Can Western Monotheism Avoid Substance Dualism?

The problem of divine agency and action is analogous to the problem of human agency and action: How is such agency possible in the absence of a dualistic causal interaction between disparate orders of being? This paper explores nondualistic accounts of divine agency that assert the following: (1) physical monism, (2) antireductionism, (3) physical realization, and (4) divine causal realism. I conclude that a robustly causal deity is incompatible with nonddualism's affirmation of physical monism. Specifically, I argue the incoherence of nondualistic strategies that advocate divine information transfer without energy transfer or the divine downward causation of physical events. Furthermore, I claim that the principle of explanatory exclusion makes any nondualistic, noninterventionist account of divine agency highly dubious. Finally, I suggest that Judaism, Christianity, and Islam can avoid a causally inert deity only if they are willing to deny the current presumption of the causal closure of the physical.     

Robust Lexically Mediated Compensation for Coarticulation: Christmash Time Is Here Again

A long-standing question in cognitive science is how high-level knowledge is integrated with sensory input. For example, listeners can leverage lexical knowledge to interpret an ambiguous speech sound, but do such effects reflect direct top-down influences on perception or merely postperceptual biases? A critical test case in the domain of spoken word recognition is lexically mediated compensation for coarticulation (LCfC). Previous LCfC studies have shown that a lexically restored context phoneme (e.g., /s/ in Christma#) can alter the perceived place of articulation of a subsequent target phoneme (e.g., the initial phoneme of a stimulus from a tapes-capes continuum), consistent with the influence of an unambiguous context phoneme in the same position. Because this phoneme-to-phoneme compensation for coarticulation is considered sublexical, scientists agree that evidence for LCfC would constitute strong support for top–down interaction. However, results from previous LCfC studies have been inconsistent, and positive effects have often been small. Here, we conducted extensive piloting of stimuli prior to testing for LCfC. Specifically, we ensured that context items elicited robust phoneme restoration (e.g., that the final phoneme of Christma# was reliably identified as /s/) and that unambiguous context-final segments (e.g., a clear /s/ at the end of Christmas) drove reliable compensation for coarticulation for a subsequent target phoneme. We observed robust LCfC in a well-powered, preregistered experiment with these pretested items (N = 40) as well as in a direct replication study (N = 40). These results provide strong evidence in favor of computational models of spoken word recognition that include top–down feedback.     

The Logic of Causal Explanation An Axiomatization

Three-valued (strong-Kleene) modal logic provides the foundation for a new approach to formalizing causal explanation as a relation between partial situations. The approach makes fine-grained distinctions between aspects of events, even between aspects that are equivalent in classical logic. The framework can accommodate a variety of ontologies concerning the relata of causal explanation. I argue, however, for a tripartite ontology of objects corresponding to sentential nominals: facts, tropes (or facta or states of affairs), and situations (or events). I axiomatize the relations and use canonical models to demonstrate completeness.     

Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency

This paper first distinguishes three alternative views that adherents to both incompatibilism and PAP may take as to what constitutes an agent's determining or controlling her action (if it's not the action's being deterministically caused by antecedent events): the indeterministic-causation view, the agent-causation view, and "simple indeterminism." The bulk of the paper focusses on the dispute between simple indeterminism - the view that the occurrence of a simple mental event is determined by its subject if it possesses the "actish" phenomenal quality and is undetermined by antecedent events - and Timothy O'Connor's agent-causation view. It defends simple indeterminism against O'Connor's objections to it and offers objections to O'Connor's view.     

Explanatory exclusion and mental explanation

Jaegwon Kim once refrained from excluding distinct mental causes of effects that depend upon the sufficient physical cause of the effect (Kim, 1984 Kim, J. (1984). "Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation", Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9, p. 257–270.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). At that time, Kim also refrained from excluding distinct mental explanations of effects that depend upon complete physical explanations of the effect (Kim, 1988 Kim, J. (1988). Explanatory realism, causal realism, and explanatory exclusion. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 12, 225–239.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 1989 Kim, J. (1989). Mechanism, purpose, and explanatory exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives, 3, 77–108.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). More recently, he has excluded distinct mental causes of effects that depend upon the sufficient cause of the effect, since the physical cause is individually sufficient for the effect (Kim, 2005 Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar]). But there has been, to this point, no parallel shift in the explanatory realm, such that distinct mental explanations of effects that depend upon complete physical explanations of the effect are excluded since the physical explanation is objectively complete. In this paper I consider, defend, and apply this update to the principle of explanatory exclusion—an update, which, in the final analysis, demonstrates a significant advantage that non-reductive physicalism has over reductive physicalism.     

