Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?

I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of “true” in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of “true” could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms (“proform”, “antecedent”, etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom’s case that “is true” is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian’s argument against deflationism).     

What exactly is a yait anyway: The role of semantics in orthographic learning

This study investigated whether semantic information presented along with novel printed nonwords facilitates orthographic learning and examined predictors of individual differences in this important literacy skill. A sample of 35 fourth graders was tested on a variety of language and literacy tests, and participants were then exposed to 10 target nonwords, 5 of which were presented with semantic information. Children were tested 1 and 4 days later on their ability to correctly recognize and spell the target nonwords. Results revealed a significant main effect on the recognition task, where items presented with semantic information were identified correctly more often than were words presented in isolation. No significant effect of training condition was found for the spelling posttests. Furthermore, multiple regression analyses revealed that both phonological and semantic factors were significant predictors of orthographic learning. The findings support the view that orthographic learning, as measured through visual recognition, involves the integration of phonological, orthographic, and semantic representations.     

A semantics-based approach to the "no negative evidence" problem

Previous studies have shown that children retreat from argument-structure overgeneralization errors (e.g., * Don't giggle me ) by inferring that frequently encountered verbs are unlikely to be grammatical in unattested constructions, and by making use of syntax-semantics correspondences (e.g., verbs denoting internally caused actions such as giggling cannot normally be used causatively). The present study tested a new account based on a unitary learning mechanism that combines both of these processes. Seventy-two participants (ages 5–6, 9–10, and adults) rated overgeneralization errors with higher (* The funny man's joke giggled Bart ) and lower (* The funny man giggled Bart ) degrees of direct external causation. The errors with more-direct causation were rated as less unacceptable than those with less-direct causation. This finding is consistent with the new account, under which children acquire—in an incremental and probabilistic fashion—the meaning of particular constructions (e.g., transitive causative = direct external causation) and particular verbs, rejecting generalizations where the incompatibility between the two is too great.     

A model of episodic memory: Mental time travel along encoded trajectories using grid cells

The definition of episodic memory includes the concept of mental time travel: the ability to re-experience a previously experienced trajectory through continuous dimensions of space and time, and to recall specific events or stimuli along this trajectory. Lesions of the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex impair human episodic memory function and impair rat performance in tasks that could be solved by retrieval of trajectories. Recent physiological data suggests a novel model for encoding and retrieval of trajectories, and for associating specific stimuli with specific positions along the trajectory. During encoding in the model, external input drives the activity of head direction cells. Entorhinal grid cells integrate the head direction input to update an internal representation of location, and drive hippocampal place cells. Trajectories are encoded by Hebbian modification of excitatory synaptic connections between hippocampal place cells and head direction cells driven by external action. Associations are also formed between hippocampal cells and sensory stimuli. During retrieval, a sensory input cue activates hippocampal cells that drive head direction activity via previously modified synapses. Persistent spiking of head direction cells maintains the direction and speed of the action, updating the activity of entorhinal grid cells that thereby further update place cell activity. Additional cells, termed arc length cells, provide coding of trajectory segments based on the one-dimensional arc length from the context of prior actions or states, overcoming ambiguity where the overlap of trajectory segments causes multiple head directions to be associated with one place. These mechanisms allow retrieval of complex, self-crossing trajectories as continuous curves through space and time.     

How to eliminate self-reference: a précis

We provide a systematic recipe for eliminating self-reference from a simple language in which semantic paradoxes (whether purely logical or empirical) can be expressed. We start from a non-quantificational language L which contains a truth predicate and sentence names, and we associate to each sentence F of L an infinite series of translations h ₀(F), h ₁(F), ..., stated in a quantificational language L ^*. Under certain conditions, we show that none of the translations is self-referential, but that any one of them perfectly mirrors the semantic behavior of the original. The result, which can be seen as a generalization of recent work by Yablo (1993, Analysis, 53, 251–252; 2004, Self-reference, CSLI) and Cook (2004, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 69(3), 767–774), shows that under certain conditions self-reference is not essential to any of the semantic phenomena that can be obtained in a simple language.     

Big brown dog or brown big dog? An electrophysiological study of semantic constraints on prenominal adjective order

Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded while participants read and made acceptability judgments about sentences containing three types of adjective sequences: (1) normal sequences--e.g., Jennifer rode a huge gray elephant; (2) reversed sequences that violate grammatical-semantic constraints on linear order--e.g., *Jennifer rode a gray huge elephant; and (3) contradictory sequences that violate lexical-semantic constraints on compositionality--e.g., *Jennifer rode a small huge elephant. Relative to the control condition, the second adjective elicited a reduced N400 and an enhanced P600 in both the reversal condition and the contradiction condition. We present several alternative accounts of these two effects, but favor an interpretation which treats them as reflecting semantic and syntactic aspects of a temporary reanalysis of the adjective order construction. Furthermore, relative to the control condition, the final noun elicited a robust N400 in the contradiction condition but not in the reversal condition. We suggest that this effect indexes the full registration of the lexical-semantic incompatibility of the two adjectives in the contradiction condition. Finally, we discuss how all of these findings fit into the broader context of recent ERP studies that have reported atypical N400s and robust P600s in response to certain types of semantic anomalies.     

