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排序方式: 共有203条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
81.
Daniel C. Dennett 《Metaphilosophy》2005,36(4):449-459
Abstract: Three critics of Freedom Evolves ( Dennett 2003 ) bring out important differences in philosophical outlook and method. Mele's thought experiments are supposed to expose the importance, for autonomy, of personal history, but they depend on the dubious invocation of mere logical or conceptual possibility. Fischer defends the Basic Argument for incompatibilism, while Taylor and I choose to sidestep it instead of disposing of it. Where does the burden of proof lie? O'Connor's candid expression of allegiance to traditional ideas that I reject highlights a fundamental difference in assumptions about how—and why—to do philosophy. There are indeed definable varieties of free will that are incompatible with determinism. Do they matter? I have argued, against philosophical tradition, that they don't. 相似文献
82.
Alexander Rueger 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2006,37(1):77-97
Summary A combination of process and counterfactual theories of causation is proposed with the aim of preserving the strengths of each of the approaches while avoiding their shortcomings. The basis for the combination, or hybrid, view is the need, common to both accounts, of imposing a stability requirement on the causal relation. 相似文献
83.
The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and processes responsible for brain-based cognition. We sketch the basic motivation for the approach, describe a particular version of the approach, so-called ‘Dynamic Causal Modeling’ (DCM), and consider a concrete example of DCM. This third way, we argue, has the potential to avoid the problems that afflict the other two approaches. 相似文献
84.
Uriah Kriegel 《Metaphilosophy》2019,50(5):688-707
This paper pulls together three debates fundamental in metaphysics and proposes a novel unified approach to them. The three debates are (i) between bundle theory and substrate theory about the nature of objects, (ii) dispositionalism and categoricalism about the nature of properties, and (iii) regularity theory and production theory about the nature of causation. The first part of the paper suggests that although these debates are metaphysical, the considerations motivating competing approaches in each debate tend to be epistemological. The second part argues that the two underlying epistemological pictures supporting these competing views lead to highly unsatisfying conceptions of the world. The final part proposes an alternative epistemological picture, which I call “introverted empiricism,” and presents the way this alternative provides for a more satisfying grasp of the ultimate nature of objects, properties, and causation. It is a consequence of this alternative picture that there is a kind of intimate self‐understanding that underlies our understanding of the deep nature of reality. 相似文献
85.
A longstanding debate exists in the literature concerning bottom-up vs. top-down influences on bistable perception. Recently, a technique has been developed to measure early changes in brain activity (via ERPs) related to perceptual reversals (Kornmeier & Bach, 2004). An ERP component, the reversal negativity (RN) has been identified, and is characterized as an increase in negative potential over the posterior scalp from 150 to 350 ms for perceptual reversals compared to perceptual stability. This finding, although interesting, has not helped resolve issues related to the bottom-up vs. top-down debate because top-down influences have not been directly manipulated. The current study focused on resolving some of these issues by measuring the RN while observers maintained one of three 'intentional approaches', (1) try to reverse perception as often as possible, (2) try to stabilize perception for as long as possible, and (3) maintain a passive approach. Enhancements in RN amplitude were found for the intention-to-reverse condition compared to the passive condition. This finding suggests an early influence (150 ms) of top-down control on perceptual reversals of bistable figures. Results are discussed in terms of competing attention shifting vs. fatigue-based theories of bistable perception. 相似文献
86.
Robert C. Bishop 《Synthese》2008,160(2):229-248
Recent developments in nonlinear dynamics have found wide application in many areas of science from physics to neuroscience.
Nonlinear phenomena such as feedback loops, inter-level relations, wholes constraining and modifying the behavior of their
parts, and memory effects are interesting candidates for emergence and downward causation. Rayleigh–Bénard convection is an
example of a nonlinear system that, I suggest, yields important insights for metaphysics and philosophy of science. In this
paper I propose convection as a model for downward causation in classical mechanics, far more robust and less speculative
than the examples typically provided in the philosophy of mind literature. Although the physics of Rayleigh–Bénard convection
is quite complicated, this model provides a much more realistic and concrete example for examining various assumptions and
arguments found in emergence and philosophy of mind debates. After reviewing some key concepts of nonlinear dynamics, complex
systems and the basic physics of Rayleigh–Bénard convection, I begin that examination here by (1) assessing a recently proposed
definition for emergence and downward causation, (2) discussing some typical objections to downward causation and (3) comparing
this model with Sperry’s examples.
The aim of science is not things themselves, as the dogmatists in their simplicity imagine, but the relations among things;
outside these relations there is no reality knowable. – Poincaré 相似文献
87.
Helen STEWARD 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(3):390-401
The paper argues against the very commonly held view that whenever a substance may be said to be the cause of something, a
fuller and metaphysically more accurate understanding of the situation can always be obtained by looking to the properties
in virtue of which that substance was able to bring about the effect in question. Paul Humphreys’ argument that when a substance
is said to have produced an effect, it always turns out to be an aspect or property of that substance which brought about
the effect in question is examined and criticized; it is argued that it is based on an illegitimate application of Mill’s
Methods of Difference and Agreement to the case. Mill’s methods, it is suggested, are methods of empirical, not of ontological
enquiry. The paper then turns to examine an argument by Mele which appears to depend on a structurally rather similar assumption
that if there is nothing about a subject which could explain why she does one thing rather than another, it cannot really
be up to that subject which thing occurs. It is suggested that, too, the inference is faulty, and that once it is rejected,
one common objection to libertarianism—the argument from luck—might be more readily met. 相似文献
88.
Alfred R. Mele 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(5):630-648
Abstract: This critical examination of Roderick Chisholm's agent causal brand of libertarianism develops a problem about luck that undermines his earlier and later libertarian views on free will and moral responsibility and defends the thesis that a modest libertarian alternative considerably softens the problem. The alternative calls for an indeterministic connection in the action‐producing process that is further removed from action than Chisholm demands. The article also explores the implications of a relatively new variant of a Frankfurt‐style case for Chisholm's views of free will and moral responsibility and for libertarianism in general. It is suggested that Chisholm's efforts will and should continue to offer important assistance to libertarians who are determined to succeed where he apparently fell short. 相似文献
89.
90.
The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue
that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other,
by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this
non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness
with the neurophysiology of the brain and body.
相似文献
Itay Shani (Corresponding author)Email: |