Causal Inference from Descriptions of Experimental and Non-Experimental Research: Public Understanding of Correlation-Versus-Causation

The human tendency to conflate correlation with causation has been lamented by various scientists (Kida, 2006; Stanovich, 2009), and vivid examples of it can be found in both the media and peer-reviewed literature. However, there is little systematic data on the extent to which individuals conflate correlation with causation. In three experiments, we presented people with one of four research vignettes generated from the combination of two independent variables: whether the vignette described an experimental or non-experimental design, and whether it revealed a positive or negative association. Upon reading their vignette, participants selected inferences that could be drawn from the findings. Participants drew causal inferences from non-experimental vignettes as often as they did from experimental vignettes, and more frequently for causal statements and directions of association that fit with intuitive notions than for those that did not. We discuss our findings in relation to other biases in human thinking.     

Decrease of prefrontal-posterior EEG coherence: loose control during social-emotional stimulation

In two experiments we aimed to investigate if individual differences in state-dependent decreases or increases of EEG coherence between prefrontal and posterior cortical regions may be indicative of a mechanism modulating the impact social-emotional information has on an individual. Two independent samples were exposed to an emotional stimulation paradigm in which the participants were invited to get involved and sympathize with the persons they were watching (study 1) or listening to (study 2), and who were expressing sadness or anxiety. The two studies yielded consistent results. Higher scores in trait absorption and in the propensity to ruminate were associated with decreased EEG beta coherence during the stimulation, whereas coherence increased in individuals low in absorption or rumination. Coherence changes did not predict to which degree the participants felt infected by the displayed emotions, but in individuals showing decreased prefrontal-posterior coupling during the stimulation, feelings of sadness and anxiety had a greater tendency to persist. The findings suggest that more loose prefrontal-posterior coupling may be related to loosening of control of the prefrontal cortex over incoming social-emotional information and, consequently, to deeper emotional involvement and absorption, whereas increased prefrontal-posterior coupling may be related to strong control, dampening of emotional experience, and not letting oneself become emotionally affected.     

Top-down processing modulates older adults’ susceptibility to noise

The present study examined older and younger adults’ ability to use top-down processes to mitigate the effects of display noise during simple feature, visual search. As display noise levels increased, older adults (age 60–74 years, n = 32) exhibited greater top-down search reaction time (RT) benefits (bottom-up minus top-down search RT), compared to younger adults (age 18–27, n = 32). Older adults’ ability to mitigate the effects of noise was further assessed with RT variability, as measured by intra-individual standard deviations across trials. Older adults again exhibited larger top-down benefits (i.e., less RT variability) compared to younger adults, and more so when display noise was present vs. absent. These results suggest a sparing of top-down processes with age (Madden, Whiting, Spaniol, & Bucur, 2005; Psychology and Aging, 20, 317), and that top-down processes in older adults enhance search efficiency by optimizing signal-to-noise ratios.     

THE METAPHYSICS OF DOWNWARD CAUSATION: REDISCOVERING THE FORMAL CAUSE

The methodological nonreductionism of contemporary biology opens an interesting discussion on the level of ontology and the philosophy of nature. The theory of emergence (EM), and downward causation (DC) in particular, bring a new set of arguments challenging not only methodological, but also ontological and causal reductionism. This argumentation provides a crucial philosophical foundation for the science/theology dialogue. However, a closer examination shows that proponents of EM do not present a unified and consistent definition of DC. Moreover, they find it difficult to prove that higher‐order properties can be causally significant without violating the causal laws that operate at lower physical levels. They also face the problem of circularity and incoherence in their explanation. In our article we show that these problems can be overcome only if DC is understood in terms of formal rather than physical (efficient) causality. This breakdown of causal monism in science opens a way to the retrieval of the fourfold Aristotelian notion of causality.     

When believing is seeing: The role of predictions in shaping visual perception

The study investigated the influence of predictions on perception—in particular, how strong but erroneous prediction coupled with poor sensory data can trigger misperceptions. Using signal detection, we tested whether predictions induced by a semantic cue change the recognition threshold (criterion) or the subjectively perceived differences between stimuli (sensitivity). In a series of 3 experiments, participants observed pictures of (a) real objects distorted to various extents (targets), (b) noise with elements corresponding to meaningful objects (foils), or (c) nonsense images (noise). Stimuli were preceded either by a semantic cue or by a blank screen with equal probability. Presence of the cue resulted in a more liberal criterion, but only for targets and foils. The cue decreased sensitivity between the distorted targets, but increased sensitivity between the targets and noise—that is, the cue increased between-class differences, but decreased within-class differences. When there was no correspondence between prediction and the sensory input, prediction actually increased the chances of correctly rejecting noise. The influence of the cue was strongest for the moderately distorted targets and foils—when uncertainty related to the bottom-up input was the highest.