Extending the classical view of representation

Representation has always been a central part of models in cognitive science, but this idea has come under attack. Researchers advocating the alternative approaches of perceptual symbol systems, situated action, embodied cognition, and dynamical systems have argued against central assumptions of the classical representational approach to mind. We review the core assumptions of the representational view and these four suggested alternatives. We argue that representation should remain a core part of cognitive science, but that the insights from these alternative approaches must be incorporated into models of cognitive processing.     

Starting at the end: the importance of goals in spatial language

We explored the linguistic encoding of Paths in children between the ages of three and seven, in children with Williams syndrome, and in normal adults, focusing specifically on Source and Goal Paths. The results showed an asymmetry, with Goal Paths regularly and systematically encoded, but Source Paths often omitted. This pattern occurred among all groups and across a broad range of domains including Manner of Motion, Change of Possession, Change of State, and Attachment/Detachment events. It also occurred whether participants spontaneously described events or were asked to use a specific verb that biased them towards a Goal or Source Path (e.g. 'give' vs. 'get'). The results are discussed in terms of non-linguistic foundations of spatial language and the linguistic mapping biases that arise when we describe what we see.     

Thematic role properties of subjects and objects

This paper tests two claims about the thematic roles Agent and Patient: first, that they can be decomposed into more primitive features, as laid out in Dowty's (1991) Proto-Roles Hypothesis; and second, that these properties can be inferred directly from the grammatical roles subject and object. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants rated the Proto-Roles properties of the subject and object of transitive sentences with real verbs. Subjects were rated as more Agent-like than objects, while objects were rated as more Patient-like than subjects. Experiment 3 used transitive sentences with nonsense content words (e.g. "The rom mecked the zarg"). Even in the absence of a known verb, the results were the same. Experiment 4 examined the corollary prediction that subjects and objects should not differ on grammatically irrelevant properties (e.g. "being liquid"); this prediction was confirmed. In Experiment 5, verbs that do not permit objects (e.g. "fall," "erupt") were placed in the transitive frame. Results were the same as in Experiments 1 through 3. Moreover, the semantics of the verb were altered by the frame, indicating that participants tried to fuse the semantics of the verb with those of the frame. Possible sources of these inferences are considered.     

How is God-talk logically possible? A sketch for an argument on the logic of ‘God’

In this paper I want to argue for the optimal way to characterise the logical and semantical behaviour of the singular term ‘God’ used in religious language. The relevance of this enterprise to logical theory is the main focus as well. Doing this presupposes to outline the two rivaling approaches of well-definition of singular terms: Kripke’s (“rigid designators”) and Hintikka’s (“world-lines”). ‘God’ as a “rigid designator” is purified from all real-life-language-games of identification and only spells out a metaphysical tag, which favours the view of “anything goes”. Instead, ‘God’ as a “world-line,” plus two ways of quantification, is much more flexible to theological traditions, teachings of the church, religious practices and personal feelings. Thus, it provides a sufficiently well-defined singular term for the purposes of logical theory. The whole sketch is based on Jaakko Hintikka’s logical ideas, mainly on his responses to different authors in PJH. I have systematically omitted direct references to his texts because I have modified considerably his ideas for my own purposes.     

Mathematical foundations of consciousness

We employ the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms that characterize sets as mathematical primitives. The Anti-foundation Axiom plays a significant role in our development, since among other of its features, its replacement for the Axiom of Foundation in the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms motivates Platonic interpretations. These interpretations also depend on such allied notions for sets as pictures, graphs, decorations, labelings and various mappings that we use. A syntax and semantics of operators acting on sets is developed. Such features enable construction of a theory of non-well-founded sets that we use to frame mathematical foundations of consciousness. To do this we introduce a supplementary axiomatic system that characterizes experience and consciousness as primitives. The new axioms proceed through characterization of so-called consciousness operators. The Russell operator plays a central role and is shown to be one example of a consciousness operator. Neural networks supply striking examples of non-well-founded graphs the decorations of which generate associated sets, each with a Platonic aspect. Employing our foundations, we show how the supervening of consciousness on its neural correlates in the brain enables the framing of a theory of consciousness by applying appropriate consciousness operators to the generated sets in question.     

Oughts and ends

This paper advances a reductive semantics for ‘ought’ and a naturalistic theory of normativity. It gives a unified analysis of predictive, instrumental, and categorical uses of ‘ought’: the predictive ‘ought’ is basic, and is interpreted in terms of probability. Instrumental ‘oughts’ are analyzed as predictive ‘oughts’ occurring under an ‘in order that’ modifer (the end-relational theory). The theory is then extended to categorical uses of ‘ought’: it is argued that they are special rhetorical uses of the instrumental ‘ought’. Plausible conversational principles explain how this end-relational ‘ought’ can perform the expressive functions of the moral ‘ought’. The notion of an ‘ought-simpliciter’ is also discussed.