The associated nontargets effect: Evidence of nontarget processing at and beyond the level of letter recognition

In four visual search tasks participants were asked to make a target response if either of two targets was present and to make a nontarget response if neither target was present. Some target-absent displays included only nontarget stimuli or features that never occurred in the same displays as targets, whereas other target-absent displays included nontarget stimuli or features that did sometimes occur with targets. Nontarget responses were reliably faster in the former case than in the latter. This “associated nontargets effect” indicates that nontargets are not simply classified as nontargets but in addition are discriminated from one another. Current visual search models may underestimate the degree to which nontargets are processed during search.     

Compositionality in a Parallel Architecture for Language Processing

Compositionality has been a central concept in linguistics and philosophy for decades, and it is increasingly prominent in many other areas of cognitive science. Its status, however, remains contentious. Here, I reassess the nature and scope of the principle of compositionality (Partee, 1995) from the perspective of psycholinguistics and cognitive neuroscience. First, I review classic arguments for compositionality and conclude that they fail to establish compositionality as a property of human language. Next, I state a new competence argument, acknowledging the fact that any competent user of a language L can assign to most expressions in L at least one meaning which is a function only of the meanings of the expression's parts and of its syntactic structure. I then discuss selected results from cognitive neuroscience, indicating that the human brain possesses the processing capacities presupposed by the competence argument. Finally, I outline a language processing architecture consistent with the neuroscience results, where semantic representations may be generated by a syntax-driven stream and by an “asyntactic” processing stream, jointly or independently. Compositionality is viewed as a constraint on computation in the former stream only.     

How is God-talk logically possible? A sketch for an argument on the logic of ‘God’

In this paper I want to argue for the optimal way to characterise the logical and semantical behaviour of the singular term ‘God’ used in religious language. The relevance of this enterprise to logical theory is the main focus as well. Doing this presupposes to outline the two rivaling approaches of well-definition of singular terms: Kripke’s (“rigid designators”) and Hintikka’s (“world-lines”). ‘God’ as a “rigid designator” is purified from all real-life-language-games of identification and only spells out a metaphysical tag, which favours the view of “anything goes”. Instead, ‘God’ as a “world-line,” plus two ways of quantification, is much more flexible to theological traditions, teachings of the church, religious practices and personal feelings. Thus, it provides a sufficiently well-defined singular term for the purposes of logical theory. The whole sketch is based on Jaakko Hintikka’s logical ideas, mainly on his responses to different authors in PJH. I have systematically omitted direct references to his texts because I have modified considerably his ideas for my own purposes.     

Language, thought, and real nouns

We test the claim that acquiring a mass-count language, like English, causes speakers to think differently about entities in the world, relative to speakers of classifier languages like Japanese. We use three tasks to assess this claim: object-substance rating, quantity judgment, and word extension. Using the first two tasks, we present evidence that learning mass-count syntax has little effect on the interpretation of familiar nouns between Japanese and English, and that speakers of these languages do not divide up referents differently along an individuation continuum, as claimed in some previous reports [Gentner, D., & Boroditsky, L. (2001). Individuation, relativity, and early word learning. In M. Bowerman, & S. Levinson (Eds.), Language acquisition and conceptual development (pp. 215-256). Cambridge University Press]. Instead, we argue that previous cross-linguistic differences [Imai, M., & Gentner, D. (1997). A cross-linguistic study of early word meaning: Universal ontology and linguistic influence. Cognition, 62, 169-200] are attributable to “lexical statistics” [Gleitman, L., & Papafragou, A. (2005). Language and thought. In K. Holyoak, & R. Morrison (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 633-661). Cambridge University Press]. Speakers of English are more likely to think that a novel ambiguous expression like “the blicket” refers to a kind of object (relative to speakers of Japanese) because speakers of English are likely to assume that “blicket” is a count noun rather than a mass noun, based on the relative frequency of each kind of word in English. This is confirmed by testing Mandarin-English bilinguals with a word extension task. We find that bilinguals tested in English with mass-count ambiguous syntax extend novel words like English monolinguals (and assume that a word like “blicket” refers to a kind of object). In contrast, bilinguals tested in Mandarin are significantly more likely to extend novel words by material. Thus, online lexical statistics, rather than non-linguistic thought, mediate cross-linguistic differences in word extension. We suggest that speakers of Mandarin, English, and Japanese draw on a universal set of lexical meanings, and that mass-count syntax allows speakers of English to select among these meanings.