Logical Metonymy Resolution in a Words‐as‐Cues Framework: Evidence From Self‐Paced Reading and Probe Recognition

Logical metonymy resolution (begin a book → begin writing a book) has traditionally been explained either through complex lexical entries (qualia structures) or through the integration of the implicit event via post‐lexical access to world knowledge. We propose that recent work within the words‐as‐cues paradigm can provide a more dynamic model of logical metonymy, accounting for early and dynamic integration of complex event information depending on previous contextual cues (agent and patient). We first present a self‐paced reading experiment on German subordinate sentences, where metonymic sentences and their paraphrased version differ only in the presence or absence of the clause‐final target verb (Der Konditor begann die Glasur → Der Konditor begann, die Glasur spreading the icing). Longer reading times at the target verb position in a high‐typicality condition (baker + icing → spread ) suggest that we make use of knowledge activated by lexical cues to build expectations about events. The early and dynamic integration of event knowledge in metonymy interpretation is bolstered by further evidence from a second experiment using the probe recognition paradigm. Presenting covert events as probes following a high‐typicality or a low‐typicality metonymic sentence (Der Konditor begann die Glasur → SPREAD ), we obtain an analogous effect of typicality at 100 ms interstimulus interval.     

The acquisition of morphological knowledge investigated through artificial language learning

Affix knowledge plays an important role in visual word recognition, but little is known about how it is acquired. The authors present a new method of investigating the acquisition of affixes in which participants are trained on novel affixes presented in novel word contexts (e.g., sleepnept). Experiment 1 investigated the role of semantic information on affix acquisition by comparing a form-learning condition with a condition in which participants also received definitions for each novel word. Experiment 2 investigated the role of long-term consolidation on affix acquisition by comparing knowledge of learned affixes two days and nearly two months after training. Results demonstrated that episodic knowledge of affixes can be acquired shortly after a single training session using either form or semantic learning, but suggested that the development of lexicalized representations of affixes requires the provision of semantic information during learning as well as a substantial period of offline consolidation.     

A left cerebral hemisphere’s superiority in processing spatial-categorical information in a non-verbal semantic format

It has been shown that the left and right cerebral hemispheres (LH and RH) respectively process qualitative or “categorical” spatial relations and metric or “coordinate” spatial relations. However, categorical spatial information could be thought as divided into two types: semantically-coded and visuospatially-coded categorical information. We examined whether a LH’s advantage in processing semantic-categorical information is observed in a non-verbal format, and also whether semantic- and visuospatial-categorical processing are differentially lateralized. We manipulated the colors and positions of the standard traffic light sign as semantic- and visuospatial-categorical information respectively, and tested performance with the divided visual field method. In the semantic-categorical matching task, in which the participants judged if the semantic-categorical information of a successive cue and target was the same, a right visual field advantage was observed, suggesting a LH’s preference for processing semantic-categorical information in a non-verbal format. In the visuospatial-categorical matching task, in which the participants judged if the visuospatial-categorical information of a successive cue and target was identical, a left visual field advantage was obtained. These results suggest that the processing of semantic-categorical information is lateralized in LH, and we discuss the dissociation between the two types of categorical information.     

Can We Turn a Blind Eye to Eliminativism?

In this paper I shall reply to two arguments that Stephen Stich (1990; 1991; 1996) has recently put forward against the thesis of eliminative materialism. In a nutshell, Stich argues that (i) the thesis of eliminative materialism, according to which propositional attitudes don't exist, is neither true nor false, and that (ii) even if it were true, that would be philosophically uninteresting. To support (i) and (ii) Stich relies on two premises: (a) that the job of a theory of reference is to make explicit the tacit theory of reference which underlies our intuitions about the notion of reference itself; and (b) that our intuitive notion of reference is a highly idiosyncratic one. In this paper I shall address Stich's anti-eliminativist claims (i) and (ii). I shall argue that even if we agreed with premises (a) and (b), that would lend no support whatsoever to (i) and (ii).     

