Testing the Francis Burnout Inventory among Anglican clergy in England

ABSTRACT

Drawing on the classic model of balanced affect, the Francis Burnout Inventory (FBI) conceptualised good work-related psychological health among religious leaders in terms of negative affect being balanced by positive affect. In the FBI negative affect is assessed by the Scale of Emotional Exhaustion in Ministry (SEEM) and positive affect is assessed by the Satisfaction in Ministry Scale (SIMS). A sample of 99 Anglican clergy serving in a rural diocese in the Church of England (75 men and 24 women) completed SEEM and SIMS together with the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale (WEMWBS) as an independent measure of wellbeing. The results confirm the hypothesis that high SIMS scores reduced the negative effects of high SEEM scores on the independent measure of wellbeing.     

Experimental manipulations of social status and stress-induced cardiovascular responses in high and low trait dominant men

The present study investigated the effect of a mismatch between trait dominance and induced status on cardiovascular reactivity to and recovery from a dyadic interaction task. Eighty normotensive men characterized as either high or low in trait dominance engaged in a discussion requiring persuasive behavior either in the context of a high or low induced status position. The outcome of a rigged competition was used as a marker of status. Induced status was found to moderate cardiovascular recovery of dominance groups. High dominant individuals exhibited less complete recovery of diastolic blood pressure (DBP) when placed in a low compared to high status position, whereas recovery of low dominant individuals tended to show greater impairment in a high status position. Results for changes in emotional states also indicate a detrimental effect of incongruous status positions, particularly for high dominant individuals. Subjective experiences did not mediate cardiovascular effects, though.     

Empathy and the responsiveness to social affordances

The direct perception theory of empathy claims that we can immediately experience a person’s state of mind. I can see for instance that my neighbour is angry with me in his bodily countenance. I develop a version of the direct perception theory of empathy which takes this perceptual capacity to depend upon recognising in what way the other person is responsive to the affordances the environment provides. By recognising which possibilities for action are relevant to a person, I can thereby understand something about the meaning they give to the world. I come to share something of their perspective on the world, and this allows me to grasp based on my perception of them something about their current state of mind. I argue that shared affect plays a central role in this perceptual capacity. Shared affect allows me to orient my attention to possibilities for action that matter to the other person. I end by briefly discuss the implications of this view of empathy for the disturbances in so-called “cognitive empathy” that are found in people diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder.     

Putting mood in context: Using smartphones to examine how people feel in different locations

Does personality predict how people feel in different types of situations? The present research addressed this question using data from several thousand individuals who used a mood tracking smartphone application for several weeks. Results from our analyses indicated that people’s momentary affect was linked to their location, and provided preliminary evidence that the relationship between state affect and location might be moderated by personality. The results highlight the importance of looking at person-situation relationships at both the trait- and state-levels and also demonstrate how smartphones can be used to collect person and situation information as people go about their everyday lives.     

All's well that ends well? A test of the peak-end rule in couples’ conflict discussions

Despite its importance for well-being, surprisingly little is known about what determines how couples feel after a conflict. Using the peak-end rule, we examined whether partners’ post-conflict affect was mainly predicted by their most aversive or pleasant emotional experience (peaks) during the conflict, or by the emotional tone at the end of the interaction. One hundred and one couples engaged in a conflict interaction and afterwards evaluated their momentary affect during the interaction. Post-conflict affect (in terms of positive and negative feelings, and perceived partner responsiveness) was assessed immediately after the conflict, after a subsequent positive discussion, and upon returning to daily life (here, rumination about the relationship was assessed as well). Our results showed that the negative and positive peaks, but not the end emotion, predicted immediate and partly extended post-conflict affect in individuals. This finding has clinical implications for the mediation of couple conflict.     

A matter of taste: Nietzsche and the structure of affective response

ABSTRACT

Nietzsche’s work is filled with references to taste. He frequently expresses his own judgements of taste and criticizes or praises individuals and groups on account of their taste. Some recent attempts to account for Nietzsche’s understanding of taste argue that Nietzsche understands affective response, when guided by good taste, as being appropriate to, or merited by, the intrinsic features of the object. This is in direct contrast to anti-realist accounts of Nietzsche’s taste, according to which his evaluative judgements have no special epistemic status. In this article, I argue against objectivist or universalist readings of Nietzsche’s judgements of taste. However, in doing so I aim to show that affective responses do not thereby turn out to be arbitrary. Nietzsche suggests that by engaging with one’s affective responses, one can organizes them into a coherent and unified taste. This process of unification is central to Nietzsche’s understanding of value and self-creation.