metaphysics is or how it should be done. Other times the problem seems to lie in a general lack of awareness about the methods and approaches of divergent philosophical traditions. This article explores an often ignored Aristotelian notion of metaphysics: That it is wisdom. If we acknowledge wisdom to be a common value or ideal found in different cultures, then characterizing metaphysics as wisdom promises to be more inclusive than prevalent ideas about it, being broad enough to allow for the appreciation of metaphysical insights and achievements in non-Western schools. I first examine Aristotle’s account of what wisdom consists of. I shall then test the inclusivity of this conception of metaphysics by showing how its characteristic features are manifest in the Neo-Confucian ideal of sagely learning.     

Fabricated Humans? Human Genetics,Ethics and the Christian Wisdom Tradition1

Abstract: This article highlights the key social issues associated with genetic screening and testing. It identifies an uneasy combination of a cultural drive towards perfection alongside heightened perception of a risk society. Awareness of risk is particularly in evidence in clinical genetics, but is surprisingly silent in public discourse about stem cell research, which has tended to flounder through its unilateral focus on the status of the early embryo. This article concentrates on current practice, such as the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and offers a critical analysis of current debates about ethical issues. It argues that Christian ethics can contribute positively to the debate by drawing on the tradition of prudence or practical wisdom, which goes beyond the secular alternatives of both the consequential analysis of risk and benefit and the precautionary principle.     

存在与解释：刍议心理咨询境域的诗性智慧

诗性智慧是生活境域中非主体化、非对象化的此在智慧,解释学是迄今诗性智慧在哲学中的最好阐发,它消解了思与诗之间长期紧张的二元对立,为至今仍困扰于科学主义与人本主义范式分裂的心理咨询提供了可资超越的借鉴。理解在时间的境域中氤氲着诗性智慧的光焰生生不息。     

Practical Wisdom: Aristotle meets Positive Psychology

The strengths and virtues identified by positive psychology are treated as logically independent, and it is recommended that people identify their “signature” strengths and cultivate them, because more of a strength is better [Peterson and Seligman: 2004, Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification (Oxford University Press, New York); Seligman: 2002, Authentic Happiness (Free Press, New York)]. The present paper contrasts that view with the Aristotelian view that virtues are interdependent, that happiness (eudaimonia) requires all the virtues, and that more of a virtue is not always better than less. We argue that practical wisdom is the master virtue essential to solving problems of specificity, relevance, and conflict that inevitably arise whenever character strengths must be translated into action in concrete situations. We also argue that practical wisdom is becoming increasingly difficult to nurture and display in modern society, so that attention must be paid to reshaping social institutions to encourage the use of practical wisdom rather than inhibiting it.     

Wisdom and Knowledge: The Outline of Eastern and Western Aesthetic Spirits?

Wisdom and knowledge are the basic spirits of Eastern and Western aesthetics. The shortcoming of the aesthetics based on knowledge, i.e., the aesthetics of knowledge, lies in the fact that it clings to the opposing differences between Western- and Eastern-centered theories. These differences include essentialism and anti-essentialism; harmonious and non-harmonious relationships between person, self, nature and society; art or nature as the highest aesthetic realm; metaphysics or psychology as the aesthetic domain; dualism and Advaita; and so on. The aesthetics based on wisdom, namely aesthetics of wisdom, is valuable due to its adopting an impartial attitude toward Eastern and Western aesthetics, essentialism and anti-essentialism, philosophical horizon and psychological horizon, theory of harmony and theory of antagonism, beauty of art and beauty of nature, dualism and Advaita, up to aesthetics of knowledge and aesthetics of wisdom. Contrasted with this understanding of the aesthetics of knowledge, non-dualism and non-Advaita are the soul of the spirit of the aesthetics of wisdom.     

WISDOM,MODERATION, AND ELENCHUS IN PLATO'S APOLOGY

Abstract: This article contends that Socratic wisdom (sophia) in Plato's Apology should be understood in relation to moderation (sophrosune), not knowledge (episteme). This stance is exemplified in an interpretation of Socrates' disavowal of knowledge. The god calls Socrates wise. Socrates holds both that he is wise in nothing great or small and that the god does not lie. These apparently inconsistent claims are resolved in an interpretation of elenchus. This interpretion says that Socrates is wise insofar as he does not believe himself to know what he does not know. Whether one knows is demonstrated through elenchus, which moderates between knowledge claims. Thus, elenchus is productive of a kind of wisdom even if it does not produce knowledge. This claim, if true, forms a suitable basis for Socrates' defense of himself. That it does so serves as further evidence for the interpretation of sophia as sophrosune.     

The Dialogue between Science and Religion and the Dialogue between People of Different Faiths: Areopagus Revisited

Christianity finds itself in a new situation, one that resembles its first-century experience in that it will be shaped by a new dominant world culture. This culture is marked by three factors-the economy, the multireligious situation, and science. The author's discussion deals with the issues that arise in this engagement with culture under three rubrics: dialogue between science and religion, globalization of the religious encounter, and interreligious dialogue in a globalized world. The major assertions are: (1) Science and religions must avoid restrictive and expansionist relationships and work for reciprocal interaction. (2) Globalization is an unavoidable, but ambiguous, historical development; religions should reject responses of "ethnification" and "primitivism" and rather engage in strategies that encourage both productive encounter and critical distance. (3) Interreligious dialogue includes dialogues of life, of intellectual exchange, of religious experience, of common action, and of confrontation; this dialogue will seek to embrace truth (which involves science) and wisdom (which includes the various religious traditions) in the reciprocal interaction that is marked by love.     

Casuistry and Principlism: The Convergence of Method in Biomedical Ethics

Casuistry and principlism are two of the leading contenders to be considered the methodology of bioethics. These methods may be incommensurable since the former emphasizes the examination of cases while the latter focuses on moral principles. Conversely, since both analyze cases in terms of mid-level principles, there is hope that these methods may be reconcilable or complementary. I analyze the role of principles in each and thereby show that these theories are virtually identical when interpreted in a certain light. That is, if the gaps in each method are filled by a concept of judgment or Aristotelian practical wisdom, these methods converge.