Happy Danes and Deep Incarnation

The new Copenhagen School of Deep Incarnation posits that, in Jesus Christ, God has become incarnate and therefore present “in, with, and under” all physical and biological processes. This claim raises the issue of “compatibilism,” according to which divine action and creaturely action are compatible, and “incompatibilism,” according to which divine action must be absent to allow for free creaturely action. Niels Henrik Gregersen, representing the Copenhagen School, affirms both compatibilism at the quantum level of physical activity and incompatibilism at the level of nature's self‐organization. This article points out the incoherence of this position along with the positions proffered by process theologians and kenotic theologians.     

Semantic embodiment,disembodiment or misembodiment? In search of meaning in modules and neuron circuits

“Embodied” proposals claim that the meaning of at least some words, concepts and constructions is grounded in knowledge about actions and objects. An alternative “disembodied” position locates semantics in a symbolic system functionally detached from sensorimotor modules. This latter view is not tenable theoretically and has been empirically falsified by neuroscience research. A minimally-embodied approach now claims that action–perception systems may “color”, but not represent, meaning; however, such minimal embodiment (misembodiment?) still fails to explain why action and perception systems exert causal effects on the processing of symbols from specific semantic classes. Action perception theory (APT) offers neurobiological mechanisms for “embodied” referential, affective and action semantics along with “disembodied” mechanisms of semantic abstraction, generalization and symbol combination, which draw upon multimodal brain systems. In this sense, APT suggests integrative-neuromechanistic explanations of why both sensorimotor and multimodal areas of the human brain differentially contribute to specific facets of meaning and concepts.     

Metaphor priming in sentence production: Concrete pictures affect abstract language production

People speak metaphorically about abstract concepts—for instance, a person can be “full of love” or “have a lot of love to give.” Over the past decade, research has begun to focus on how metaphors are processed during language comprehension. Much of this work suggests that understanding a metaphorical expression involves activating brain and body systems involved in perception and motor control. However, no research to date has asked whether the same is true while speakers produce language. We address this gap using a sentence production task. Its results demonstrate that visually activating a concrete source domain can trigger the use of metaphorical language drawn from that same concrete domain, even in sentences that are thematically unrelated to the primes, a metaphorical priming effect. This effect suggests that conceptual metaphors play a part in language production. It also shows that activation in the perceptual system that is not part of an intended message can nevertheless influence sentence formulation.     

Dimension‐specific intertrial facilitation in visual search for pop‐out targets: Evidence for a top‐down modulable visual short‐term memory effect

In visual search for pop‐out targets, target detection is expedited when the target‐defining dimension (e.g., colour) is repeated on consecutive trials, but not (or less) when the target feature (e.g., red) is repeated (Found & Müller, 1996). The present study examined whether this dimension‐specific intertrial facilitation (ITF) is mediated by an explicit or an implicit memory of the target on the previous trial. In Experiment 1, observers had no above‐chance knowledge of the target dimension (or feature) when this information was not to be encoded and retained explicitly; yet, they exhibited dimension‐specific ITF. In Experiment 2, the nature of the ITF effect was unaffected by whatever attribute of the target was to be explicitly encoded and memorized, its dimension or feature; however, ITF was increased compared to a no‐memory control condition. In Experiment 3, ITF was not increased when observers had to determine the target dimension, but without having to maintain a memory of it during the intertrial interval. These results suggest that, although an implicit memory is sufficient for producing dimension‐specific ITF, ITF is top‐down modulable by explicit memory instructions.     

Persisting problems for a quantificational theory of complex demonstratives

I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.” King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.

Beyond Millianism

In Beyond Rigidity, Soames attempts to defend Millianism by articulating a novel account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing names. Soames uses this account both to respond to the objection that Millianism unintuitively allows the unrestricted substitution of coreferential names in propositional attitude contexts, and to generate a positive argument for Millianism. I argue that the positive argument fails, and that Soames’s account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing names is inconsistent with Millianism.